mamorte – American Disasters

April 30, 2014December 16, 2020

The Dust Bowl: An End to The Gilded Age or a Critique on Government

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Clayton Koppes two part book review of Paul Bonniefied’s The Dust Bowl and Donald Worster’s Dust Bowl offers an interesting comparison on two books about the same general topic. Koppes strongly favors Worster’s book as a more compelling use of the Dust Bowl for a general critique on capitalism, government policy, and technological impact on the environment. As Price cunningly notes in his post, Koppes praises Worster’s use of the Dust Bowl as an example the failures regarding short term New Deal relief, the flaws in agricultural capitalism, the misuse of land, and the need to blame Midwest farmers for the Dust Bowl. Further Koppes critiques Bonnefield’s emphasis on natural blame for the Dust Bowl, as Bonnefield insists that capitalism, free market economics, and technology had little impact on this disaster. From my prospective, it seems almost impossible to argue one way or another about Koppes opinion. As I have read neither book, I am forced to accept Koppes’ interpretation of the author’s arguments as true, well thought out and warranted. If everything that Koppes interprets and reviews is true, I would say his article seems justified. Nevertheless, one must be careful as Koppes could very well have had an ideological bias behind his review.

When I was reading this book review, I could not think about the historical significance of the Dust Bowl. As Koppes notes, there has been little scholarly work covering the Dust Bowl and of the work that has been done, there is still much debate about the cultural, economic, environmental, governmental, and historical significance. There seems to be large scientific evidence (as noted in Worster’s use of the lack of grass cover, diminished crop yield, and the lowered population rate in affected areas) that humans, pushed mostly by the government, attributed to Dust Bowl and the black blizzards. While we can blame whomever we would like, the question must now be about the historical meaning of the Dust Bowl. If we consider Worster’s argument and place the entire blame on the government and capitalism does this mean we should extend the Gilded Age through the 1930’s? If it was truly the government wanting to extend power to large corporations through exploitative measures, certainly this seems justified. As seen in this course, the Gilded Age was defined by disasters of premature technological innovation and favored the expansion of powerful companies. However does this mean that the Gilded Age continued into the 1980’s like Koppes mentions? How much does government favor large corporations and big business even today? Should we blame capitalism for modern environmental disasters or do we blame the failures of technology and ignorance? Personally, I think Koppes book review opens up many different discussion points about the meaning of the Dust Bowl. The 1930’s is often considered a hybrid time period mixed between the Depression and World War II and thus many of the events have been underreported. I do not think we can expand the Gilded Age and place blame for the Dust Bowl on Gilded Age policy or any economic policy. From what I have interpreted about these two books, the Dust Bowl seems more an unknown consequence of government policy. The New Deal policy was not purposely imposed for the destruction of natural land nor for the promotion of big business. It was more what FDR thought would be the best temporary fix for the Depression and unfortunately the Dust Bowl was an unforeseen problem.

April 7, 2014December 16, 2020

Titanic Remembrance through Recovery

Throughout Biel’s second part titled “Memories” I was particularly struck by the idea of recovery. While I believe in many of the narratives about Titanic fascination, something about the 1985 recovery effort seemed disturbing. In the past twenty years, the rediscovery of the Titanic has drastically altered public perception. Instead of remembering the tragedy, society seems to have depersonalized the loss of so many lives.

Living relatively close to Woods Hole, I find it very hard to imagine the entire world focusing on this small Massachusetts town. Robert Ballard represented the frontier of man, venturing into the unknown. The symbolic nature made this small town and researcher much more than they intended. Yet, should Ballard be elevated as an explorer, frontiersman, or simply an opportunist? Biel even makes Ballard out to be someone is troubled by his prolific success. The idea of using someone else’s tragedy into profit seems almost dirty and wrong. Nevertheless, society remains addicted to the Titanic. Based on the references to Titanic buffs, Titanic memorabilia, and even the recreation attempts today, we are drawn to it despite the catastrophic nature. The Titanic even has a permanent exhibit at the Luxor in Las Vegas, right next to the Jabbawockeez and Carrot Top. The Titanic has a cultural draw. Nevertheless, my fascination with the world’s obsession makes me wonder what is next. Are we drawn because of the length of time it took us to uncover the artifacts, the fact that we know so little about the ocean depths (more about space than the ocean floor), the popular appeal through the media (movies, plays, and books) or because it is the biggest failure of modern technology. As AJ notes Biel brings in every detail for metaphoric comparison. The promotion of the Titanic has historically been for significant promotion of policy change. However is it possible that our society sees tragedy and just tragedy and revels in uncertainty? There seems to be an eerie comparison between the mysteries surrounding the Titanic and the search efforts for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. Certainly it seems that the uncertainty about location and the troubles can be related to the Titanic. The longer the mystery, the more interest grows. Similar to what Biel implies, maybe only when technology uncovers technology’s failures will we accept what happened.

