South – U.S. to 1877

December 3, 2013

After the Civil War

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The end of the Civil War brought about a new type of America. Although the war was still fresh in everyone’s minds, citizens, particularly of the North, tried to look past that and rebuild their country. It is important to note that many people in the South were unhappy with the way the war ended and thus still did not full support the United States. JANEWTON notes how Davis mentions that t the country came to terms with the end of the civil war. While this may be the case in the North and in the middle states, most members of the deep South most likely felt otherwise. Imagine having your entire livelihood taken away from you, your main source of income gone. For many in the South the ending of the war and the emancipation of enslaved people was not something they could come to terms with. In my studies in previous years I learned how guerrilla warfare continued in states like Missouri and Kansas, where there were both Confederate and Union sympathizers. Most of these altercations were instigated by angry ex-Confederates so I think to say that the entire nation was at peace with the end of the war would be misguided.

I do think however that the end of the war went better than it could have. Despite some angry southerners, people seemed to to adjust well to this new slaveless nation. Additionally, and rightfully so, President Lincoln came out looking like a hero to all people of the North and formerly enslaved people. The South was also in slightly better spirits after the war because the North was somewhat merciful in their victory. As a clever way to appease some southerners, the North allowed the South to rebuild and create sort of a new identity. This worked to keep relations between the two regions peaceful. This sort of liberty and trust that the North afforded the South after the war was responsible for keeping the South content and as a result could be a reason why the South did not act against the Union again.

December 3, 2013

Effects of the Civil War

In Chapter 15 of Inhuman Bondage, David Davis writes about the Civil War and describes the lasting impact it had on the United States. The most interesting aspect of Davis’ writing in this chapter, was to me, how the country came to terms with the war after it was over. With the North winning, slavery was effectively finished in the U.S. and President Lincoln was heralded as a hero. Davis gives an example of an African American man kneeling to the President during an instance of slaves being freed. Lincoln responded by telling the man “don’t kneel to me”(298). This is the type of characterization of Lincoln that I have come to expect. He is often portrayed as a beacon of moral superiority and hero of sorts. Davis writing in this section is consistent with that narrative. Another interesting aspect of the chapter was how the North was able to keep the Civil War deemed a “good war” (299) by not decimating the south after it was over. This is in part because it was necessary in keeping the country together. Robbie Mangone discusses this more in his blog post (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/a-necessary-evil/). In addition, Davis says that another reason it was deemed a good war is that the North didn’t unleash “full vengeance” on the states that had seceded and kept blacks from taking over parts of the south. He also goes on to explain that the North allowed the south to essentially recreate their own identity after the war was over which was huge in keeping tensions between the North and South at a minimum. This is something I hadn’t ever considered before. After a war of that magnitude, it is safe to assume that the South had deep-seated feelings of resentment and hatred for the North. Northerners had to act delicately in order to restore the country to where it needed to be. It was tremendously important that they handled the situation this way and I like that Davis included this in his writing.

Another important point Davis brings up in his writing is the shrewdness of President Lincoln during the war. He describes the President as “keenly aware” (309) of how delicate the issue of slavery still was during the war. The President was sure to act carefully and made sure that his Emancipation Proclamation did not include slaves from Union states like Maryland. This turned out to be a brilliant tactical move, helping the North assure victory. I think Davis did a very nice job throughout the chapter of characterizing the President, describing his impact on the outcome of the war and explaining exactly how significant this war was on the development of the country.

December 1, 2013

Leading up to Secession

Many events took part in factoring into the decision for South Carolina so secede from the Union. Of course they had been upset for quite some time with the abolitionists in the north and they were starting to feel that few if not no northerners could be trusted to hold represent them as president. They were shocked to see how far some northerners would go to see abolition when John Brown took hostage a federal armory. He had hoped to have many more people join him, especially other major figures like Frederick Douglass who firmly said no and it would be foolish to take the armory. Brown also intended to rally slaves as he went through to fight for him, but they were not very interested. Finally John Brown gave up after a day and half and was captured by Robert E. Lee. Just before his execution he wrote out his final prophecy and that was that the US was a guilty land and its crimes “will never be purged away; but with Blood.” (424) His words struck a large amount of the population who saw that maybe he war right and that a war was imminent. I think that Brown solidified the possibility of war in citizens’ heads. Many thought that it might occur, but Brown’s violent actions and his prophecy surely convinced a large amount of Americans that secession and war was in the future.

