War of 1812 – U.S. to 1877

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In chapters 3 and 4 in The Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz focuses on the battle between the Federalists and the anti-federalists/Republicans. Early on in chapter 3 wilentz starts with the Adams presidency, yet ultimately spends much of his time giving background into Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, rather than focusing on the presidency of John Adams. This choice of spotlight reveals the perceived importance of Jefferson by Wilentz. The election of 1800 was a significant election for Jefferson in that because of the division of the national government and of the people of the united states, he had to prove himself worthy of presiding over all people of America. The discrepancy between Jefferson’s writings and Jefferson’s actions is usually the main focal point for many historians when analyzing Jefferson’s presidency. But Wilentz points out that Jefferson’s actions, specifically with the Louisiana Purchase and the judiciary scenario involving the repeal of the Judiciary act of 1801, were generally the correct and rational decision, rather than the hypothetical decision noted in Jeffersons writings. Jacob Newton talks about this in his post about how Wilentz “seems to be a big fan of Jefferson.” In this sense, Wilentz is almost protecting Jefferson from much scrutiny. I think Wilentz’s stance on Jefferson’s presidency is affective in that shows the other side of the coin, yet I do not think that this softer political scrutiny is justified simply by the fact that his writings differ from his actions. Sure, Jefferson may have made more passive practical decisions than his writings, but that does not give him a pass from stringent political examination.

In chapter 5 of The Rise of American Democracy, the War of 1812 is Wilentz’s main focus. What is surprising to me in this chapter is how close America was to loosing its independence from Britain. Wilentz spends much time focusing on the weak points of our young nation that I had not seen before in respect to the War of 1812. In 1814, after the total destruction of Washington, many New England states “were talking openly of secession and a seperate peace with the British” (Wilentz 80). I believe Wilentz is purposefully pointing out that America was not as strong of a country that the majority of people assume it to be today—even in the early years of independence. Although, Wilentz does not address very thoroughly the British side of the War of 1812. Maybe Wilentz is trying to draw more attention to the struggles and successes in America, but I feel like some deeper analysis of Britain’s mindset in the war may be beneficial (even though this is an American History book).

Our readings this week address the evolution of the early American Republic and, in doing so, suggest a seemingly unified American spirit, described by Semonin as the nation’s “conquering spirit” (2) and by Turner as it’s “consolidated nationality.” Though one could point to the Americanization of the West, with its ever-advancing lines of demarcation, or the rise of Moderate Republicanism, with Jefferson’s unifying inauguration speech or the promise of young nationalists Clay and Calhoun, as indicative of this unified spirit of the age, I think the Mastodon—the gentle giant cast as a “tyrant of the forests”—best exemplifies the real state of the American character at the time (Semonin 4). Simply put, despite the initial successes in the West by the Louisiana Purchase and in Washington by the Jefferson presidency, the United States suffered a serious identity crisis, particularly during in the War of 1812.

Though by the end of the war the US “commanded international respect,” American victory didn’t come without serious threats on the home front (Wilentz 88). Naval victories by the USS President and ‘Old Ironsides’ might have invigorated Americans with confidence, but that confidence seems more like hubris when one considers the embarrassing defeat at Detroit in August 18012 or the psychological trauma of the new capitol’s destruction in July 1814. Equipped with a meager regular army and disorganized state militias, Madison and the US appeared to be biting off more than they could chew by confronting the real imperial powerhouse of Britain. The initial strategy of invading Canada seems ambitious at best considering the United States’ military disorganization. Even more, amidst the perils of war at home, the Union faced serious internal threats both before and during the war. Exploiting disgruntled and disorganized American military officers, then-Vice President Aaron Burr conspired to establish a new, seceded nation comprised of the western states and territories in the build-up to the war with Britain. And later in 1814, a dissatisfied and decidedly Federalist New England convened at Hartford, CT to propose seven “nonnegotiable” amendments as a restitution for its wartime grievances (82). Were it not for the remarkable success of the well-outnumbered US navy or the unlikely victories of Andrew Jackson in Louisiana, the young republic might not have survived its first, real international conflict.

Considering the many crises, both military and political, faced by the United States, the Mastodon seems a fitting symbol of the American spirit at the time. Sylvia Strauss notes in her blog this week that “having a fierce symbol, like the mastodon, gave Americans [an] idea . . . . [which] transferred to western expansion, where Americans felt it was their calling to gain more land and power” (http://sites.davidson.edu/his141/the-beginnings-of-western-expansion/). I agree. I also, however, think that symbolically the mastodon not only motivated, but reflected the events of the time. Influenced by the same “conquering spirit” of the American frontier, the United States challenged a daunting European empire and received a much-needed reality check (Semonin 2). Though the initial successes of the Jefferson presidency, Westward expansion, and a new, revolutionary republic might have led Americans to believe they were a ferocious carnivore ready to rival the “British lion” or its European counterparts, they were in fact no more than an eleven-foot-tall, prehistoric herbivore—imposing and noteworthy, but certainly no “tyrant [in] the forests” of international politics (Semonin 4).

Tag: War of 1812

Jefferson, Reality vs Actuality

The Mammoth in the Room: American Identity Crisis and the War of 1812