Bank – U.S. to 1877

November 12, 2013

Wilentz, Ch. 14: Jacksonian Democracy, Delivered With Force

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Sherwood Callaway

HIS 141, Blog Post 7

Jackson’s vision of democracy was implemented with force, and predictably, the result was destruction. The two subjects that best characterize this phenomenon are indian removal and the bank war, both of which Wilentz covers in chapter 14.

Indian Removal was a violent and clumsy process. He pursued it to please his constituency, much of whom resided in areas of population growth and frontier expansion. And although the government desperately needed to implement national Indian policy, Jackson’s was a crude proposal. The stories vary, but in every case, moving Indians across the country was inefficient and cost unnecessary lives. In some cases the natives responded violently, as in the Black Hawk War and the Seminole War. In other cases the natives attempted to deal with the Americans on their on terms, through the courts. In Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia they were defeated “when Chief Justice John Marshall declared…that because the Cherokees were a “domestic dependent nation,” they lacked standing to sue” (223). Worcester v. Georgia had a more promising result, in which Marshall declared that “the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community, occupying its own territory”” (223). But ultimately, legislators had little tolerance for even those Indians who were most similar to whites.

In the case of the bank, Jackson vehemently sought its destruction, because he thought it favored northeastern states over western and southern states, and because it seemed to serve only to make the rich richer. He managed to quash its rechartering, and withdraw funds from it, thereby rendering the institution impotent. Striking against state banks as well, he passed the Specie Circular, which demanded that federal lands be bought with gold or silver. Suddenly, the paper currency issued by these state banks became worthless, and speculators demanded specie in exchange—specie that the banks did not have. Ultimately, Jackson’s violent dismembering of banking within the US spiraled the country into panic and recession, and left the government ill equipped to deal with financial matters.

By the time Jackson’s presidency ended, his successor was left with a real mixed bag. Indian Removal had been a long and costly process, and the Specie Circular had incited a national financial crisis. Jackson’s constituency had degraded and Van Buren was forced to establish political friendships upon different principles, as well as make new allies altogether. Frontiers people disliked the restrictions of Jackson’s Specie Circular, Southerners objected to the tariff that Jackson had defended, and the planter aristocracy was upset with the loss of the BUS. Despite the mistakes of his predecessor, Van Buren was able to win his election by gaining a popular reputation amongst southerners as “eager to mollify southern slaveholders and silence the abolitionists” (236). Hard to believe.

November 11, 2013

The Adventures of Andrew Jackson and the Invisible Hand

We find much of WIllentz’s commentary on Andrew Jackson and the American economic system within his description of the battle between Andrew Jackson and the Bank of the United States (BUS) and the following aftermath. Generally, this chapter describes Andrew Jackson as a man of contradiction, especially in his populist stance. WIllentz tells us that Jackson fought for the liberation of the people and the government from the national bank, so that citizens could have the most direct access to a monetary system which funded a domestic economic system that was held accountable by the people. However, to reach these goals which are almost indicative of classical liberalism, Jackson engaged in major political manipulation which even led him to a censure. For someone who calls himself populist, this was a very realist maneuver.

Willentx goes on to state all of the problems which came about after the national bank was slain, which the changeover to coin currency from paper money and the massive levels of speculation which swept over the country before any benefit from the new system could take effect. Using the town of Woodberry, where ‘economic trauma’ took place due to land speculations and the new currency, many of Jackson’s supporters during the war on the bank began to criticize him for his ‘economic experiments’ but this whole debawkle just raises the question of just how much control does the president have over the economy? In most cases one could argue that the president has almost no control. In Jackson’s case, one could argue that the combination of taking land from the Native Americans and screwing with the currency was a perfect storm caused by Jackson himself. Some could argue that there was no way that speculation could get s out of control and there was no way for Jackson to know that. Magilland makes a good point in that this type of history tends to repeat itself, and by extension of parties fighting all the time always the misconception that the president is solely responsible for the state of the economy has arisen because the issue is almost constantly being politicized.

November 6, 2013

Abolition, the Bank, and Jackson

Wilentz in chapter thirteen divides this chapter into three sections: the Bank, Abolition, and Unions. May I start by saying I feel that Wilentz’s combination of these three topics takes away from their significance and in a way confuses me. The differing time periods and the attempt to tie these instances together seem unnecessary.
However, in the beginning of the chapter Wilentz focuses on Jackson’s forceful hand in getting his way, yet does not comment on whether Jackson had the authority to do so or not. Jackson appointed a new secretary of the treasury “after the cabinet reshuffle” in response to the House of Representative’s obstruction to Jackson’s bank deposit removal plan. Because Jackson could not pass this plan through the House, he appointed William John Duane to Secretary of Treasury to attempt to fix this problem. Again upset at not getting his will, Jackson promptly fired Duane and appointed yet another Secretary of Treasury to carry out his orders. Finally, Roger Taney the next Secretary of Treasury removed the federal deposits as Jackson ordered (Wilentz 207-209). Wilentz in this portion of the chapter refrains from commenting too harshly on Jackson’s debatable use of his presidential powers. Which poses the question “Did Jackson overstep his presidential powers?”
Next, I found it was interesting how systrauss (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/abolition-and-the-second-great-awakening/) points out Wilentz’s statement about the free black men separating themselves from the regular abolitionist movement. This in my opinion sets apart the abolitionists who believed in abolition based upon moral background and those who did not. Thus, as Davis stated, it is important to differentiate between the moral abolitionist and the spiritual abolitionists. Thus, the abolitionist movement may have been hindered in this way that the abolitionist movement was divided in itself. If the party came to agreement to collaborate together then there may have been a more effective abolitionist movement.