November 2013 – Page 4 – U.S. to 1877

November 13, 2013

Texas Annexation and Polk

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Since we read about Polk this week, I thought ya’ll might enjoy this song about his presidency:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StTiCU_fqCg

I found the annexation of Texas to be an interesting story, particularly the variety of reasons supporting and opposing it. Annexation appealed to several groups of people for a variety of reasons. Manifest Destiny appeared as a means of spreading democracy and American ideals onto the rest of the continent, and the expansionists believed that democracy “was a universal value that should- and could- rule the world” (Wilentz 296). Additionally, bringing Texas into the Union could defend against Great Britain’s imperial powers. Houston was considering joining with England after the United States rejected annexing them the first time (298). People such as Upshur and Andrew Jackson supported annexation as “the only practical check on Britain’s ambitions” (295). Third, Southern slaveholders approved of this move because it would expand their influence. However, slavery also affected opposing arguments. The anti-slavery advocates feared that Texas would offer too much power to the South. Additionally, some of the eastern slaveholders also opposed Texas annexation because it would cause a westward diffusion of slaves and lessen the consolidation of power on the Southern east coast. Finally, others were opposed to Texas entering the union because it would bring on a war with Mexico.

On either side of the issue, slavery and war came into play. Some wanted to avoid the spread of slavery; others wanted to spread their slave influence. Some people wanted to avoid a war with Mexico; others wanted to combat English imperialism.

Polk aligned with those that saw Texas annexation as an important move to protect against Great Britain. Rather than associating himself with the spread of slavery and risking alienation from anti-slavery advocates, his pro-annexation stance was based on protecting the United States from the English and spreading democratic values westward. As a classmate mentioned in his post (spedwards), Polk did not have the intention of favoring one group over the other, but Texas unfortunately ended up becoming an issue about slavery.

November 13, 2013

The Modern Whigs: Destined for a comeback?

On November 5, a registered member of the Modern Whig party was elected to a relatively unimportant, albeit official and public office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Sources say that this is the first Whig to be elected to office in 160 to 150 years. When asked “Why the Whigs?” the electee, Robert “Heshy” Bucholz, responded that he found the party to be a sensible middle ground given America’s current bipartisan atmosphere. The party was founded, or re-founded, in 2007 and now has upwards of 30,000 members. Though it is interesting to consider that such an obscure party has secured public office, it is most likely just an unusual fluke in local politics and not at all indicative of a major change in thought. It seems far more likely that a more established socially liberal, financial conservative third-party political organization (ex: libertarians) will be the party to absorb potential voters for Modern Whigs and become successful on the national level.

Sources:

http://cnsnews.com/news/article/philadelphia-voters-elect-whig-public-office
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/07/whigs-win-for-first-time-in-150-years.html

November 13, 2013

James K. Polk: Expanding Land and Sectionalism

As President, James K. Polk was a devout Jacksonian democrat with a steadfast goal to annex new land into the Union. By expanding territory, Polk believed that a nation-wide belief in manifest destiny could eradicate the sectional disagreements that had recently emerged. Unfortunately for Polk, this plan backfired. Northern abolitionists believed that an expansion in land, also meant an expansion of the “slaveholder’s democracy” (311). This dispute led to even more tension between northern and southern states concerning the debate on slavery. In these chapters, Wilentz seems to always pair expansion and slavery together. The nation had become much more political than in earlier years and many debates arose regarding the governance of new land (slavery being the most debated topic). Because the United States was a democratic society, citizens wanted the new states to have characteristics were parallel to their beliefs. Soon, the debate on slavery enveloped the nation’s goals to expand and widened the gap between north and south. It is ironic that the frontier used to be a uniting feature of the United States, giving citizens a common goal of settling the lesser-known areas of continent and an overall feeling of nationalism. Now, people were so sectionalized and stubborn that expansion only led to more debates.

Wilentz characterizes the increased hostility between north and south during this time as a “mutual misunderstanding between Polk and his critics” (311). I agree with this statement. Polk had no intention to favor a side with his expansion policies. He was just following his Jacksonian democratic ideals of expanding the nation’s territory, and by doing so, its scope. I do think Polk could have tried harder to settle political tensions instead of focusing so much on foreign policy. But at this point in American history, I believe there was too much tension built up over regional practices that a president at this time could not do anything to successfully end the sectionalism in the states. At this point, the north and south were divided and no particular plan could appease both sides.