The final major event that lead to secession was the election of Abraham Lincoln into office. This election was very hard fought and caused the Democratic party to split in two, forming Northern and Southern branches. I think if anyone other than a pro-slavery president was elected, the South would surely secede. And that is exactly what happened when Lincoln was elected. ROMANGONE raises a good point regarding the fact that even though some Southern Democrats were divided on certain issues, they all stood together in opposition of Lincoln. Within the same month of Lincoln’s election South Carolina had seceded, closely followed by many other states who would go on to form the confederacy. I think that Lincoln’s election was the tipping point of the road to secession. It was as though the idea of secession had been brewing for so long and with the 1860 election, the South finally snapped. There were many events on the road to secession, but none more important than the election of Abraham Lincoln.

November 21, 2013

The Southern Scare: Southern Fear of British Abolitionism

In Chapter 14, Davis makes the case that one of the driving forces behind the South’s fear of restriction on the expansion of slavery was British abolitionism. Davis makes the case that the south saw this British abolitionism as a new form of british control as NIPAPPAYLIOU noted. “… Southerners believed that Britain was attempting to spread their abolitionist ideas throughout the world as a new form of imperialism.” This fear of British cultural imperialism coincided with a period of vehement anti-British sentiment, which fed into anti-Federalist sentiment, as the federalists were viewed as being too pro-British. This anti-British sentiment, alongside connections between Britain and abolitionism, and a fear that Britain was seeking to collapse slave-holding economies so that their newly slave-free colonies could become competitive, lead to intense suspicion of Northern abolitionists as potentially being unpatriotic and likely to be in bed with British interests. The irony of this all was of course that, despite Britsh abolitionism and anti-British sentiment which was strongest in the south, when the Civil War finally came to the fore, Britain would consider joining the war, but on the Southern side, rather than the Northern side. Thus while Southern fear may not have been entirely unwarranted, with regards to beliefs that Britain was seeking to abolish slavery more broadly, it was almost certainly overstated.

November 20, 2013

Antebellum Southern Stubbornness

The decade leading up to the Civil War featured tenacious animosity between politicians. Southern proslavery figures constantly butted heads with their Northern counterparts, and politicians pushing for compromise had extremely limited success in appeasing both groups. In both Davis’s and Wilentz’s accounts, slavery legislation seemed to favor the South. The North appeared willing to allow slavery to continue where it already existed and simply wanted to slow or halt its expansion. The proslavery South, however, never seemed satisfied and continually pleaded for more slavery. The repeated threat of disunion revealed excessive Southern discontent and lack of adaptability.

The South came out of the Missouri Crisis with Missouri as a slave state and even maintained the possibility of more slave states in the future despite growing criticism of the institution. This criticism was even limited by the proslavery gag rule. Nonetheless, the South kept battling for more slave states, best evidenced by the blatant disregard for the Missouri compromise in the debate of Kansas’s status. David Brion Davis provided a hilarious consequence of overly aggressive pursuits for more slave influence by Jefferson Davis. Jefferson Davis’ push for “federal protection of slave property” alienated the North and split the Democratic party (293). This split allowed for Southerners’ worst nightmare to come true as Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 presidential election as the first outspoken opponent to slavery.

Southern resistance to popular sovereignty, essentially the only proposed compromise, marked the South as more stubborn. In addition, no Northern legislature prior to 1860 infringed on slaveholders’ right to own slaves. The Fugitive Slave Act, however, significantly affected and altered lives of antislavery proponents in the North. It was no surprise that this Act stirred up the strongest opposition, as it inherently imposed Southern ideals in the North. Not to mention its inhumane principles. The North seemed much more open to compromise, but this policy clearly crossed the line.

The South came off as ungrateful and greedy in antebellum politics. It had enjoyed prolonged dominance and still maintained its most prized possession, slavery. Whether its vigor stemmed from Anglophobia, as WEKING suggests (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/a-great-experiment-british-abolition-and-southern-paranoia/), racism, or sheer greed, the South should have been content with the continuation of such a controversial and widely hated practice.

