February 2014 – Page 2 – American Disasters

February 25, 2014December 16, 2020

Issues across the Isthmus: The Disaster of Malaria During Construction of the Panama Canal

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Issues across the Isthmus: The Disaster of Malaria During Construction of the Panama Canal

The Panama canal is often remembered as a pinnacle of human achievement and as a testament to human ingenuity. More recently, some of the negative aspects of the canal have come into the zeitgeist, but much of the negative focus is placed on the shady political tactics used by the United States. This paper will focus on the hidden killer that ravaged the workers on the Panama canal. Thousands of workers died during construction of the canal, and most of these workers were low-wage minorities. This paper asks, how did, in the context of the American Gilded Age, race manifest itself in the deaths and the reaction to the deaths during construction of the Panama canal? Within this exploration, this paper will explore if social darwinism had a role in these outcomes. Malaria is a disease that humanity has been coping with for thousands of years, yet it took a massive toll on the workers. In India, British colonists had been drinking tonic water for decades to prevent malaria. This paper then examines wether these deaths were a necessary evil or not. Could more have been done to prevent them? This will link up well to the question of race. The Panama canal revolutionized the world economy, and radically reduced the time it took to ship by sea. While heralded by industrialists, did this really help the average American, or world citizen? Finally, this paper asks wether the Panama canal was a necessary evil. Did the costs outweigh the benefits? Who is benefiting? In order to achieve these goals this paper will use a wide variety of sources. First, official construction records will be incredibly useful for numbers and statistics about workers and deaths. It will also help answer many of the economic components of the questions this paper asks. Then journals would be extremely useful for this paper, but they can be hard to find, especially the journals of poor, immigrant workers, who may or may not be either literate or fluent in english. The journals will probably be most helpful in getting the elite perspective on the canal. Another source for the elite perspective on the canal could be American newspaper articles published during construction and right after completion about the glory of the canal. The hardest sources to find will be the non-elite perspective. For this, secondary source materials on the canal will be the most useful in conveying the feelings of the workers.

February 25, 2014December 16, 2020

Charleston Earthquake Project Proposal

Sarah Walters

Disasters in the Gilded Age

Final Project Proposal

February 21, 2014

Shaking Stone, Support, and Sickness: The 1886 Charleston Earthquake

For my final paper, I would like to focus on the 1886 Charleston Earthquake. I’m interested in the topic because I have always lived in the South, Charleston is probably one of my favorite cities, and many Gilded Age disasters seem to be somewhat concentrated in the North and Midwest rather than the South. I also find the disaster compelling because it seemed so unexpected. In contrast with the Peshtigo and Chicago fires, where small fires had been cropping up constantly, Charleston did not necessarily expect an earthquake. Already troubled by Reconstruction, economic troubles, and a hurricane the previous year, Charleston was hit by an earthquake of a magnitude between 6.6 and 7.3 on the Richter scale in 1886. It was one of the most severe earthquakes to ever hit the southeastern United States. Previously, Charleston had experienced very little seismic activity. The earthquake seemed to be rather unexpected.

How did the structure and architecture of Charleston affect the amount of damage in the 1886 earthquake? From preliminary research, it seems like the amount of stone and brick buildings in Charleston created more damage; wooden buildings were more likely to sway with the earth. I found this to be an interesting contrast with the Great Chicago fire and all the wooden structures that increased the amount of damage. For this question, I might look at photographs of the disaster, tallies of the extent and location of damage, and perhaps personal letters describing the aftermath of the earthquake.

How did Charleston recover from the damage—specifically, where did support come from and why? I could consider state and federal records to see if government support was sent. I might also look at newspapers to see how widespread the coverage of the earthquake was and the amount of response. From my initial research, it appears like most of Charleston’s financial support came from private sources. Yet even without state and federal support, many sources suggested Charleston made a rapid recovery. Sometimes it appeared the city repaired itself more quickly than other disaster-stricken areas that did receive government support.

