April 2014 – Page 3 – American Environments to 1893

April 7, 2014

Does Bergman Have It Wrong?

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Jonathan Bergman’s essay speaks to what Ted Steinberg does in his Acts of God. Bergman states, “With the advent of environmental studies, disasters have become something of a ‘growth field in American history.’ Armed with novel theories of disaster, scholars have set out to examine urban life, race, class, politics, and governmental culture through a variety of socially dislocating events” (938). Using disaster studies as a lens for studying traditional topics serves to boost both environmental history and the field of history as a whole. Bergman has his doubts about the the manner in which disaster studies has taken (and taking). He is skeptical of disaster studies and its future. While I think I understand his perspective, having read Acts of God and other environmental works, I must call him out and suggest he re-think his argument. I think disaster is a useful category for historical analysis. Disaster can allow for a nuanced analysis of a period that and using other categories of analysis can also allow for a more nuanced interpretation of the events before, during, and after the disaster.

The essay I chose for this week, “Fighting the Hessian Fly: American and British Responses to Insect Invasion, 1776-1789,” serves as a proper contribution to the environmental/disaster studies field. When read after Bergman’s essay, one can understand how Bergman “got it wrong.” Philip J. Pauly’s states in his essay, “Looking beyond the eighteenth century, I suggest that the Hessian fly provides a useful starting point for examining how nationalism–involving issues of both political sovereignty and, more diffusely, xenophobia–has influenced the science of policy of biological invasion (486). Yes, it is possible for analyses to get carried away with other categories of analysis and thus take away from telling the story of the disaster, but I think it is possible to tell both at the same time. As Ian reminded us last week in our discussion of Chicago, “. . .they also altered their environment by flooding and freezing a region that would not have faced these conditions without human alteration.” Cronon’s analysis would have been much stronger if he had added commentary on this matter (regardless of the fact that this might not have been his primary purpose).

After completing the readings for this week I thought a lot about language. Are actually doing these events justice by calling them “natural disasters.” This phrase carries a negative connotation, so how does one rid that from the phrase without changing the name or replacing it with something that no one will recognize? Instead is it suitable to call them “natural events”? Other words with just as negative connotations are brought into the conversation as well. With these words and negative connotations come negative interpretations of the events and nature. Nature is made out to be the bad force. Now, I am not suggesting that Steinberg does this in his work, not at all. He makes this obvious. We as readers know exactly with whom the fault stands, but could this be an inadvertent (and most likely subtle) component that is in some ways difficult to separate? Are these concerns the at crux of Bergman’s struggle and argument?

April 7, 2014

Conquering Nature

This article provides a unique look at nature by taking us back in time to the first settlers of America. These settlers had great fear and respect for the environment and for the effect it could have on them. They had an almost morbid fascination with the sun and the power it had over the balance of the body. With disease more prominent and more deadly, one had to be wary of the dangers of nature. Many diseases were attributed to exposure to too much heat. While these people had a worse understanding of their environment that we do now, they had to live with its effects everyday. Whether this actually makes them closer to nature than we are today is an interesting question to ponder. With all the medicine and technology we have today, it’s easy to subscribe to the idea that nature’s effect can be conquered or beaten. Settlers back then however, had to deal with the daily physical effects that the environment could have on you.

One of the most provoking parts of the article was the idea that environment, the heat specifically, could actually shape a race of people. The English believe that hotter climates made people ‘wittier’ and smarter but less physically strong than people from colder climates. That’s why these people were often conquered by Northerners. We tend to ascribe stereotypes to different regions even today. The simplest example is the way Northerners view Southerners and vice versa. When we talk about these differences we rarely discuss environment. However, it was the environment that first created these differences. The warmer climates of the South and the flatter topography led to the agrarian focused, plantation style economy. It was the environment that paved the way for slavery and made the South so dependent on it.

Jumping into the minds of these settlers raises some interesting questions about nature. Does nature actually have less of an impact on us now or are we just better equipped to handle it? I would argue that nature doesn’t have less of an effect on us than it did on the colonists, we have just developed better ways to counter that effects and live with nature. However, I don’t subscribe to the idea that you can ever conquer nature. No matter how many diseases we cure or preventative measures we take, the environment will always have an effect on us. The countermeasures that the settlers took, although comedic to us now, expose an attitude we still have today. Rather than seeing nature as something we live off of, we see it as something dangerous that we have to fight against. It is something unknown that has to be explained. I have to wonder if this attitude has something to do with the American Exceptionalism that Henry discussed in his post. Perhaps we would feel vulnerable or defeated if we left ourselves at the mercy of an environment we could not control or understand.

