In chapter five of his The Rise of American Democracy, <\/i>Wilentz convincingly debunked myths that the War of 1812 amounted to nothing more than a waste of resources. Declaring it a \u201cbungled, needless, and costly effort,\u201d while not a ludicrous accusation since the war was costly and messy, misses some important points (88). America had the worst of its troubles in the early stages of war, and even if the burning of Washington proved a \u201csymbolic embarrassment,\u201d it was followed by a number of accomplishments. The fledgling country displayed \u201cskillful management of war debt,\u201d returned many captured Americans to their homes, and at last established vital international credibility (88). While America did not win the war, I agree with Wilentz that this conflict was a pivotal moment in American history nonetheless. America had finally proven itself a viable nation amongst the other world powers. I therefore respectfully disagree with Charlotte\u2019s assertion that the war was unproductive and accomplished little to nothing. I do not think Wilentz was attempting to argue this point, for he seemed more focused on providing counterarguments to similar statements from other historians. Instead, Wilentz identified the Indians and Federalists as the \u201closers\u201d of the war while maintaining that it was an important success for the nation at large (88).<\/p>\n
Wilentz also did an excellent job tracing the decline of the Federalist Party. I knew the party\u2019s influence waned as the war they had failed to support drew to a close, followed by the so-called \u201cera of good feelings,\u201d but I was unaware of Federalist activity during the early stages of the war. Indeed, early on in the war, neither the outcome nor the level of support for the Federalist Party was yet clear. Many were, for good reason, skeptical of the war, and it was not clear until later that the Federalist Party would inevitably decline. As Wilentz described, Madison held a \u201cvulnerable\u201d position and incredibly limited military resources (77). Until Madison secured Pennsylvania in the election, DeWitt Clinton had a legitimate chance of winning the presidency and weakening the Democratic-Republican Party\u2019s influence.<\/p>\n
The outcome of the war is what ultimately solidified the Democratic Republican Party and doomed the Federalists to \u201cpolitical isolation\u201d (80). I agree with Wilentz\u2019s interpretation here, and I believe it raises the question: what if the war had ended differently? How might the political parties have been affected? Even in the last stages of the war, Madison was eager to proceed with peace negotiations due to a threat of secession from the New England Federalists. I cannot help wondering if the Federalist threat was a very real one, or if the Democratic-Republican Party would have emerged as the sole political party even under different circumstances. Thomas claimed in his blog post that the Democratic-Republicans\u2019 ability to \u201cgrasp political power,\u201d unlike the Federalists, defined the subsequent era in American politics. I would need to think about the issue more extensively before arriving to such a conclusion. Especially in an era where political parties were virtually nonexistent, exactly how important was the winner of this struggle? Would a Federalist rise to power have changed everything or almost nothing?<\/p>\n
As for Frederick Jackson Turner\u2019s suggestion that the frontier defines much of American history, this exact thesis was the focus of my American history class a few years ago. I may even have read excerpts from this same article, although I cannot be sure. At any rate, it\u2019s an idea to which I have already devoted a great deal of thought, and I think it is a very useful way to approach American history. The best way to study history, in my mind, is to take a number of different approaches. Giving careful consideration to Turner\u2019s argument alongside other viewpoints ultimately provides the best sense of history, one that encompasses a variety of theses.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In chapter five of his The Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz convincingly debunked myths that the War of 1812 amounted to nothing more than a waste of resources. Declaring it a \u201cbungled, needless, and costly effort,\u201d while not a ludicrous accusation since the war was costly and messy, misses some important points (88). America had … <\/p>\n