Finally a man named Ezekiel Stone Wiggins predicted that a disaster even more destructive than the Charleston earthquake would occur. His prophecy caused some Americans to panic and a few newspapers published his sensationalist ideas to grab attention. Other newspapers, however, decried Wiggins as a fool and made fun of his predictions. The expected disaster never arrived, but Wiggins highlights some of the fear and irrationality behind disasters. How did the Charleston earthquake psychologically affect people? I might look at newspaper articles on Wiggins or perhaps his own writings. I could also look at personal letters detailing people’s emotional response to the event. I have also found doctors’ reports of nausea, headaches, losing hair, and increased use of sedatives among earthquake survivors.

Update: I’ll be focusing my research on the last question.

February 25, 2014December 16, 2020

Gilded Age Topic Proposal

Lodged between the
jammed pack Civil War and reconstruction era and the booming Progressive Era of
the early 20^th century, the Gilded Age lends itself to critiques as
a time where the nation was littered with fraud, corruption and rotten to the
core. The term “Gilded Age” was coined from the title of the novel published by
Charles Dudley Warner and Mark Twain in 1873, and as the decades passed,
scholars from the 20^th century began to unanimously deem this term
an appropriate descriptor for the period. This label for the late 18^th
century has caused much evaluation from historians ever since the 20^th
century and has had rather larger implications then possibly predicted. Since
the mid-20^th century, Gilded Age historians have gone through
serious reevaluation in an effort, not to deny what happened during the period,
but rather assess the practicality of the Gilded Age as a serious and study
worthy period of the American history. In the past few decades, scholarship on
the viability of the Gilded Age, upon closer examination, has revealed some new
ways of envisioning the term “Gilded Age” and has lent itself to the question:
if the late 1800s was not the Gilded Age, they ask, then what was it? Other
historical questions surrounding this scholarship are: does the period between
the Civil War and the Progressive Era even deserve a periodization of its own
and if new historians deem the Gilded Age as not worthy of its name then do we
have to discuss the practicality of combining it with the Progressive Era as a
period of grassroots movement and establishment of a foundation for the
Progressive Era? Some primary sources that I would want to analyze would be
newspaper clippings during and after the Gilded Age period to look for the
shift in labeling this period, possibly political speeches that address the
times of the period and how it will be categorized in the future. Also, it
might be beneficial to look at historical magazine articles to see and analyze
any scholarship coming out at that time regarding the outlook of the period its
difference from the Civil War Era.

February 25, 2014December 16, 2020

Looking Out for Your Own: Empathy’s Role in Disaster Relief

My paper will seek to understand the role that demographical similarity between those affected by disasters and those responding to disasters plays in the mobilization and formulation of aid and legislation. More specifically, I’m curious if aid is more likely to come from those who are demographically similar to victims. I will examine the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 and the Triangle Fire of 1911. I find these two sources to be of particular interest due to the ways in which their contrasting narratives might manifest themselves into contrasting aid objectives. Much of the narrative surrounding the Chicago Fire centered on upper class hardships due to the removal of social barriers and subsequent abuse by Chicago’s lower class. In contrast the dominant narrative of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire centered on the exploitation of the lower class by a predatory and greedy upper class. One of the questions that must be addressed in order to pursue this topic is whether or not differing focuses on aid, in particular maintenance of class boundaries versus lower class protection, developed over time rather than as specific responses to each disaster. More specifically, was the lower class focus of the Triangle Fire’s recovery a product of the ‘progressive era’ rather than specific to the Triangle Fire itself? Conversely, was the upper class focus of the recovery efforts for the Great Chicago Fire stem from the era’s emphasis on speculation and economic productivity over social responsibility? Answers for this question could potentially be found by comparing which organizations led the relief efforts for disasters occurring around the time of the Chicago fire and the Triangle fire. Another question is whether the response to the Chicago Fire even favored the upper class over the lower class? The existence of committees such as the “Special Relief Committee” of the Relief and Aid Society suggests that it might have, though this was only a small facet of the recovery effort. A third question that is extremely central to the overarching thrust of this paper revolves around the rationale of charity. Are people more inclined to provide aid when they can identify with the victims of a disaster? This has important implications for both the Chicago Fire and the Triangle fire; an understanding of who is leading the relief effort is invaluable for understanding the type of relief that the disaster prompted. Primary sources that will be valuable for understanding both this question and the topic on the whole include newspaper articles (particularly whether an event is more likely to be discussed by a progressive or conservative paper), records of donations (who was most compelled to give aid), accounts of rallies or demonstrations following the disaster (the funeral processions following the Triangle Fire were absolutely massive and demonstrate overwhelming conviction despite many of its participants being too poor to donate), and records of the organizations leading the relief effort (the Chicago Fire was led by the a society comprised of industrial leaders, the Triangle fire was led by unions and women’s societies).