April 6, 2014

“Architects of Destruction”: Ted Steinberg’s Acts of God

Ted Steinberg’s Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America deals with the human dimension of natural disasters. Steinberg suggests three issues with which his research and analysis attempt to define. He looks at the role of human complicity in response to disasters, the rise in a particular set of social relations in an attempt to restore order, and the ways in which people have attempted to rationalize natural disasters as events beyond human control. He poses questions like, “Why have those in power, for example, at times denied the risks of living in seismically active areas? Whose vision of society is at stake when nature and culture collide? How and why have some Americans come to view natural disasters as amoral, chance occurrences?” (xvii-ix). Steinberg suggests these three themes intersect with three fields of study: environmental history (interactions between humans and nature), social history (power), and cultural history (meaning and interpretation). Thus, with his brief but detailed outline of his structure, readers are fully aware of Steinberg’s agenda, a very political agenda. He states, “Ultimately, this book critiques the approach to natural calamity that has dominated U.S. politics over the last century. This approach has tended to overemphasize the natural forces at place while diminishing the human, social, and economic forces central to these phenomena” (xix). Thus, according to Steinberg, when viewed as “freak events” as separate from everyday life, natural disasters are posited outside the boundaries of the ordinary; therefore, no one individual or group of people is held accountable.

The title Acts of God comes from the once popular (in some areas it still is) belief that natural disasters happened as a result of God’s disappointment with humans. If a certain area experienced an earthquake or flood, it had to be because the people living there had displeased God and this was to be there punishment, a sign they needed to change their ways. This notion became popular in the eighteenth century, and quite possibly before then. Steinberg states, “For the colonists, what we now call natural disasters were events heavily laden with moral meaning. They were morality tales that the God-fearing told to one another” (xxi). This theme stayed prominent into the nineteenth century. In some cases, these events moved those who strayed from their faith to turn back to religion and become God-fearing people again. Steinberg suggests that twentieth-century efforts at secularization helped to demoralize nature and its powers as well as these events being an act of God. However, roughly one-fifth of the current population still believes moral lessons can be learned from the extremes of nature. Steinberg also suggests that some use the God-fearing method as a simple way to evade human accountability. While the demoralization of nature has been a positive, Steinberg recognizes negatives to this. He believes this demoralization came with the federal government’s role in rationalizing disasters. This has especially been the case since World War II. The government provided now offered relief to those in disaster-struck areas. Steinberg states, “For the most part, these changes helped to underwrite increasing development in hazardous areas” (xxii). He suggests this transition severed the risk from physical space. Thus, when a disaster occurred, deciding who to blame became difficult. He states, “Natural disasters have come to be seen as random, morally inert phenomena—chance events that lie beyond the control of human beings” (xxiii). Steinberg provides a great example of how humans can warp nature into something that it is not. He mentions Hurricane Hugo from 1989 and how new reports exaggerated the wind speed. One report mentioned a wind speed of 150 miles per hour, while some said 135 miles per hour. However, sustained winds were actually between ninety and ninety-five miles per hour. Steinberg suggests that since the 1960s engineers have known about the need for better building requirements in hurricane-prone areas but chose not to act. Thus, the hurricane turned out to be as destructive became of man and not nature; therefore, the media needed to make a connection between the event and the resulting effects.