November 20, 2013

The Troublesome British and Not so Honest Abe

In Chapter 14 of Inhuman Bondage, Davis discusses American foreign policy, the Missouri Crisis, the impact of Britain’s emancipation in the Caribbean on the United States, and the Lincoln-Douglas debates in the late 1850s. A major theme of the chapter that stood out to me was Davis’s description of Britain’s emancipation and its impact on the South. As the abolitionist movement in Britain gained momentum emancipation seemed evident, Southerns became paranoid that the British emancipation in the Caribbean could spread to parts of North America (Davis, 269). In fact, many Southerns believed that Britain was attempting to spread their abolitionist ideas throughout the world as a new form of imperialism. The newfound American animosity toward Britain at this time is demonstrated best by people who unintentionally supported political movements that were deemed to be in the best interest of Britain being condemned for preventing the “westward expansion of the United States” (Davis, 271). Although it is possible for certain political movements to spread across national borders, it was highly unlikely for British lawmaking to have a significant impact on a country that very invested in a slave society as well as country where slavery was deeply engrained in its culture. Despite this, Southerns were almost certain that the “monumental emancipation bill” would foster a swift and severe revolution by the blacks (Davis, 283). Of course, no such revolution came but Southerns began blaming the British emancipation for the slaves’ refusal to work plantations and the negative impact it had on the cotton and sugar production in the South. Even after the pro-slavery Southerners’ greatest fear was eliminated, they irrationally explained their additional problems on those awful British.
Although I usually find most of Davis’s writing to be dense, I consider Davis’s discussion of the British emancipation of slavery in the Caribbean to be interesting and insightful. He provides numerous details to enhance his argument through the use of direct quotes and the citation of a primary source. Moreover, Davis is able to convey to the reader that the South was in no position to accept abolition in their own country or in neighboring territories and that they would go to war to prevent such a thing from happening. Overall, I would say that Davis’s argument of Southern paranoia of and opposition to abolition at all costs is a reasonable one and is quite effective.
Another aspect from Davis’s writing that I found interesting was his section on Abraham Lincoln. As my classmate MASPEED said, Lincoln is remembered as a man who believed in the equality of all men and the destruction of slavery. However, Davis is able to demonstrate how Lincoln’s words and tone were changed when he found himself running for political office. Rather than haphazardly speaking of a nation where blacks and whites are politically equal, he diluted his message to one of blacks and whites deserving the natural rights guaranteed by the declaration of independence. Davis is able to show Lincoln’s skill as politician as well as his awareness that some of his inner convictions could cause him lose him an election.

November 20, 2013

A “Great Experiment”: British Abolition and Southern Paranoia

From the racism of John Henry Hammond to the staunch support of slavery by John Calhoun, we’ve addressed the various manifestations of the Southern proslavery ideology. But I don’t think we’ve entirely understood why such radical sentiment arose. Sure, we’ve postulated slavery’s economic incentives and the fear of slave revolts as possible motives for certain policy measures. But neither of these, I don’t think, sufficiently explain the vitriol of slavery’s Southern defenders. So, why were the proslavery ideologues so radical? While it’s certainly not a complete explanation–for proslavery radicalism in particular—I think that David Brion Davis provides a fair explanation for the rise of anti-abolitionism in the South. Great Britain, he insists, was largely responsible.

As we’ve discussed a number of times already in class, “anglophobia” was prevalent in the US for much of this period, particularly during the War of 1812 and the subsequent demise of the Federalist Party. But, as Davis points out, the pervasive opinion that Britain was “America’s ‘natural enemy'” led many to perceive British abolitionism as a veiled threat of imperialism (272). In fact, some Southern leaders, such as Robert Turnbull, feared that the rise of abolitionist sentiment in Britain in the 1820s coupled with the effects the abolition of the slave trade would drive an “entering wedge” into the public minds of non-slaveholders, leading to the destruction of plantations, human chattel, and the slave economy (281). Such fears, Davis suggests, explain why the nullification movement coincided with British abolition and were no doubt aggravated by the declaration of Lord Aberdeen, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, that “Great Britain . . . is constantly exerting herself to procure the general abolition of slavery throughout the world” (282). Humanitarianism appeared, to many Southerners, a very present threat to humanity, a British conspiracy to undue American prosperity.

As abolitionist sentiment slowly disseminated into the Northeast, Southern antipathy escalated as the “Northeast was becoming a perfect replica of the British enemy” (286). Not only had Northern states—with the exceptions of Delaware and Maryland—abolished slavery but much of the industrialized North was fraught, like Britain, with wage-labor issues. In many Southern minds, this illustrated the failure of the “great experiment” of abolition not only in Britain, but more generally (281). Just as Britain had experienced economically decline following the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, so too did Southerners speculate that the US would suffer economic turmoil were emancipation declared nationwide. The Southern press subsequently published editorials from the London Times exclaiming that “slave emancipation had been a colossal failure” (285). Meanwhile, Southern leaders, such as Secretary of State Abel Upshur, sponsored American reports on the state of the free British colonies, stating that “England has ruined her own colonies, and . . . wishes to see other countries . . . in a similar state” (284). Restoring the memories of the anglophilic Hartford Convention and the Garrisonians’ support of British abolition, the Southerners stigmatized the North as in league with the British. The so-called humanitarian threat had formed on the home front.

I think Davis’ explanation of Southern radicalism might also explain certain features of our conversation in Tuesday’s class. In his post “The Mouth of the South,” Justin Hill notes the abuse of the Irish at the hands of the British as well as how “along with their mistreatment [by the British], the nativists of the north attacked the Irish immigrants” (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/the-mouth-of-the-south/). Such injustices, he suggests, explain why Irish immigrants headed south. I agree. But I also think that, when viewed in light of Southern anglophobia, one might suggest that a shared animosity toward both the British and the Northeast more generally likely influenced Southerners’ acceptance of Irish immigrants.