February 25, 2014December 16, 2020

Research Proposal: The Cholera Epidemic of 1832

Research Proposal

Blog Post 5 (for Thursday, 2/27)

Tentative title: “Disease in the Modern World: The Cholera Epidemic of 1832”

The cholera epidemic of 1832 killed thousands of people and caused panic cross multiple continents. Seemingly healthy individuals could become diseased and die within hours. The circumstances of modernity— industrialization, urbanization, globalization and immigration — especially exacerbated the outbreak of cholera in New York City. Industrialization eroded the air and water in urban environments. Urbanization resulted in areas of highly concentrated population. Globalization connected the world in unprecedented ways, allowing for the transfer of goods and people. Immigrants brought disease along with them. The cholera epidemic of 1832 exemplified the relationship between modernity and disaster during the Gilded Age. It also demonstrated class disparity. Because the disease was spread through water supplies, members of the lower class were far more susceptible. Wealthy residents had access to cleaner water and better medical attention. Those who had the means fled the city seeking refuge.

The cholera epidemic of 1832 suggests the following historical questions: what was the relationship between American industrialization, immigration, globalization and the conditions that led to the cholera epidemic of 1832? What was the significance of class disparity during the cholera epidemic? To what extent was nature responsible for the cholera epidemic, and to what extent was mankind? What makes a Gilded Age/Progressive Era disaster different from other kinds of disaster, and in what ways does the cholera panic demonstrate this distinction? How do reactions to this particular epidemic illuminate contemporary perspectives of disaster?

There are many different angles from which to view the cholera epidemic of 1832, and as a result, there are many different types of relevant sources. Secondary sources are useful for gaining context for some of the larger themes surrounding the disaster, such as industrialization, urbanization, globalization, immigration and class disparity. I wasn’t able to find any articles that synthesized these broad but indisputably linked themes, unfortunately. Certain books, however, seemed promising. For example, Silent Travelers by Alan Kraut examines the connection between immigration and the transfer of disease during the Gilded Age/Progressive Era, and how this connection contributed to xenophobia. Primary sources would be useful to tease out the tones with which people spoke about immigration and class disparity. Medical journals would be useful to explain how the disease works, how it is transmitted, and the processes for treating it. A study of relationship between modernity and the cholera epidemic of 1832 would necessarily include a wide range of sources.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

A Feeling of Fresh Perspective

As I was reading the first three chapters of The Johnstown Flood, I felt like I was reading literature, not history. I knew McCullough had the ability to do this, though, as I have read his other works before. I also know almost nothing about the Johnstown flood, so I feel like I can read it from a fresh perspective, getting lost in the story.

With that said, I do not think that McCullough properly places blame while assessing the flood. After reading about many different disasters, their causes, and effects in class, I feel like blame cannot be solely placed on one person or one group of people. A mix of unexpectedness and unpreparedness definitely contributes to disasters, but I do not feel as though a sole party is at fault, especially in the case of the Johnstown flood. McCullough argues that the elites were responsible for the flood, but another historian could argue that the lack of proper building codes that have yet to be put in place by the government. If I were looking at the disaster as a stand alone, I might, like jewarren, place blame on a sole party, but because I have studied multiple different disasters up to this point in the course, I’m much more wary of quickly trying to find a specific cause of the catastrophe. I think McCullough is a great historian and writer, but I am not even sure if I agree with what is on the back cover, which hints at placing blame on the elites, but I guess that making a bold claim makes for more interesting writing, whether or not you agree with it.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Selfish Living or Acceptable Ignorance

