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In chapter 15 of Inhuman Bondage, Davis discusses the death and destruction the American Civil War caused, providing the reader with statistics that are very difficult to grasp. As the author of “A Bloody War” mentions, “both sides of the war lost so many men, with the number of casualties over 600,000.” Poorly maintained prisoner-of-war camps, unwarranted executions of these prisoners, and warfare-related casualties all contributed to these staggering numbers and Davis does a great job of explaining that neither side deserved more blame than the other; the Civil War was one of especial deep-seated hatred and both sides were willing to do whatever it took to win the war. Nevertheless, Davis reiterates the claims of many American historians and abolitionists by maintaining that the Civil War was a “necessary and good war.” In addition to resulting in the emancipation of four million slaves, he explains that “the war led to the nation’s first civil rights legislation and to constitutional amendments that extended to blacks full citizenship and equality before the law as well as the right to vote (for adult black males).”
However, as Davis mentions, the American Civil War was not always an “abolitionist war.” He notes that in 1862, Washington politicians and even Lincoln himself, knew that fighting this kind of war would be impossible as “any radical policy against slavery would alienate not only Unionists in the secessionist South but also supporters of the Union in the absolutely crucial slaveholding border states.” In fact, when General Fremont proclaimed the emancipation of slaves in Missouri, Lincoln overruled this order in order to protect his executive authority and more importantly, to appeal to the border states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and eventually West Virginia. Lincoln explained why he believed it was necessary to maintain the support of the border states early in the war: “I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we can not hold Missouri, nor, I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capitol.” Although Lincoln identified slavery as the cause of the nation’s problems at this time, it is no wonder why he adopted a more conservative stance early in the war – there was no chance of the Union winning an abolitionist war.
Eventually, Lincoln became more radical and on January 1, 1863, publicly issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which successfully liberated all slaves in the states that were still in rebellion. Davis ultimately does a wonderful job at once again revealing the complexities that are rarely talked about in American history. He presents the issues Lincoln was dealing with and successfully explains the president’s hesitancy at making the Civil War an abolitionist war in the first couple years of the conflict. My only complaint with Davis’ account is the lack of clarity he exhibits when describing the turning point in Lincoln’s agenda. Davis explains that Lincoln came to the conclusion “that it was a military necessity absolutely essential to the salvation of the Union” to free the slaves on July 13, 1862, but in my opinion, he does not do it clearly enough.