November 13, 2013

Wilentz’s treatment of Calhoun

The issue of Wilentz’s treatment of his historical “characters” rises once again in chapters 17-2o in The Rise of American Democracy. I think it is interesting to note the way in which Wilentz treats the “characters” in his book, specifically his vilification of John C. Calhoun. In many ways the archetypical Southern Democrat, it is clear that Calhoun was not Wilentz’s ideal political representative. However, Wilentz could do much more to disguise his bias for the purpose of creating an accurate and trustworthy historical narrative. The language with which Wilentz describes Calhoun’s actions is much more negatively connotated than the language he uses for Jackson, or virtually any other politician. For example, where other politicians “take action” or “attempt” to do something, Calhoun does much more negative things–for example, on page 241, Wilentz describes Calhoun’s actions in the following manner: “John C. Calhoun hatched a scheme that would again put him in contention for the presidency. He would not join the Whigs but instead find ways to manipulate the Democrats. His plan: ally with northern Democrats, beat down the Yankee financiers and manufacturers, and then capture the Democracy–and the national government–for the south” (emphasis mine). Here, Calhoun is portrayed as ill-willing, scheming, and untrustworthy. In Chris’s post, he manages to describe Calhoun and his allies fairly, avoiding the bias that Wilentz inserts into his writing. No other political figure is characterized as negatively as Calhoun in Wilentz’s work. Perhaps Calhoun deserves this treatment, but I would assert that these extreme descriptions do not have a place in academic writing intended to give a well-rounded view of the democracy and its rise in America.

November 12, 2013

Wilentz, Ch. 14: Jacksonian Democracy, Delivered With Force

Sherwood Callaway

HIS 141, Blog Post 7

Jackson’s vision of democracy was implemented with force, and predictably, the result was destruction. The two subjects that best characterize this phenomenon are indian removal and the bank war, both of which Wilentz covers in chapter 14.

Indian Removal was a violent and clumsy process. He pursued it to please his constituency, much of whom resided in areas of population growth and frontier expansion. And although the government desperately needed to implement national Indian policy, Jackson’s was a crude proposal. The stories vary, but in every case, moving Indians across the country was inefficient and cost unnecessary lives. In some cases the natives responded violently, as in the Black Hawk War and the Seminole War. In other cases the natives attempted to deal with the Americans on their on terms, through the courts. In Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia they were defeated “when Chief Justice John Marshall declared…that because the Cherokees were a “domestic dependent nation,” they lacked standing to sue” (223). Worcester v. Georgia had a more promising result, in which Marshall declared that “the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community, occupying its own territory”” (223). But ultimately, legislators had little tolerance for even those Indians who were most similar to whites.

In the case of the bank, Jackson vehemently sought its destruction, because he thought it favored northeastern states over western and southern states, and because it seemed to serve only to make the rich richer. He managed to quash its rechartering, and withdraw funds from it, thereby rendering the institution impotent. Striking against state banks as well, he passed the Specie Circular, which demanded that federal lands be bought with gold or silver. Suddenly, the paper currency issued by these state banks became worthless, and speculators demanded specie in exchange—specie that the banks did not have. Ultimately, Jackson’s violent dismembering of banking within the US spiraled the country into panic and recession, and left the government ill equipped to deal with financial matters.

By the time Jackson’s presidency ended, his successor was left with a real mixed bag. Indian Removal had been a long and costly process, and the Specie Circular had incited a national financial crisis. Jackson’s constituency had degraded and Van Buren was forced to establish political friendships upon different principles, as well as make new allies altogether. Frontiers people disliked the restrictions of Jackson’s Specie Circular, Southerners objected to the tariff that Jackson had defended, and the planter aristocracy was upset with the loss of the BUS. Despite the mistakes of his predecessor, Van Buren was able to win his election by gaining a popular reputation amongst southerners as “eager to mollify southern slaveholders and silence the abolitionists” (236). Hard to believe.

November 11, 2013

A Divided Democracy

Beginning with the Nullification Crises, the Tariff of 1828, and the Bank War, Wilentz illustrates the growing internal rifts within the Democratic Party, especially between Andrew Jackson and his Vice President, John C. Calhoun. United opposition against Jackson resulted in the emergence of the Whig Party, which would eventually overtake the Democratic Party in the election of 1840.