Section I is titled “Return of the Suppressed,” followed by Section II, “Federalizing Risk” and Section III, “Containing Calamity.” Steinberg starts off with the story of the August 31, 1886 Charleston earthquake. Charleston experienced several bouts with disaster long before the 1886 earthquake. Disasters struck Charleston as far back as the late 1600s. Hurricanes, smallpox, drought, fire, and storms attacked Charleston. The years 1783, 1787, 1792, 1797 and 1800 proved to be detrimental to Charleston as storms struck, and in some cases resulted in death. However, Steinberg suggests that the earthquake surprised many. Disasters before this one were the result of weather, disease or war. Steinberg coins the 1906 San Francisco earthquake as the archetypal disaster, but not an archetype for reasons one might think. The quake is by far the most sizeable (in magnitude) on record. He states, “Moreover, the notorious San Francisco quake, for all the tremendous attention lavished on this one slip of earth, has hardly had the effect on development and building in the city that one would expect. In this sense, the disaster has both tremendous meaning and almost no meaning at all, at least not in its impact on reducing seismic risk throughout the bay area” (26). Steinberg suggests that with disasters such as the San Francisco quake, other areas of seismic activity or areas of potential seismic activity received, and in some cases continue to receive, less attention. He specifically wants his readers to think about the difference between the risk of an earthquake and the risk of disaster. There is a difference, and one he suggests is often overlooked. Steinberg transitions from earthquakes to hurricanes. He talks about how hurricanes became naturalized when the U.S. Weather Bureau used gendered names to identify the storms. He states, “Women hurricanes were routinely described in the 1950s as wild, capricious, fickle, whimsical, and erratic, creating the sense that nature was literally out of control, when of course economic development, driven by private property, was as much if not more than nature to blame for disaster” (68). Florida boosters and others who sought to profit from property saw this as a positive for their system. Steinberg’s research is brought full-circle when he talks about more current disasters such as Hurricane Camille and the 1989 California earthquake and its impact. Thus, the response to natural disasters might appear to be different, but the same underlying issues and thoughts two hundred years still exist.

Steinberg is very passionate about his work and analyzes these natural disasters in interesting and thought-provoking ways. He is conscious of the social climates and uses stories of how marginalized groups were treated as a social justice outlet. His primary concern is to bring these issues together and bring about awareness. This book, this first edition is now fourteen years old, stands a marker and foundation for the environmental justice movement. His writing is compelling and demands that readers begin to understand the impact humans have on the environment and how humans can stand in the way of nature’s happenings. This is most certainly a call-to-action approach to environmental history and history as a whole. He allows each natural disaster to tell the history of the period in which it occurred.

Steinberg wants his readers to do what those who have experienced nature’s extremes have thus failed to do—learn and make changes that have the potential to alleviate destruction. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina Steinberg released a revised edition of his book. Published approximately one year after the storm hit, the book has an added section about the hurricane and its impact. Steinberg talks (in the first edition) about what he warned would happen if humans did not heed his advice.

While I agree with many of Steinberg’s assertions, a book review should not be written without a critical lens. Thus, Steinberg’s passion can also stand in his way. Ultimately, Steinberg suggests that humans should be faulted for building in disaster-prone areas and/or not building structures that can withstand these events. Humans ignore safety reports and continue their attempt to win the battle of human vs. nature. What about the events that happen where a disaster has never occurred?

April 6, 2014

Representations of Disasters

I read the article called “Distant Disasters, Local Fears: Volcanoes, Earthquakes, Revolution, and Passion in The Atlantic Monthly, 1880-84″ by Sheila Hones. In it, Hones draws on essays about natural disasters, essays about social problems that included references to natural disasters, and fiction pieces that used natural disasters as part of the plot (173). From reading other blog posts, it seems that this article is unique. Instead of writing about Gilded Age disasters themselves, Hones writes about how authors published in The Atlantic during the period represented disasters in their stories and reporting (170). “Distant disasters thus provide the textual framework for an exploration of local anxieties,” Hones argues, and proceeds to explain how authors did this.

First, Hones demonstrates the connection between the “social atmosphere” and the attitude toward disasters of educated Bostonians during the 1880s: “the large natural world is meaningful and ordered while the local social world is prone at any particular moment to turmoil” (172-173). Next, authors created what Hones calls “narrative distance” between the upper-class writers and readership of The Atlantic and the disasters experienced far away, such as the eruption of Krakatoa (175). Finally, disasters were understood to be, though destructive, also creative of new life. In disasters, authors found a way to understand their local concerns about social change as possibly a good thing in the end. Hones says the example of the volcano is “a potent symbol for a conservative community proudly finding its roots in revolution” (190-191). The United States, then, was a volcano: eruptive democracy led to eventual stability. This corresponds to Brandon’s post about how disasters might/might not be a good thing. But the fact that they might even be considered a good thing is interesting in itself.

