Lincoln – Page 2 – U.S. to 1877

December 2, 2013

Sending Not Peace But A Sword

Warning: Undefined variable $num in /home/shroutdo/public_html/courses/wp-content/plugins/single-categories/single_categories.php on line 126

Warning: Undefined variable $posts_num in /home/shroutdo/public_html/courses/wp-content/plugins/single-categories/single_categories.php on line 127

Reading what Wilentz had to say about the politics and events leading up to the civil war was much more invigorating than usual. Come of the previous chapters explored high politics, and though well-written, failed to keep my attention. However, these chapters were rather interesting, especially the section about John Brown.

John Brown’s plans for raiding Harpers Ferry were foolish. However, the extent to which his strategy was unrealistic leads me to believe that he had a feeling he’d be exchanging “the role of an avenging commander-in-chief for that of a martyr” (Wilentz, 423). Uncommitted to actually being successful in his raiding efforts, he seemed to know that his actions served more as an ideological example for abolitionists. He knew that true change within “this slave country” would “never be purged away; but with Blood” meaning that his insurrection was only a glimpse of what was to come in the clash between the North and South.

Evfarese mentioned in their post that “many thought that it might occur, but Brown’s violent actions and his prophecy surely convinced a large amount of Americans that secession and war was in the future.” As my classmate pointed out, John Brown’s actions precipitated the public’s realization that war was imminent given the growing tensions between the North and South.

It was ironic that Brown’s actions, meant to exemplify his fundamental hatred for the institution of slavery, actually made southern slave owners believe that their slaves were content with slavery (Wilentz, 425). Wilentz brought up a point that I had never previously considered. After John Brown’s failed revolution, he was almost universally ridiculed for his hastiness. But as a result of this widespread disapproval of his actions, the door was opened for more moderate Republicans such as Abraham Lincoln to ascend to political power (Wilentz, 425). Although Brown would have rejected the more moderate route taken by Lincoln, the same goal of abolition was achieved in the end. Although the election of Lincoln is most often cited as the greatest provocation of the South’s secession (and perhaps it is) the events such as John Brown’s raid should also be cited to give context of the rising tension and chaos in the nation leading up to the election of 1860.

December 1, 2013

Politics of Secession

The politics surrounding the rapid secession of southern states seems at first to be fairly simple. The south wanted to protect the institution of slavery which they felt the north was attempting to eradicate from the United States. The fallout of Lincoln’s election as president, however reveals a level of complexity which is often overlooked in textbooks. For example, many non-slaveholders in the south were opposed to immediate secession and there was even division among secessionists about the best way to go about seceding from the union. Some radicals wanted to secede immediately while others wanted to give Lincoln’s moderate stance a chance. Clearly the south was not united, at least in the beginning, in secession. It was surprising that the radical fire eaters were able to successfully manipulate the convention delegate elections of so many southern states to ensure that secession occurred. The explanation for this, one newspaper stated was in the “hopelessness of preserving the union,” which “made disunionists, since the election, of thousands of Conservative and Union men” (Wilentz 438). But even so, with the wide variety of opinions both in the north and the south, how was it that the fire-eaters were able to gain such great influence over the session of the southern states?

I also found Wilentz’s treatment of Lincoln interesting, because he emphasized the political side of Lincoln which is often left out in descriptions of him. Although he is often idealized today, Lincoln had to be politically savvy and moderate in order to function effectively during this highly divided period of American history. As Sylvia points out, despite the idealization of Lincoln as a moral political figure in our history, “he still had to be a politician” (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/abraham-lincoln-the-final-straw-for-southerners/). Just like southern secessionists strove to appear more moderate in order to appease and win over moderates, especially in border states, so to did Lincoln have to remain moderate in his political stances.

