The Fugitive Slave Law: Root of the Civil War


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In Chapter 21: Political Truce, Uneasy Consequences of Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz discusses the implications of the acquisition of new American territory on America’s political parties, specifically with regard to the growing disconnect between the pro-slavery South and the anti-slavery North. In general, I find Wilentz’s writing style to be difficult to follow and a little bland; however, Chapter 21 held my attention and introduced historical arguments that I had not heard of before. Wilentz dedicated a large portion the chapter to analysis of the Fugitive Slave Law. Contrary to many historical arguments that cite the Fugitive Slave Law as a debate between humanitarianism and the constitutionality of slaves as property, Wilentz argues that the law was simply a medium through which the North and South tested each other and the limits of their federal authority. He writes that, “[i]n reality the point of the law had never been to recapture slaves but to test the North’s sincerity over the truce of 1850” (352). Just 5% of runaway slaves were captured under the Act between 1850 and 1851, seemingly undermining the enormous national outcry that resulted from its passage.

I agree with Kurt’s blog post that articulates the significance of the pre-Civil War Period as imperative to study of the Civil War, itself. He argues that many history courses focus heavily on the Civil War (the battles, generals, etc.) without analyzing the roots of the conflict. In Chapter 21, Wilentz not only discusses the causes of the Civil War, but also presents his argument in an effective and attention-holding manner. For instance, I had never heard of the Craft Affair—a shooting that a Pennsylvania newspaper announced as “The First Blow Struck” of the Civil War. These relatively minor squirmishes signal the buildup of pro-slavery and anti-slavery sentiments, and underscore the eventual secession of Southern states and the creation of the Confederacy. Thus, Chapter 21 was both entertaining and crucial to our course’s later study of the Civil War.

The Connection Between Women’s Rights and Abolition


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In “Chapter 20: War, Slavery, and the American 1848” of The Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz briefly discusses the roots of the women’s rights movement and its connection to abolitionism. The Seneca Convention, which was held in July 1848 in Seneca Falls, New York, was the first major American convention devoted to women’s suffrage. Led by Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Stanton, the Seneca Convention issued a declaration that affirmed that “all men and women are created equal”—an alteration to the original United States’ Declaration of Independence. Wilentz argues that the Seneca Convention was not merely concerned with women’s suffrage, but was an extension of the growing anti-slavery contingency. According to Wilentz, the Seneca Convention was “a logical extension of the fight for liberty, equality, and independence being waged by the antislavery forces” (334). While I agree with Wilentz’s assessment that a definitive relationship existed between the struggle for women’s rights and abolition, he failed to acknowledge how this association negatively impacted the short-term successes of the women’s rights movement.

When the Civil War erupted, the leading women’s rights’ activists decided to put the anti-slavery movement to the forefront, in hopes that the abolition of slavery would pave the way for women’s suffrage to occur shortly thereafter. The women believed that dedication to the Northern, anti-slavery cause would draw attention to the necessity for constitutional equality on the basis of race and gender. Unfortunately, the end of the Civil War did not introduce increased attention to women’s rights—the 14th Amendment uses the word “male” three times in its definition of citizenship, thus exemplifying Congress’s dedication to a male-dominated social and political hierarchy in America.

While my classmates have not yet commented on chapters 17-20 of Wilentz, Kurt noted in his blog post from last Thursday that Wilentz does an effective job identifying the roots behind the loss of Democratic support in the South. In regard to the foundations of the women’s rights movement, I agree with Kurt that Wilentz introduces the subject to his readers in an effective way, as he links different historical issues into the greater context of American history. Similar to Kurt’s critique that Wilentz left out necessary details to strengthen his argument concerning the leadership dynamics within the Whig party, I wish he had discussed the implications of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery on women’s rights. Specifically, I think it is very interesting that the leaders of the women’s rights movement split into two separate factions during Reconstruction. Elizabeth Stanton and Susan B. Anthony formed the National Suffrage Association, and racist references dominated the rhetoric of their cause. In contrast, Lucy Stone’s American Suffrage Association supported the 15th Amendment and did not consider black suffrage a threat to the eventual success of gender equality. While I recognize that the women’s rights movement was not central to Wilentz’s argument, I believe that the interesting dynamics between the two movements should have been addressed in greater detail.

Wilentz, Sean. The Rise of American Democracy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.

Jackson: Bankers, Abolitionists, and Unions


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Wilentz goes through the second half of Jackson’s presidency in  chapter 13, taking the reader through first the drama of the Bank War, then through the growing abolitionist movement, and then through the Union movement taking place in urban centers, such as New York and Boston. Even before coming to the last section of Wilentz’s chapter, I found a peculiar amount of contradictions in Jackson’s stances, as well as how various groups alligned themselves politically.

Jackson first closes down the BUS by redistributing the dungs from the national bank to loyal state banks. Wilentz explains that Jackson’s motives were that the national bank was tied with northern industries, and did not support or fund frontier expansions. This fits with Jackson’s earlier moves, as Grey mentions in his post, around Georgia’s state power to deal with the Cherokees as they saw fit.

However, it is interesting that many people who backed Jackson initially saw this Bank War as Jackson’s lust for power. While he may have said that he did not want a powerful federal government, he also was able — as only one man — to bypass Congress in issues related to the Bank. Additionally, Jackson redistributed the funds to only a few states — showing a sort of favoritism in politics that he seemed vehemently against. This is an interesting contradiction.

Another contradiction I found was Wilentz’s reason for why Jackson did not become involved in some of the abolitionist issues that arose over censoring mail and abolitionist literature distribution. Some Southern states wanted to prohibit this literature from circulating. While Congress said this was unconstitutional, there was no enforcement in the states themselves. This was an issue of state rights over federal rights, so one might assume that Jackson might blindly favor state rights, allowing for the censorship of abolitionist literature. However, he was against this. Wilentz reasons that “though Jackson disapproved, he did not want to stir up more trouble” by calling states out in the unenforced laws. Wilentz seems to be, once again, painting a favorable picture of Jackson. Jackson had no problem stirring up trouble by redirecting funds from the National Bank, and speaking his mind on other issues, even when it directly threw him up against Congress. I don’t think it is fair for Wilentz to therefore reason this.

I see many similarities between the abolitionist movement and unionists that Wilentz does not interestingly spell out more clearly. This era seemed marked by many “for the people” movements, both for the workers (unions) and for slave laborers. While Wilentz discusses “a new humane model of equality, [and] freedom” in terms of abolitionist movements through the religious lens, I think this can be an interesting parallel to the unionizing and Workies in the Northeast.