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Supplementary Reading: Disaster Citizenship: Survivors, Solidarity, and Power in the Progressive Era
“The Emergence of a National Politics of Disaster, 1865-1900”
By Gareth Davies
In his essay “The Emergence of a National Politics of Disaster, 1865-1900”, author Gareth Davies traces the evolution of a federal policy towards disaster. His argument contends that it wasn’t until the Civil War that the Federal Government became involved on a national level to an extent it had never before considered possible. This occurred through the creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Bureau came about because the Federal Government needed a clearinghouse to help escaped slave refugees that the “army had no choice but to shelter, clothe and feed.” Falling under the auspices of the War Department, the Freedmen’s Bureau and led by General Oliver Otis Howard. Howard found that his job was antithetical to what the Federal Government had provided to citizens up to that point in history. The Freedmen’s Bureau found itself protecting African Americans from violence, reuniting families and negotiate labor contracts.
The Freedmen’s Bureau became the point of relief distribution when a combination of natural disaster on an epic scale. For the first time a large-scale relief operation occurred when extreme flooding and crop failures swept the South two years in a row. According to Davies, this large-scale disaster had congress providing a budget to Howard which then extended the life of the bureau. The next year more flooding, crop failures and citizen destitution occurred again, but this year an added disaster infected the surviving crops. Caterpillars and cutworms swept through the area. There was an added factor of Yellow Fever epidemic that also devastated the area. Davies contends that the impact was so overwhelming that local governments and private citizens were unable to help. They were also unable or unwilling to “relieve the plight of African Americans.” This put the federal government in a position of having no alternative but to provide relief.
According to Davies, what truly began the relief movement came with the grasshopper plague that occurred in 1874. While the plague was known nationally, the extent of its effects were unknown. It wasn’t until an army major, James Brisbin, traveled through the area to find out if settlers needed more weapons for defense against Indian attacks that the truth of the devastation was revealed. Upon his return, Brisbin insisted that instead of arms, the War Department needed to send people to shoot down buffalo for food to feed the starving citizens. Unfortunately, congress was not in session at the time and it came down to president Grant to authorize the measure without congresses approval, he would seek it when congress returned. Such action freed up the Army to provide resources for those in the Platte area.
Davies also contends that federal relief policies developed from technological advancement. He argues that the development of two specific technological advances truly pressured congress and the federal government to provide relief to more disasters. The first advancement is not new technology. The railroad had been around prior to the Civil War, but it wasn’t until after the war that the railroad had national connections that helped to speed up communications and “change political culture in the more densely steeled areas of the East” The second technological advancement, the extension of the telegraph, sped up communication and allowed for an almost instantaneous reaction. With the telegraph, readers received news of a disaster almost immediately and would be provided updates and given dramatic accounts from various sources. Sometimes newspapers printed hourly updates from disaster areas. This led to the increase of letters in support of relief to congressmen. Davies argues that the simultaneous advancements with both the telegraph and the railroad was more impactful towards the federal government developing a policy of disaster aid than anything else at the time. Davies also shows that not every disaster received federal funding. The more dramatic the public perceived a disaster to be, the more likely it was to receive said funding. One example used by Davies, is the Chicago Fire. On the same day of the Chicago Fire, a more deadly and damaging fire occurred in eastern Wisconsin, killing as many as twenty-five hundred people. Due to the remoteness of the area and lack of dramatic retelling of the event, it never got the attention of the nation and no aid was provided to this area from the Federal Government.
While Davies looks at the development of a policy of Federal Disaster Relief funding compliments the reading for this week. Jacob Remes’ book Disaster Citizenship: Survivors, Solidarity, and Power in the Progressive Era looks at the local impact of such disasters and how local authorities worked with and against the federal government to provide aid and compete for power structure within a devastated locale. Where Davies article leaves off, Remes’ book begins. Both show how devastating a disaster can be and both look at the political structure surrounding relief aid. While Davies looks federally, Remes looks to the local and private authorities of each city.
Gareth Davies, “The Emergence of a National Politics of Disaster, 1865–1900,” J. Policy Hist. Journal of Policy History 26, no. 03 (2014): 306, doi:10.1017/s0898030614000141.
Davies, 306.
Davies, 307.
Davies, 307.
Davies, 310-311.
Davies, 312.
Davies, 314.
Davies, 317.