Hones has interesting things to say about the locale of disasters. One author wrote about the Mississippi River floods in The Atlantic. The author showed that the natural disaster threatened America’s “self-regulation at the national level” (187). With the Civil War recently concluded, the author saw the possibility of local governments responding to the disaster instead of the federal government and the author worried that it would “create the ‘gravest political dangers'” (187). This made me think about how natural disasters are also national disasters. In the moment of a natural disaster, a local community is unable to respond. It seems that communities outside of the one destroyed must respond if any rebuilding/assistance can occur. This is the case, at least, where humans have built second nature on top of first nature. If humans are living in first nature, then they can move somewhere else, right?

Some thoughts from the other readings:

In Steven Biel’s introduction, he states, “catastrophic disturbances of routine actually tell us a great deal about the ‘normal’ workings of culture, society, and politics” (5). This makes sense, but it also makes me wonder if a disaster can be a historical event? Because who are the actors? Can a disaster be an actor in the same way that nature can?

Also, in the overview article by Jonathan Bergman, he cites Matthew Mulcahy, who writes, “‘[d]isasters become disasters only when natural forces meet human ones'” (936), which means that disasters need humans (and to an extent, second nature) present in order to actually be a disaster. I think this is interesting and it reminds me of Crosby’s broad view of changes in nature in Ecological Imperialism. If a disaster occurred in an uninhabited place, could we really call it a disaster?

April 6, 2014

American Exceptionalism and Natural Disasters

In People of Calamity, Kevin Rozario discusses how Americans, beginning with the earliest settlers of New England, came to view natural disasters in a somewhat positive light. That is, they began to see them as tests from God that would ultimately help them progress and become better people. It is important to note that these early settlers were coming from Europe, where there were fewer disasters and also better infrastructure to shelter people from nature in general. The New England puritans were intensely religious, and actually developed a sentiment that the frequent disasters they faced were actually a sign that God favored them over others. Rozario actually quotes one New England settler comparing the natural disasters they faced to those God used to test his “chosen” people of Israel in the Old Testament. That settler backs up his thinking by pointing out that the New England colony, a bastion of religion where people lived as God wished (as he believed), faced more natural disasters than other countries where he says the people “sin and do wickedly.” (41)

I found this line of thinking to be an interesting intersection between the environmental issue of natural disasters and the phenomenon of American exceptionalism, a line of thinking the pious New England colonists very much subscribed to. American exceptionalism is something historians have noted to be a big part of American culture and thought since the country’s settlement. William Bradford, the first governor of the Plymouth colony, famously decreed that the colony would be a “city upon a hill,” with the eyes of the rest of the world looking to them as an exemplar of morality. That line of thinking stemmed greatly from the Bradford and his followers’ specific brand of Christianity—they saw themselves as the only true followers of god; in other words, as an exceptional people. That belief was the driving force of their very worldview, and we see that fact represented in terms of how they came to saw natural disasters as yet another example of their unique relationship with God. I also believe this creates an interesting tension with the ideas Manish explains in his post about Southern Californians’ experience with natural disasters. As I understand from his post, it seems that Southern Californians approached nature and its disasters with a sense of carelessness. For example, as Manish points out, they seemed to underestimate the frequency and magnitude of earthquakes in their area. I find it interesting to compare this seeming lack of respect for nature with the New Englanders’ deeply serious belief that these disasters, in addition to being something to contend with, were an expression of God’s will for them to be great.

April 6, 2014

Natural Disasters and the Dominance of Capitalism

I had never previously thought of natural disasters as a way through which to analyze culture, politics, and economy. However, Biel’s introduction to American Disasters – especially his explanation of disasters being able to teach us about the “normal” workings of American society – convinced me of the utility of looking at disasters to interpret the arcs of American culture (5). I saw these “complex cultural resonances” clearly in Patricia Bixel’s “It Must Be Made Safe” (6).

Bixel’s “It Must Be Made Safe” tells the history of the aftermath of the devastating hurricane that struck Galveston, Texas in September 1900. Deaths were estimated between 6,000 and 8,000 people following the storm, and the damage inflicted upon the port city was assessed at $30 million (223). The determination of the residents of Galveston never to experience this again is where I first saw an example of the cultural resonances introduced by Biel. After the local government failed to secure the restoration of utilities to the city, many people saw the need to restructure the municipal government. This led to the passage of a new bill allowing two of the commissioners of Galveston to be elected by the populace, and three commissioners to be appointed by the governor (230). What I found interesting about this purge of the old government was that while Galvestonians had perceived their officials as corrupt for over a decade, it took a natural disaster to induce change (228). While the natural disaster destroyed much of the city, it also provided a pseudo-purification or purge of the iniquities of Galveston. In a way, the storm represented an opportunity for a new beginning. Most people thought the new government was more in tune to the interests of the people (230). However, I think those “people” who were able to capitalize on the revival provided by the flood were clearly those who held the most capital, and I think that is seen in the economic aftermath of the 1900 hurricane.