Chris argues in his post, “This idea of inherited guilt attempts to relieve Van Buren of blame, even though the panic of 1837 happened directly under Van Buren’s leadership.” I do not necessarily agree with this statement, for Wilentz is right in that Jackson’s Specie Circular led to the financial crash of 1837, just as Martin Van Buren happened to take office. The requirement of gold or silver payments to purchase federal land resulted in the loss of millions of dollars worth of paper money; land sales called for a shift to hard money that speculators just did not have. “The largest New York City banks lost more than ten million dollars in federal deposits and saw their specie reserves drop from 5.9 million dollars in August 1835 to 1.5 million dollars by May 1837” (Wilentz 231). Similar to the way George Bush left President Obama to deal with immense financial issues exacerbated by Bush’s presidency, I believe Wilentz is correct in characterizing the Panic of 1837 as Van Buren’s inherited dilemma from Jackson’s presidency.

Martin Van Buren’s attempt to compromise and gain supporters ultimately backfired as it further fueled the antislavery movement. Calhoun returning to the Democratic Party had pressured Van Buren into appeasing him and the proslavery southern Democrats. To the antislavery northern Whigs and abolitionists, Martin Van Buren appeared to be an advocate of slavery, something he was trying to avoid the entire time. His willingness to support slave-owners presents a contradictory image of Democracy as the party of the common farmer, yet that still defends the interests of the wealthy slave-owners. “Van Buren’s and the Democrats’ political difficulties exposed, once again, the deepening contradictions and dilemmas of Jacksonian egalitarianism” (252). This brings us back to the political debate over not only racial divisions, but also over socioeconomic divisions fueling the abolitionist movement.

November 11, 2013

The Adventures of Andrew Jackson and the Invisible Hand

We find much of WIllentz’s commentary on Andrew Jackson and the American economic system within his description of the battle between Andrew Jackson and the Bank of the United States (BUS) and the following aftermath. Generally, this chapter describes Andrew Jackson as a man of contradiction, especially in his populist stance. WIllentz tells us that Jackson fought for the liberation of the people and the government from the national bank, so that citizens could have the most direct access to a monetary system which funded a domestic economic system that was held accountable by the people. However, to reach these goals which are almost indicative of classical liberalism, Jackson engaged in major political manipulation which even led him to a censure. For someone who calls himself populist, this was a very realist maneuver.

Willentx goes on to state all of the problems which came about after the national bank was slain, which the changeover to coin currency from paper money and the massive levels of speculation which swept over the country before any benefit from the new system could take effect. Using the town of Woodberry, where ‘economic trauma’ took place due to land speculations and the new currency, many of Jackson’s supporters during the war on the bank began to criticize him for his ‘economic experiments’ but this whole debawkle just raises the question of just how much control does the president have over the economy? In most cases one could argue that the president has almost no control. In Jackson’s case, one could argue that the combination of taking land from the Native Americans and screwing with the currency was a perfect storm caused by Jackson himself. Some could argue that there was no way that speculation could get s out of control and there was no way for Jackson to know that. Magilland makes a good point in that this type of history tends to repeat itself, and by extension of parties fighting all the time always the misconception that the president is solely responsible for the state of the economy has arisen because the issue is almost constantly being politicized.

November 11, 2013

Everybody is Whiggin’ Out

Wilentz, in Chapter 16, discusses the Whig movement and the popularity of the Whigs in the mid 1830s to early 40s. These New School Whigs were a diverse combination of Anti-Masons, politicians from the Old Northwest and western states, former Jacksonians in the South, and northern Whigs. Although the regional differences of the Whig party were diverse the Whig party was able to establish a national system of anti-Jackson newspapers and campaigning. The Whigs attacked Jacksonian corruption. Whigs based their platform on self-improvement and reform. The self-reform/improvement aspect and emphasis of moral choice grew out of the Second Great Awakening. Whigs were most popular in the areas where the Second Great Awakening was most popular and intense. The Whigs abandoned the division between classes and turned the national debate into the struggle between basic morals and those who rejected them. Although Clay drew large crowds in New England and appealed to the southern Whigs, William Henry Harrison became the party’s go to candidate for the election of 1840. The Whigs attacked Van Buren and the Democrats during the 1840 presidential election campaign. Harrison traveled the country formally delivering campaign speeches, breaking the precedence. On page 263, Wilentz said, “the Whig campaign reformulated their broader economic, cultural, and moral precepts and packaged them for the voters.” To me, the Whig party and their campaign in the election of 1840 was more like a modern day campaign than any other in the Era of the New Republic. The Whigs worked to include all different demographics, including women, even though they didn’t have the right to vote. The Whigs understood women’s influence on the male voters. The extremely high voter turn out in the election of 1840 set a record (still unbroken). As WIROBERTSON said in his post (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/dishevelled-democracy/), the triumph in the 1840 presidential election only delayed the sure downfall of the Whig party. The Whig party was a fragile unit, but held it together long enough to achieve greatness.