On a side note, I thought Biel’s afterword about modern phrases about Titanic usage was very well thought out. Considering the word alone has “become a facile, all-purpose reference point for negligence, incompetence, obviousness, or futility” has Titanic fever spread because of the word or the tragedy. Had the Titanic been named something else, something more original and not a common adjective, would the word still live in infamy? The word has not changed definition, but through the negative connotations, now the word has a new meaning. Politicians, students, and professionals use the word often only as a negative word for size. Nevertheless, the word still has the same definition. Does this help with the memory of this tragedy or diminish the meaning? By only using the word “titanic” as a metaphor colossal failure, we not only ruin the word but disrespect the event.

Research Update:

As an extension of my blog post, I will update the progress of my final paper. After reviewing several primary and secondary sources, I was surprised at how accurate the preliminary damage reports were for the Great New England Hurricane. Nevertheless, my general thesis stands unchanged. Essentially, while the US Weather Bureau and the media overlooked this storm, ultimately nothing could have changed the destruction. The Storm was unlike anything that has ever hit the area and, in reality, nothing could have prevent the coastal destruction.

March 26, 2014December 16, 2020

Life in a Bubble or Life on the Edge

After reading both Mike Davis’ and Ted Steinberg’s articles about the buildup of California and specifically Los Angeles and San Francisco within the past century, I could not help but be drawn to numerous ethical and psychological dilemmas faced by all those associated with the region. Both articles paint an ominous forecast for California and imply inevitable devastation. They clearly show how vulnerable the area is and how likely a massive catastrophe (most likely greater than the 1906 earthquake) is in the near future. Nevertheless, I find their arguments pushing for relocation shortsighted. I think they draw on some unique scientific proof, but their suggestions seem unrealistic. Individuals residing in California have understood the risks and still proceed with their lives. Scaring residents of Los Angeles and San Francisco will ultimately change little, for they have understood the risks for some time.

Let me begin with some of the facts that Davis points to. He notes the unusual climate and geological location of California implying how the region is susceptible to weather anomalies. He notes that the rivers hardly ever reach their flowing average, but on the rare occasion they do, can flow at 3000 times their capacity. How after taking land samples, the area had experience catastrophic droughts comparable to Mayan proportions. Finally, he notes how the vaults are ticking time bombs ready for explosion. Forecasters predict an 80-90% chance of a big earthquake by 2025 and that in the past 195 years there should have been 17 catastrophic earthquakes, yet only 2 have actually occurred. Essentially, the area is doomed. At any point there could be a flood, a drought, a heat wave, or a massive earthquake. But isn’t the climate what makes California so beautiful and appealing. I’m not implying that people live in California for the risk of disaster, but that people see this tropical, Mediterranean mix as an appealing hybrid. The risks are a natural consequence for living in such a nice area. Even if there is a “dry spell” of earthquakes, people continue to play the game of chance. We are always playing the odds and clearly the climate of the west coast is appealing.

From an economic prospective, the growth of the region makes relocation impossible. People moved out west for economic promise and hope for a better life. As Steinberg notes, even in the immediate aftermath of 1906, the region quickly rebuilt. By the 1930’s people began building for profit and in the 1950’s there was an explosion of housing. The Redwood shores are a great example. Real estate moguls built up the area and even hired scientists to prove that their housing was no greater risk than anywhere else. Basically, if they didn’t do it, someone else would have. Sherwood makes some great points in his post that I believe support this claim. The conspiracy about the blame on businessmen for the improper memorialization of the 1906 earthquake is unwarranted. Capitalism is part of our United States’ culture and someone took the opportunity that was there. There was now an economic draw because people were moving their businesses out west and families therefore relocated. By the middle of the century the reward in terms of livelihood was too great to ignore and risk became almost a non-factor. Even today, as Davis notes, the government (Clinton administration) pumped money into Southern California so there is an economic investment that cannot be ignored.