While the local government before the hurricane was criticized for its “self-interested” nature, the appointment of commissioners following the passage of the new city charter in Galveston demonstrated that not much had changed. These officials held substantial influence in politics and business, and were appointed on their ability to acquire money from potential lenders and expedite the construction of a sea wall in Galveston (235). Though the reformation of government and construction of the sea wall were said to promote the restoration of Galveston and improve the safety of its people, the reconstruction of the city was driven almost solely by a desire to remain the most important port city on the Gulf Coast (224). Many of the reconstruction efforts were aimed at restoring beaches for tourism (235). This reflects much of what we have been discussing in the past few weeks of class as the manipulation of nature can be traced by the flows of capital and interests of capitalists throughout Galveston.

Ironically, these efforts only led to the destruction of Galveston’s natural environment. Filling projects led to the destruction of many trees and plants because they were trapped under dredge material being used to raise the grade of the island (238). Construction of the sea wall led to the erosion of other Gulf Coast beaches (241). I think these examples lend themselves to supporting Manish’s point that many politicians and businessmen have been stubborn and reluctant to adapt to the threats of nature. To apply this theory to my example, moving the population and businesses of Galveston off the island and to a more suitable coast location were way too high for any businessmen or politicians to even seriously consider. This mindset, like Manish indicates, has “expanded beyond the check that nature institutes on society.” The profits promised by trying to manipulate nature were too desirable to leave. It is remarkable that even after being stricken and humbled by the power of natural disasters like the 1900 Galveston hurricane, mankind still assumes the conviction that nature is an entity to be conquered.

April 6, 2014

The Political Impact of Natural Disasters

Henry McKiven Jr. studies the political impact that natural disasters have had throughout history in his article “The Political Construction of a Natural Disaster: The Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1853.” McKiven begins by discussing one of the more recent examples of a natural disaster being used to push a political agenda, Hurricane Katrina, and how the left pushed the idea that the storm revealed entrenched institutional racism. While Katrina is a well-known example of a national disaster being used in greater politics, McKiven argues that disasters have had this role throughout history, and he presents the example of the Yellow Fever epidemic in nineteenth century New Orleans.

The epidemic occurred at a time of political upheaval in New Orleans local political. In the 1850s a reform movement was developing, but it was split among those who saw immigrants as the root of political corruption and those who thought the nativist leaders were at fault, while both took issue with the Democrats in power. The Yellow Fever epidemic broke out during this strife, and the nativist reformers blamed it on the poor hygiene of immigrants while the more open-minded reformers recognized the greater hygienic problem and proposed solutions. The Democrats in power contended that it was likely to be contained in poor neighborhoods, as the affluent were exempt, but eventually the disease started to spread to all classes. The government at that point had to act, but it was too late and it hurt their public standing, as McKiven writes “the press shifted its attention from the habits of newcomers and poor German and Irish immigrants to the failure of past governments” (740). While the split in the reformist movements between nativist and the less bigoted continued, the Young America faction was able to make a difference in the end, and political reform did take place as a result of the disaster.

Tying this natural disaster together with Katrina is easy because they both took place in New Orleans, and there were those who were accused of racist beliefs in both cases. While McKiven makes a greater argument about the political impact of natural disasters, I found his argument effective, as he traced the developing political opinions during the course of the disaster as new knowledge was learned, and showed how it made direct connections to the developing conflict between the reformers and the Democrats in power. However, since McKiven was writing in 2007, his argument does not apply a more recent natural disaster in Super Storm Sandy. I may have just been oblivious to any conflicts that took place, but I saw the disaster as more bringing people together politically than creating conflict, especially with members of opposing parties President Obama and Governor Christie (before more recent embarrassments) working harmoniously.