November 20, 2013

The Troublesome British and Not so Honest Abe

In Chapter 14 of Inhuman Bondage, Davis discusses American foreign policy, the Missouri Crisis, the impact of Britain’s emancipation in the Caribbean on the United States, and the Lincoln-Douglas debates in the late 1850s. A major theme of the chapter that stood out to me was Davis’s description of Britain’s emancipation and its impact on the South. As the abolitionist movement in Britain gained momentum emancipation seemed evident, Southerns became paranoid that the British emancipation in the Caribbean could spread to parts of North America (Davis, 269). In fact, many Southerns believed that Britain was attempting to spread their abolitionist ideas throughout the world as a new form of imperialism. The newfound American animosity toward Britain at this time is demonstrated best by people who unintentionally supported political movements that were deemed to be in the best interest of Britain being condemned for preventing the “westward expansion of the United States” (Davis, 271). Although it is possible for certain political movements to spread across national borders, it was highly unlikely for British lawmaking to have a significant impact on a country that very invested in a slave society as well as country where slavery was deeply engrained in its culture. Despite this, Southerns were almost certain that the “monumental emancipation bill” would foster a swift and severe revolution by the blacks (Davis, 283). Of course, no such revolution came but Southerns began blaming the British emancipation for the slaves’ refusal to work plantations and the negative impact it had on the cotton and sugar production in the South. Even after the pro-slavery Southerners’ greatest fear was eliminated, they irrationally explained their additional problems on those awful British.
Although I usually find most of Davis’s writing to be dense, I consider Davis’s discussion of the British emancipation of slavery in the Caribbean to be interesting and insightful. He provides numerous details to enhance his argument through the use of direct quotes and the citation of a primary source. Moreover, Davis is able to convey to the reader that the South was in no position to accept abolition in their own country or in neighboring territories and that they would go to war to prevent such a thing from happening. Overall, I would say that Davis’s argument of Southern paranoia of and opposition to abolition at all costs is a reasonable one and is quite effective.
Another aspect from Davis’s writing that I found interesting was his section on Abraham Lincoln. As my classmate MASPEED said, Lincoln is remembered as a man who believed in the equality of all men and the destruction of slavery. However, Davis is able to demonstrate how Lincoln’s words and tone were changed when he found himself running for political office. Rather than haphazardly speaking of a nation where blacks and whites are politically equal, he diluted his message to one of blacks and whites deserving the natural rights guaranteed by the declaration of independence. Davis is able to show Lincoln’s skill as politician as well as his awareness that some of his inner convictions could cause him lose him an election.

November 20, 2013

Lincoln, Moral Idol, Yet Still A Politician

In Inhumane Bondage, Davis gives a broader, less detailed account of history than Wilentz ever does. Although arguably more objective, one can find points to analyze and break down. One thing that stood out to me was the characterization of Lincoln and his stance while running against Douglas. Historically, we see Lincoln as the just idol, always behind equal rights and abolition. One would not think he considered the African American race as inferior morally and intellectually. In reality, Lincoln might have been the perfectly moral character we are taught about in elementary school. But when standing behind the podium or on the political stump, he did not speak in absolutes and extremes. Though he claimed slavery was wrong, he “repeatedly acknowledged that the federal government could not interfere with slavery in the existing states” (Davis 290). So did Lincoln think the Deep South should immediately rid itself of slavery? No. He supported gradual abolition and “…wholly rejected the idea of ‘perfect social and political equality with the negro'” (Davis 290). Is this the Abe Lincoln we all know and revere as a man to model your moral standards after? Among these factors, I still say yes. These questionable quotes don’t necessarily reflect Lincoln’s heart. He is a politician after all and politicians that take extreme stances very rarely are successful. As a politician, especially a Senate and Presidential candidate, Lincoln had to attempt to appeal to more people than those who mirrored his views exactly. If he had run on a promise for the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln would not have an enormous copy of himself sitting in a chair in DC today. Since I am taking a political science class this semester, I recognized and considered the way politicians must be vague and avoid absolutes while running. Lincoln obviously did this and later, stimulated by the secessions all over the south, let out his true, deeply embedded moral motivations.

I look forward to seeing what else Davis has to say about Lincoln’s actions and positions on racial equality because I know we haven’t seen the end at the conclusion of chapter fourteen.

