Fugitive Slave Law – American History to 1877

April 16, 2014

Growing Disunion

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In Chapter 21 of The Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz discusses the disputes in the US over the admission and control of western territories (California, Texas, New Mexico) largely in regards to slavery. The disputes can be summed up into North vs. South. When President Taylor presented his plan for admitting California, and soon after New Mexico, many southerners further projected thoughts of secession from the Union. Henry Clay then stepped in to quiet the outraged southerners with his set of resolutions: admission of California and the rest of Mexico’s given up land with no restrictions on the subject of slavery, the next basically preventing a pro-slave state coming out of Texas, another attempting to resolve the fight over slavery in DC by proposing the abolition of slave trade, not slavery itself in DC, and lastly denying congressional authority over the interstate slave trade with more strict federal laws in the recovery of fugitive slaves to offset the personal liberty laws put in action by the north. Reasonably, the resolutions did favor the South slightly, and I say reasonably because if they didn’t, then the South would have no reason to comply.

Later, the conclusion was reached, disregarding which deal was chosen, that if California was admitted into the Union as a free state, the southern states would be under the power of the north. Because of the many compromises and of new land by the North, the South was drastically falling behind in how much control it had in the future of the nation. In Thomas’ post, he talks about the effects of the Compromise of 1850 and also the controversy caused by the Fugitive slave law. Basically the compromise of 1850 was a delay because at the rate that the North and South were dividing and playing against each other in controlling new land out west and fighting for or against slavery, the Union was bound to separate. The North had begun taking any advantage it had over the south to remain in control, and the South, in response to that, began talk about seceding to use as leverage for many pro-slavery laws. Thus, leading to the Civil war in the near future.

Overall it was a very interesting reading; I enjoyed Wilentz’s depiction of both sides of the arguments made by the North and the South. It really gave me a grasp of the larger picture of what was going on at the time.

April 16, 2014

The Fugitive Slave Law: Root of the Civil War

In Chapter 21: Political Truce, Uneasy Consequences of Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz discusses the implications of the acquisition of new American territory on America’s political parties, specifically with regard to the growing disconnect between the pro-slavery South and the anti-slavery North. In general, I find Wilentz’s writing style to be difficult to follow and a little bland; however, Chapter 21 held my attention and introduced historical arguments that I had not heard of before. Wilentz dedicated a large portion the chapter to analysis of the Fugitive Slave Law. Contrary to many historical arguments that cite the Fugitive Slave Law as a debate between humanitarianism and the constitutionality of slaves as property, Wilentz argues that the law was simply a medium through which the North and South tested each other and the limits of their federal authority. He writes that, “[i]n reality the point of the law had never been to recapture slaves but to test the North’s sincerity over the truce of 1850” (352). Just 5% of runaway slaves were captured under the Act between 1850 and 1851, seemingly undermining the enormous national outcry that resulted from its passage.

I agree with Kurt’s blog post that articulates the significance of the pre-Civil War Period as imperative to study of the Civil War, itself. He argues that many history courses focus heavily on the Civil War (the battles, generals, etc.) without analyzing the roots of the conflict. In Chapter 21, Wilentz not only discusses the causes of the Civil War, but also presents his argument in an effective and attention-holding manner. For instance, I had never heard of the Craft Affair—a shooting that a Pennsylvania newspaper announced as “The First Blow Struck” of the Civil War. These relatively minor squirmishes signal the buildup of pro-slavery and anti-slavery sentiments, and underscore the eventual secession of Southern states and the creation of the Confederacy. Thus, Chapter 21 was both entertaining and crucial to our course’s later study of the Civil War.

April 16, 2014

The Compromise of 1850. Did it work?

Chapter 21 in The Rise of American Democracy focuses primarily on the political consequences of the Mexican-American War. The issue had primarily to do with the admittance of new states, specifically California, into the union in such a fashion that would preserve the precarious senatorial balance between slave and free states. This had been a polarizing subject even since before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, as Henry Clay’s 1847 address to Congress (my primary source) shows, which highlights how controversial and difficult compromise would be. Yet, thanks to the political wisdom of Clay and the energy of Stephen A. Douglass, a palatable agreement was achieved under which: California was admitted as a free state, New Mexico and Utah were to be admitted without reference to slavery, a new Fugitive Slave Law was enacted, the slave trade was abolished in Washington DC, and Texas received $15 million for relinquishing its land claims to New Mexico. As Clay notes, the Compromise of 1850 was brilliant in its scope; however, it did little but paper over entrenched divisions within American society.

Wilentz foreshadows this failure through anecdotes concerning the Fugitive Slave Law and through an explanation of the rifts that drastically altered the identity of the Democratic and Whig Party. The discussion of the Fugitive Slave Law begins with a story about William and Ellen Craft, who were fugitive slaves living in Boston. When two-slave catchers from Georgia came to apprehend the Crafts, they found an organized group of abolitionists who opposed them at every turn, eventually forcing them to return home empty handed. The abolitionists’ actions actually broke the law because a clause in the Fugitive Slave Law stated that all citizens must aid in the arrest of a runaway slave. This illustrated Northern contempt for the law, solidifying its abolitionist position while further incensing Southern “fire-eaters.” Thus, the relationship grew ever more strained.

Wilentz also points to the divisions among political parties that occurred following the Compromise of 1850 as evidence that the agreement did little to heal deep divides over slavery. As he says, “all efforts to shore up the political center eventually wound up worsening the clash between North and South” (356). The almost-collapse of the Whig Party serves as evidence to this. Alex’s post titled The Rise of American Democracy: Chapter 17 traces divisions within the Whigs to the election of President Tyler and his subsequent falling out with Henry Clay over the national bank. Yet, a decade later, the issue of the bank had fallen into obscurity in the shadow of slavery, a much bigger, more divisive demon that created factions such as the “pro-Fillmore Silver Grays, Cotton Whig Websterites, [or] the antislavery Conscience Whigs” and ensured that the Whigs lost on all fronts to the Democrats. Even they, however, were not without their troubles. As the election of 1852 showed, the southern bloc of Democrats was growing ever more powerful, undermining the stabilizing influence of Northern Democrats.