Like Brandon, I also found the note in Steven Biel’s introduction that there were no wars discussed in his book interesting, especially because I read it after McKiven’s article. While McKiven’s article was technically not about a war, it was about a conflict that could be described as a political war, and the main point of the piece was that natural disasters were used in these political wars. While McKiven’s work does not relate specifically to the statement because Biel is talking about literal wars, I still found it interesting as in my mind while reading about the conflict in New Orleans, I thought of it as a kind of war.

April 6, 2014

The Pros of Natural Disasters

Steven Biel asserts in his introduction, “the essays in this book recognize that disasters generate meaning” (4). The article by Kevin Rozario, titled “What Comes Down Must Go Up,” proposes that disasters portend a boon for American capitalism. Rozario focuses his article on the San Francisco fire and earthquake of 1906, but he also includes many other examples to support his claim. Rozario explains that disasters spark capitalism through a concept termed “creative destruction.” The term creative destruction insinuates, “that modern capitalist systems require the continual obliteration of outmoded goods and structures to clear space and make way for new production and development” (73). Essentially, as Rozario demonstrates using the example of San Francisco in 1906, the destruction of a city offers a clean slate for business. San Francisco had to be rebuilt, and cutting edge technology could be used to make the city better than it had been before. Beneficial financial opportunities abounded for bankers, investors, construction companies, and realtors. The rebuilding of San Francisco, as Rozario describes it, was a boon for capitalism.

Throughout the article, Rozario presents the idea of creative destruction in a positive light. Rozario focuses on the benefits and positive impacts that natural disasters have on capitalism. Then, in a sudden turn of events, Rozario concludes “the benefits, however, have not been spread equally, and we all have to find a way to live with and under a capitalist system that must constantly destroy to create, and at times seems to create solely in order to destroy” (96). I think this is a very valid point, but it is extremely underdeveloped in Rozario’s article. The conclusion leaves the reader wondering whether or not Rozario believes natural disasters have an overall positive effect on capitalism. As Manish notes in his post, humans have the opportunity to adapt to natural disasters. For much of the article, it seems as though Rozario is arguing that American capitalism has adapted and improved because of natural disasters. The closing paragraph, however, seems to question the entirety of his article. As previously mentioned, I think Rozario’s conclusion makes for an interesting discussion. The problem is that Rozario does not begin the discussion about the negative aspects caused by natural disasters in capitalist America, and instead leaves it entirely to the reader. The closing paragraph appears in complete opposition to the rest of the article, and Rozario offers no evidence to support his concluding claim.

Although it was not discussed in my particular chapter, I was intrigued by the statement in the introduction that “there are no chapters here about wars, which are the most devastating of all disasters, because somehow wars are perceived as a separate category of experience and a separate subject for study” (4). While I would agree that wars are not a natural disaster, I think that wars should still be considered at least a subcategory of disaster. Wars devastate the human population, infrastructure, marketplaces, and the order of everyday life just like natural disasters. Obviously wars are the result of human decisions, and not a natural occurrence outside of human control, but nevertheless they certainly constitute some type of disaster.

April 6, 2014

New Jersey and the Disasters that Devastate the Land

James K. Mitchell’s essay “American Disasters during the Twentieth Century: The Case of New Jersey” is an intriguing piece which analyzes a number of different types of natural disasters within the state. Throughout the piece, Mitchell argues that “natural disasters” are a result of humans interacting with dangerous environments, leading to the destruction that ensues (327). At the start of the piece, I was a little skeptical about this idea, but by the end, Mitchell has swayed my opinion through his specific examples.

One example that Mitchell drew heavily on, which inevitably influenced my decision to conform to his school of thought, was his description of fires within New Jersey. Though New Jersey’s climate is not the most ideal for the spread of a wildfire, the dryness in the environment that occurs during the summer months does create favorable conditions for this type of disaster. Even so, it still takes a spark to create the fire in the first place, which Mitchell attributes specifically to human hand. Whether it was locomotives creating sparks with the tracks which sparked a flame or a person purposefully lighting something on fire, Mitchell attributes a majority of wildfires in New Jersey during the 20^th century to humans (340-341). Due to humans, for a lack of better term, “playing with fire” in a region that tends to get pretty dry; they sparked the flames which created the massive devastation that we attribute to natural disasters. In this manner, it was humanity’s choice of acting in a hostile environment which created these disasters, which supports Mitchell’s argument regarding natural disasters.