*Note: With the new way we are doing blogs, there are none with similar subjects to mine. I found no way to connect my blog to another’s. I will, however, state that I agree with SPEDWARDS in their post that it was quite interesting that the press would characterize the Craft Affair as a start to a civil war. That seems very extreme and not well placed by the press.

November 18, 2013

America’s Slavery Issues aren’t Black and White

David R. Roediger and John Ashworth discuss the implications and the debate over the term “White Slavery” and how it was used in mid-19th century America. This term, as Roediger says, sparked when the editor of The Plebeian, Levi Slamm, organized a protest referred to as the “coffin handbill protest” using pamphlets that harshly depicted white laborers as slaves to the industrialized wage system. (Roediger 347) However, while Roediger is focused on attempting to define the phrases “white slavery,” “wage slavery,” or “slavery of wages,” I believe Ashworth successfully shows that the issue of wage slavery was merely pinned onto the issue of, as Roediger calls it, chattel slavery and detracts from the abolitionist movement.

As Roediger put it on page 346, “The advantages of the phrase white slavery over wage slavery or slavery of wages lay in the former term’s vagueness and in its whiteness.” Using these words, he says, allowed radical democrats to “cast” abolitionists, free blacks, bankers, factory owners and prison labor, “as villains in a loose plot to enslave white workers.” The idea being democrats could unite their supporters under the term “white slavery,” and use it to attack the wage system. However, this is inherently flawed because the issues of black slavery and the wage system’s oppression are fundamentally different. Roediger admits this contradiction on page 347. He says, “The tendency to indict white slavery and to support Black slavery was especially strong [in New York].” At its core, a white slave abolitionist may very well attack the wage system but not necessarily oppose black slavery, and I think Roediger becomes too focused on defining the different terms and misses this larger picture. As Will pointed out in his blog post, the comparison of a white and a black slave, where the black man is protected, clothed, and fed by his slaver while the white man is alone and overburdened by his multiple “masters,” is a biased and rationalized excuse. Roediger admits in his conclusion, “Chattel slavery was, in this view, better than white slavery, a point fraught with proslavery paternalist implications and not lost on the southern editors who reprinted articles carrying such opinions.”

The problem with Roediger’s essay, as I said before, is that he is misguided in his argument. The coupling of wage slavery with black slavery was detrimental to the abolitionist movement and even to white slavery-abolitionists. For example, because of the comparison of white and black slaves, white workers tried to avoid being associated with African-Americans and bigoted slurs started appearing in the American language. Suddenly, workers who were not preforming well were called “white niggers,” and described as “working like a nigger.”(343) This shows, I think, how linking the wage system battle to slavery hurt the American society and the abolitionist movement in the long run; especially considering that these slurs were still used in America during the Jim-Crow years after the civil war.

In comparison, Ashworth does a better job at looking at the bigger picture. As he quotes Charles Sumner coining a phrase to refer to southern slavery as “labor without wages,” Ashworth shows us that some individuals were trying to point out the injustice in coupling both issues. Sumner was trying to illustrate to his readers that the slave system was more oppressive than the wage system and that the issues were not remotely on the same level. Ashworth asserts that Lincoln realized the underlying issues in both white and black slavery, and rather than trying to solve both together, “Lincoln emphasized social mobility.” (354) Lincoln believed that the “American greatness” could be attributed to the fact that “every man can make himself” in the U.S.

Ashworth describes Lincoln as someone who fought for “equal privileges in the race of life,” and not someone who would fight against the apparent wage slave oppression. Lincoln believed this labor system was part of what made America great; that it contributed to the “American dream” ideal. Ashworth concludes that Lincoln’s fundamental change in American Politics was based on the idea of social mobility, the freedom of each individual to make a life for himself, and the “relationship between the employer and employee.” According to Ashworth, this relationship is “now hailed as a quintessential characteristic of a “free” society. There it remains today.” (357) Rather than attempting to define and solve the wage crisis as Roediger tries to, Ashworth proves to us with Lincoln’s example that the issues were separate and should have been treated as such.