war – U.S. to 1877

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Sherwood Callaway

HIS 141, Blog Post 7

Jackson’s vision of democracy was implemented with force, and predictably, the result was destruction. The two subjects that best characterize this phenomenon are indian removal and the bank war, both of which Wilentz covers in chapter 14.

Indian Removal was a violent and clumsy process. He pursued it to please his constituency, much of whom resided in areas of population growth and frontier expansion. And although the government desperately needed to implement national Indian policy, Jackson’s was a crude proposal. The stories vary, but in every case, moving Indians across the country was inefficient and cost unnecessary lives. In some cases the natives responded violently, as in the Black Hawk War and the Seminole War. In other cases the natives attempted to deal with the Americans on their on terms, through the courts. In Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia they were defeated “when Chief Justice John Marshall declared…that because the Cherokees were a “domestic dependent nation,” they lacked standing to sue” (223). Worcester v. Georgia had a more promising result, in which Marshall declared that “the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community, occupying its own territory”” (223). But ultimately, legislators had little tolerance for even those Indians who were most similar to whites.

In the case of the bank, Jackson vehemently sought its destruction, because he thought it favored northeastern states over western and southern states, and because it seemed to serve only to make the rich richer. He managed to quash its rechartering, and withdraw funds from it, thereby rendering the institution impotent. Striking against state banks as well, he passed the Specie Circular, which demanded that federal lands be bought with gold or silver. Suddenly, the paper currency issued by these state banks became worthless, and speculators demanded specie in exchange—specie that the banks did not have. Ultimately, Jackson’s violent dismembering of banking within the US spiraled the country into panic and recession, and left the government ill equipped to deal with financial matters.

By the time Jackson’s presidency ended, his successor was left with a real mixed bag. Indian Removal had been a long and costly process, and the Specie Circular had incited a national financial crisis. Jackson’s constituency had degraded and Van Buren was forced to establish political friendships upon different principles, as well as make new allies altogether. Frontiers people disliked the restrictions of Jackson’s Specie Circular, Southerners objected to the tariff that Jackson had defended, and the planter aristocracy was upset with the loss of the BUS. Despite the mistakes of his predecessor, Van Buren was able to win his election by gaining a popular reputation amongst southerners as “eager to mollify southern slaveholders and silence the abolitionists” (236). Hard to believe.

The Chapter 18 reading of American Colonies presents an alternative view of the New World. Whereas up until this point Taylor has described the New World in terms of settlement and development of political structures and economic systems, he now describes it as a battlefield to set the stage for the seven years war. He opens the history of war in the 18th century by stating that, despite having a well-funded army in the area, the French managed to lose a fortress at Louisberg to what was essentially a New English militia. After initial battles, both the French and the British realized that they needed to pay more attention to the New World as a theatre for warfare. However, as both colonial areas developed into the mid 18th century, population dynamics shifted so that the British found themselves at a massive advantage. They enjoyed areas of centralized, high density population, whereas the French found themselves dispersed along hundreds of miles of land that frankly was unsustainable and nobody could really live on. This lead to a particular point where Taylor refers to the French as “more restrained and civil” during the seven years war.

Really?

He goes on to explain himself by stating that since the French had such a dispersed population, they knew that the only way to win the seven years war was to gain the help of the Indian population, and become their puppeteers so that the Indian nations between the French and British Borders would die for the French. I completely agree with Jelaws post stating that The British, in this and several other instances, are painted in far too kind a light.

However, this does not excuse the indignation of the colonists that is described in later chapters. In exchange for fighting for and successfully defending the colonies, The British began to raise taxes on the colonists that were minuscule compared to taxes in England, and extremely affordable in the economy of the New World. However, the Colonists believed that they were being oppressed by their mother country because they were being asked to pay in VERY small part for a war which the British fought for them. Taylor describes the taxes being viewed as an “attack on liberty”, but, as always, in reality there is always a much more simple and pragmatic cause for government actions. Like trying to pay for two imperial wars at once.

Tag: war

Wilentz, Ch. 14: Jacksonian Democracy, Delivered With Force

The Verbal Worship of the British Empire by Taylor