Along with his claims about wildfires, Mitchell also analyzes humanity’s hand within droughts as well. Being from upstate New York and formerly living close to the New Jersey border, it was a little shocking at first to read about New Jersey suffering from droughts. Yet, after some thought on the matter, I realized that I was conflating my definition of a drought to a much larger scale, like something one might face in Arizona. After reassessing this definition, I noted that New York went through similar dry spells during the summer months, often resulting in the grass withering and browning. With this similar type of region in New Jersey, Mitchell noted that most registered droughts were a result of human use of the water supply (347). Again, within a region that tends to get dry, by humans using the water supply for x amount of things, like swimming pools, watering their lawn, etc., they create their own disaster through their actions. In a region that has a more abundant water supply, this type of natural disaster would be less likely, but because humans chose to inhabit this environment they are left to deal with the repercussions.

Manish makes some incredibly interesting comments about the lack of respect for nature by the people of Southern of California. Initially I was shocked to read his post about these people turning a blind eye to nature’s supremacy, instead creating their infrastructure with little concern to environmental threats. However, this mindset is something we have witnessed throughout our course with numerous people believing they could overcome nature. For example, our discussion on the Union General trying to shape the Mississippi and failing is a perfect portrayal of humanity continually believing themselves above nature’s power. Yet, with the devastation caused by natural disasters all over the country, we are reminded that humanity is simply another part of the ecosystem, with nature’s power reigning above all. Recognizing our place under nature’s power is important though for humanity’s growth in technology. As Manish references in his post, other people respond to natural disasters by improving their society in terms of safety and various forms of technology. In a backwards manner, one can almost view natural disasters as a good thing for society, as it sparks ongoing innovation.

April 5, 2014

Ecology of Fear Chapter 1

What is a disaster and what makes a disaster a disaster? These are two of the most difficult questions to answer about nature. Disasters are very unpredictable occurrences and how they relate to humans are difficult to determine. As Steven Biel notes in his article many see disasters as the antithesis to everyday life (5). Others such as Jonathan Bergman believe that disasters have a profound influence on our everyday lives. For Mississippians disaster was what forced them to develop their coast into a major tourist attraction thus establishing a stable component of their economy.

Bergman’s ideas seem to speak to a similar idea that Justin brought up in his post from last week. Justin talks about the interconnectedness of nature and humanity. One could not exist without the other. He also makes an interesting comment when he speaks about the constant reworking and repositioning of man’s relationship with nature.

When it comes to natural disasters humanity has two options. One, It can adapt like the Mississippians. For Bergman disasters operate as a check on human society. It provides them with opportunities to expand but also warns against overextension. It can act as a framework that allows us to build society on a strong and stable foundation. The second option is to try and build independently of nature. As Biel notes in his article “disasters evoke the defense of established ways…” (5) Despite what nature may deem necessary, man reverts back to the established ways.

This second option is what Mike Davis argues was the course for Southern California in the first chapter of his book Ecology of Fear. The goal of Davis in this chapter was to try and understand SoCal’s relationship to disaster and how this shaped the development of its cities and society. He begins the chapter by highlighting several of the natural disasters that hit the region. Despite these disasters Californians continued to present their state as the Mediterranean on the Pacific. It was supposed to be a perfect land that would see a disaster only once or twice a decade. According to Davis however, this belief in consistency was a flawed belief. The perfect nature of California landscape was a myth and that the perfectness of the landscape was overemphasized.

Due to this flawed understanding of the environment Californians constructed their societies without much thought to the tremendous power of natural disasters such as earthquakes. When they did devote some thought to safety they based their safety procedure on a limited and shortsighted disaster record. They assumed that the frequency and magnitude of these disasters would hold constant in the future. Recent science has indicated differently and has portrayed current patterns of disasters as an anomaly.

Most likely the future will bring about greater disasters and consequences. Regardless of these warnings politicians and businessmen have been unwilling to refit the structures of their buildings for they believed the cost to be too high. They have also failed to develop an effective enough emergency services program and so when disaster does strike the response will be relatively ineffective in comparison to what it should have been. Davis’ ultimate criticism of Southern California in this chapter was that politicians and industrialists have overlooked the power of disasters. They have expanded beyond the check that nature institutes on society. Even when science has indicated that a change is necessary, no change has occurred. Instead the established ways are reaffirmed which in time will reap a heavy price.