Reading the first three chapters of David McCullough’s book, it is obvious that McCullough attempts to blame a variety of people for the events around the 1889 storm. However, I believe some of the targeting is a too harsh and unwarranted, especially on the members of the South Fork organization. Clearly McCullough tries to place considerable blame on these elite businessmen who established, lived, and were members of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club. Pointing out members like Carnegie who willingly financed the dam’s research, acknowledged the risks presented by Fulton and Morrell, yet ignored calls to fix the structure. McCullough is extremely harsh on the men of the South Fork essentially stating that their frugality endangered Johnstown. However, the more I read chapter two and three, the more I tended to agree with Catherine that this disaster should not be blamed on these people. During the second chapter especially, I could not help but think of extravagant homes from around the word and potential blame if something extreme were to happen. For example, you hear about celebrity homes on the foothills of LA that clear out vast amounts of space for views of the downtown or houses in Malibu built on cliffs for better ocean views. Should we blame them for forest fires in dry areas because some material in their houses slightly expedited the natural progression of a fire? If an earthquake were to hit, could we blame those in Malibu for potential landslides because their houses disrupted natural landscape? Additionally, I thought of houses along ski resorts and if an avalanche were to occur, would we blame those inhabitants that who created a cliff while building their house, ultimately facilitating an avalanche? I understand there is a difference between these example and building an unstable dam, yet I just do not think you can put blame for these people for the severity of the rain was what caused most of the problems. As McCullough states, the rain had already caused flood from anywhere between 2-10 feet before the dam broke. This storm produced rain unlike anything ever produced or ever expected. As Sarah points out the engineers did everything according to code and did a “competent job”. Everything was up to standard set up by the government and maintaining the dam was not a requirement. The residents of the club had done everything legally required.

Placing blame for something unnatural starts a slippery slope when it comes to proving a precedent for responsibility. By definition, unnatural is something out of the ordinary; impossible to predict. By placing blame on the elite members along the Fork, people are implying that they should predict the future. The storm was of greater magnitude than ever expected so how could one prepare for something like that. I feel this would be very different had a smaller rain storm destroyed the walls because that was something that could have happened at any time. Going back to the house at a ski resort, if there were to be a snow storm of epic scale followed by a subsequent avalanche, could we blame the person when for x number of years their cliff had produced no problems. So long as regulations are met, we cannot place blame for predicting the unexpected. That is not to say that these people did not inhibit to the severity of the damage, yet there needs to be a line between willful endangerment and something like this.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Who is to Blame?

After a disaster of such magnitude like the Johnstown Flood, the natural inclination is to attempt to blame somebody(s) or something for the tragic event. The cause of the flood could be attributed to the deforestation, cyclical flooding, and industrialization like Schmidt points out. The people of Johnstown were accustomed to frequent floods and viewed them as a part of life. On the other hand, the owners of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club and the expert they hired to assess the strength of the dam could also be at fault. Ruff, the man hired to oversee the maintenance of the dam could also be a culprit since he ignored the advice of John Fulton who believed the dam would break.

I believe the improper maintenance of the dam is to blame for the disaster, while environmental factors exacerbated the damage. If the dam had been properly managed the incredible magnitude of the flood could have been averted. The question now becomes: whose job was it to maintain the dam? Were the owners of South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club responsible? Or was Ruff guilty of ignoring the danger the dam presented? Both parties share a portion of the blame. As a proprietor of a piece of land, it becomes the responsibility of an owner to ensure all structures on the land are sturdy—especially when not doing so places human lives in danger. Ruff was guilty of ignoring voices that said the dam was structurally unsound. Both Ruff and the owners were negligent but in different ways.

Lastly, I want to comment on how the Johnstown Flood fits into the narrative of the Gilded Age made by Edwards. Edwards presents the notion of The Wedge to explain the distance between the working class and the rich industrialists. Seemingly, the relationship between the wealthy residents of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club and the working class inhabitants of Johnstown fits into this narrative. I think this, however, would oversimplify the relationship. McCullough mentions the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club employing local residents of Johnstown to do construction work. Additionally, Johnstownians were proud that they had such wealthy neighbors. While there is clearly an economic and geographical wedge, this situation does not fit into the category of extreme disconnect that Edwards believes in. There seems to be a comfortable homeostasis between the two groups.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Neglect and Responsibility, Past and Present

From the recent coal ash spill in North Carolina (http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/dam/assets/140209142643-01-nc-coal-ash-ap749629851608-horizontal-gallery.jpg)