So, reevaluating last class’ discussion, I would like to ask the class: Were Irish immigrants so willing to join the Confederacy merely because of their sense of “belonging” in the South? Or might the perceived threat of a British conspiracy brewing in the Northeast have inspired the Irish to join the Southern ranks?

November 20, 2013

Wilentz, Ch. 21-22: Angles of the Argument

Sherwood Callaway

HIS 141, Blog Post 10

I was interested in the different angles used in arguments preceding the Compromise of 1850. Clay suggested a compromise in eight parts, which seemingly favored the southerners, but left the fate of new territories to northerners. His legislative angle kicked off the discussion, and most parties followed suit.

Calhoun also described the issue as a legislative one, in which the north had repeatedly gained favorable national legislation at the expense of the south. As examples, he cited the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which brought an expanse of free northern territory into the Union, and the Missouri Compromise, which restricted the majority of the Louisiana territory from becoming slave-affiliated in 1820. Wilentz adds that, “tarrifs and internal improvements had enriched northern business at the direct expense of the South”, blatantly hinting towards the Tariff of 1828, or the Tariff of Abominations, as it was called in the south (345). These restrictions made manufacturing more profitable in the north, and consumer goods more expensive in the south. Calhoun seemed to believe that the north had negotiated legislation with unfair aggression.

Webster encouraged a legislative compromise, and suggested that legislative taunts such as the Wilmot Proviso be stopped, out of respect for the southern position. Better than other northerners (he was from Massachusetts), Webster seemed to understand the southern predicament—being entrenched economically and culturally in a slave system. He demonstrated that “some sort of compromise was required to keep the nation from falling apart”, deviating from the unreasonable inflexibility he had once shown as a supporter of the Proviso (346). Like Clay and Calhoun, Webster saw the issue from a legislative angle.

But then there’s William Henry Seward, an antislavery northerner who argued on different terms—ideological terms. He was against compromise altogether, “condemning out of hand Clay’s compromise, and any such sectional deal” (346). Furthermore, he attacked the moral foundations for slavery, as “an oppressive and undemocratic institution”, and invoked language from the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution (346). Listeners interpreted his speech as arguing that “the forces of antislavery were above the law” (346). Personally, I respect Seward’s values and determination, but feel that pragmatism would have been a more effective way to disarm the situation. In fact, it seems as if Seward was hardly interested in disarming the situation at all, but in confronting the problem at its root. Maybe Seward’s direction was best, though; as my classmate MIHAN writes, “the truce of 1850 was [ultimately] fruitless, for it once again avoided the question of slavery instead of trying to solve it”.

I think that southerners were most afraid of unbending northerners like Seward because they represented the type of northern aggression that Calhoun had described. It was unreasonable and unsympathetic to make such demands of the south, when the south was so deeply a slave society. Whether or not Calhoun considered the institution of slavery morally defendable, he knew it was integral to southern economy and culture, and thus could not be removed without uprooting southern society itself. Legislators like Clay and Webster recognized this, and subsequently proposed compromises instead of making demands. I can imagine that Seward, and other inflexibles like him, made southerners feel as if backed into a corner. But maybe his approach was necessary, and just poorly delivered?

September 18, 2013

In this week’s reading, chapters 7 and 11, Taylor discussed the colonial practices of Georgia, the Carolinas, and the Chesapeake. To start, I disliked the lack of information the author gave about Georgia. Granted, as mentioned in class, Georgia history is boring. But I am from Atlanta, and I am biased. I want my state to be represented as much as the others. My suggestion to the author, without any credibility of course, would be to include more detail about the issues in Georgia and the native peoples involved. However, I was born in Greenville and also lived 9 years in York, SC so I was moderately pleased with the history of the Carolinas. One of the main arguments Taylor presents includes the white sense of solidarity versus the fractioned Indian identities. I found this particularly interesting and wondered the outcome had the Native peoples banded together and fought as an American nation. Would we all still be in Europe? Would it have taken decades or centuries more to conquer the “New World”? In just about all of the cases on the eastern coast of the North American mainland, Indians fought side by side with colonists against rival tribes. The Europeans would play the nations against each other and take advantage of the rivalries. Later, when convenient, the colonists would find an excuse to massacre the former partners. One of the very few chiefs to promote a nation combining tribes was executed for his ideas, not by a European, but by a fellow native. A few differences between the colonies include the attempt by Georgians to create a colony without slave while the Chesapeake and Carolinas relied heavily on slave trade and labor to prosper. The explanation about trying to keep whites motivated to work by avoiding slave labor rang bells in my head because I have taken AP US history but this idea was never addresses in the textbook I read before. It makes sense that whites would find physical labor degrading because it made them feel like slaves and that was definitely depressing in the time period.