November 11, 2013

We Can’t Stop, We Won’t Stop

While reading chapters 14-16 of Wilentz, the belief that history is to repeat itself kept popping into my head. These chapters seemed to echo all of the American history I have read about and am living. The idea of manipulative political parties fighting each other, whether it is Whigs and Jacksonian-democrats or democrats and republicans, is not foreign to us. Nor is the fight for race relations. At the time of Jackson, Van Buren, Calhoun, etc. the fight was over slavery, but race issues stood flood our computers and television sets daily. William Lloyd Garrison even brings women into the equation, which is a conflict that pervades every aspect of politics today.

In addition, the Whig party struggles with Van Buren dominating the polls with his popularity. ALKAROUT mentions this through democratization by saying, “The party’s attempts at democratization demonstrate that the party was more or less obligated to reshape itself if they desired to maintain political relevance.” I would say this is true for today’s politics as well. I believe we are left with two parties, one who is popular and the other realizing that it will not win an election without changing some views.

Then, of course, there is this economic debate over banks and money. At the time, Jackson was still shutting down most of the popularly approved ideas regarding the banks and any money relations. We see at this time a large debate over the use of gold vs. paper money and the gold standard. As gold and silver ran low, there was an issue over money and many politicians of the time referenced paper money as a solution. Many other politicians saw the threat of inflation through paper money, something that has been considered since we picked up the dollar. A shipment of gold from Britain would quell their uneasiness for a short time, but as we now, the shift to paper money would occur eventually.

From the economic crisis of months and years past to the on going disagreement and refusing to settle between the democratic and republican parties, I would not go as far as to say that we are mirroring the past, or repeating it, but it important to note that we are still fighting the same things. Process of great strides has been made but the issues still remain. My question is whether or not we will ever move past these issues. My answer- in a democracy, I am not sure we ever will.

November 11, 2013

Democratization of the Whig Party

The topic from Tuesday’s reading that was particularly compelling was the democratization of the Whig Party prior to the 1840 election. Our classmate Will Robertson rightfully characterized the Whig party as being “grounded solely in their opposition to Jackson,” which threatened their unity as a party. However, I found that the reading for Tuesday, namely chapter 16, highlighted how the Whig party used their vehement distaste for Jacksonian politics to strategically unite themselves by changing their party’s ideals in an attempt to gain power.

Will highlighted the issue of hypocrisy in the Democratic Party to which the Whig party opportunistically responded. He stated that, “in its effort to appease voters from all areas and walks of life, the Democratic party under Jackson and Van Buren featured striking hypocrisies.” (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/dishevelled-democracy/).Horace Greeley—a key addition to the Whig party after they began to consolidate their party to include more than just “high-toned Whigs”—felt that Whiggery would be able to “confound Democratic hypocrisy and uplift the masses” (Wilentz, 253-254).

The party’s attempts at democratization demonstrated that the party was more or less obligated to reshape itself if they desired to maintain political relevance. Van Buren, the Whig party realized, was popular among the people “Not so much for him as for the principle they suppose he represents. That principle is Democracy” (Seward, quoted by Wilentz, 253). As a direct response to this American desire for democracy, the Whig party revolutionized American conservatism (Wilentz, 253).

The way Wilentz characterized the Whigs attitudes of humanitarianism was rather humorous, highlighting the condescending tone they adopted when appealing to more radical-minded voters who sympathized with oppressed groups. The Whig party chose to focus “on relieving the misery of battered wives, abused blacks, and others who suffered deliberately inflicted hardship and pain” and on creating a benevolent society of people who would adopt “an affectionate regard for the lowliest of God’s creatures” (Wilentz, 257). Despite the haughtiness of the rhetoric surrounding their humanitarianism, there is no denying the progress that this shift in mindset was, especially since many Whigs were moved by the “benevolent impulse” to contribute to antislavery work (Wilentz, 258).

In addition to highlighting corruption and hypocrisy within the opposing party, the Whigs also exemplified impressive strategy in their ability to spin criticism in their favor. The harsh ‘hard cider and log cabin’ comment supposedly delivered by Clay was used by Whig leaders to “claim to be paragons of plain rustic virtue while condemning the Democrats as scornful, out-of-touch politicos” (Wilentz, 260).

I felt this reading was a bit more readable than some previous chapters in which the jargon creates a bit of an obstacle for readers who are less familiar with the concepts of the discussion. However, I feel Wilentz did a fantastic job in outlining the changes in the Whig party and the reasons behind them, guiding the reader clearly through the course of events.