Although nowhere near as damaging at the Johnston Flood, about two weeks ago some North Carolinians experienced a different sort of flood themselves when a storm water pipe broken beneath one of Duke Energy’s 14 coals ash ponds. Duke Energy reported that 50,000 to 82,000 tons of coal ash and up to 27 million gallons of water were released from a coal ash pond in Eden, about 130 miles northeast of Charlotte. The containments are still flowing into the Dan River. The preliminary reports suggest that the coal ash ponds in North Carolina lack stringent regulations and that the pipe that broke had not been properly maintained. (Sound familiar?) These reports led the New York Times to publish, “North Carolina citizens have good reason to wonder just whom their environmental regulators are trying to protect.” The question now: who are we to blame?

In the case of the Johnstown Flood, I agree with Jean and Catherine, we should hold people accountable. Jean pointed out that using a more structuralist approach we can blame “Ignorance and focus on capital, reputation and pride that a person holds often clouds the vision of doing what is right.” We can also blame the mindset of the people in Johnstown. As Victor Hesier would later recall, “The townspeople, like those who live in the shadow of Vesuvius, grew calloused to the possibility of danger. ‘Sometime’ they thought, ‘that dam will just give way, but it won’t ever happen to us!’ (66).” And if you want to point fingers at someone specific, maybe try Benjamin Ruff, the man in charge of the dam’s restoration.

But with so many running narratives – is it even useful to attribute blame? This is the question that the current North Carolina and federal governments are facing in dealing with the coal ash. Federal prosecutors recently order dozens of subpoenas seeking documents from Duke and the N.C. Department of Environment and National Resources. Critics are also looking to Governor Pat McCrory for appointing businessman John Skvarla as head of the department.

But at the end of the day we must hold people responsible for the coal ash and the Johnston Flood; ignorance is not a good enough excuse. If you are going to intentionally manipulate nature, you better intentionally manage it, if not for the sake of environmentalism, for the people. These two tawdry tales illustrate the need for stricter regulation and enforcement. Why can’t we learn from the past?

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Clouding the Water

David McCullough sets the scene by introducing a range of characters from the wealthy to the middle class of Johnstown. Setting up the scene allows McCullough to give narratives that provide background information that sets up the reader for the disaster that is going to occur.

Location of Johnstown is important when understanding the flood and the severity of its impact on the town. As Sarah mentions in her post, Johnstown was an area that was exposed to and prone to unexpected rains and windstorms. The location in a valley makes Johnstown specifically susceptible to flooding. Comparing the Chicago Fire of 1871 and the Johnstown Flood of 1889 many similarities can be drawn. Both places had natural elements that made them vulnerable to hazardous elements whether it is fire or rain. Catherine points out that there are many parallels between the two disasters, in both the Fire and the Flood the often threats of damage, but no actual harm caused people to become immune to the actual threats of a serious fire or flooding. More specifically in Johnstown, there were many written accounts of the threats that were given to the South Fork dam. “In 1881, the dam threw a terrific scare into the people in the valley. On the morning of June 10, during a flash flood, a rumor spread through Johnstown that the damn was about to break.” (63) Throughout the years until 1889 there was not much cause for alarm because the threats of calamity only proved to be rumors. So, in the wake of a disaster people are disorganized and are not fully aware of the dangers.

Touching upon the aspect of blame, I disagree with Sarah post because in this instance there are people who can be held accountable. Ignorance and focus on capital, reputation and pride that a person holds often clouds the vision of doing what is right. There were many opportunities for the dam to be fixed, and as hindsight is always 20/20 there were telltale signs of a dam that needed amending. Thus far, McCullough has presented the information about Benjamin Ruff who was in charge of the restoration of the old dam. Ruff was put off by the findings of John Fulton, associate to Daniel Morrell (a man who held a high reputation), who sent Fulton to check the status of the South Fork dam. Fulton saw the faults of the dam, the erosion and lack of upkeep, gave great concerns to urgent correcting the issues. Ruff was put off by Fulton’s findings and disregarded his suggestions as he saw Fulton as less then competent. While the blame is not solely on Ruff, it was people with his attitude that accompanied to the devastation of the flood.