Finally, while both authors note the costs of abandoning the west coast, the reality is impossible. Who would fit the bill for disaster fortification? From the governments prospective they have four choices: 1. Stop people from living in dangerous area (but the California government would lose millions in taxes and lose residents) 2. Force earthquake remodeling (California would lose millions again because people would sell buildings at lower costs and relocate) 3. Pay for remodeling out of their own budget (but as Davis notes, the people in CA not from the vulnerable area would feel their tax money is wasted) or 4. Do nothing and proceed as is. Unless there is a disaster, the government will always do number four. From an individual prospective, it fiscally does not make sense to remodel. Insurance agencies pay up to 43% for a destructed house. If you put in twice the money that your house is worth remodeling for earthquake prevention and the house still gets destroyed, you basically double your losses. From an economic standpoint, people are willing to task the risk. Steinberg notes that a city like San Francisco would need to spend $835 million to save 415 lives. While you cannot put a dollar amount on a life, neither the city nor an individual will willingly sacrifice that much when it is still a game of chance. We cannot expect people to live in a bubble or alter their lives completely to construct this bubble. Californians know their risk and we should all step back praying that they continue to beat the system.

February 26, 2014December 16, 2020

Blaming Forecasting for Inevitable Destruction

For my final paper I will be looking at the Great New England Hurricane of 1938 and analyzing how the lack of hurricane understanding combined with the extreme nature of the storm made this hurricane the single most destructive natural disaster in New England history. In the modern era of data collection and meteorological study, the Northeast had no precedent or experience with hurricanes. More accustom to snow and winter weather, this storm took forecasters, the entire country, and New Englanders by complete surprise. Truly the Great New England Hurricane was the perfect storm for such destruction. Preoccupied by instability in Europe, the media underreported the potential power. Meteorologists not only lacked hurricane forecasting equipment in the region, they incorrectly assured the region that the storm would not make landfall. Finally, the hurricane acted unusually by taking unexpected turns, rapidly gaining speed, and somehow gaining power through colder water. Therefore, my paper will explain how the entire region was unprepared due to coincidence and scientific failure. Many theorize that sole responsibility lies on poor forecasting, yet I believe that even if New England knew of the projected path, the storm was so powerful and the region was so inexperienced with hurricane reaction that nothing could have prevented the destruction.

As for sources, I have several secondary sources that intend I to research and a general idea for primary sources. My focus will be on RA Scotti’s book Sudden Sea: the Great Hurricane of 1938. This 2003 collection of newspapers articles, eyewitness accounts, and archival testimonial, will provide great primary sources. Additionally, I intend to request titles like New York-New England Hurricane and Floods, 1938; Official Report of Relief Operations and A Wind to Shake the World: The Story of the 1938 Hurricane as two other books that focus on primary source accounts. In preliminary research, newspapers like the New York Times, the Cape Cod Times, and the Hartford Times have shown good potential as well. Finally, I intend to use recorded transmission from meteorologists and other testimonial from forecasters along the East Coast. As for secondary sources, JSTOR and EBSCOhost both have limited selections of historical research about this specific storm, but there are many books available through WorldCat. Historians and scientist have researched this hurricane from multiple angles, including the immediate reaction and response, so I should have no trouble compiling a historiography regarding my specific topic.

As I research there are several topics and question I intend to answer when narrowing my topic and thesis. Looking at hurricane research and study during the 1930’s, I want to explore differences between forecasting in Europe, the Southeast, and the Northeast. Additionally, I want to research a history of all Northeast hurricanes and see if any other storms produced the wind speed, storm surge, damage inland, or destruction throughout the entire region like the 1938 hurricane. Finally, by researching testimonial of citizens along the coastline, I should be able to compile an understanding of expectations, preparedness, and consequences for future storms. In answering these questions and topics I will prove that the New England Hurricane of 1938 was truly unique and that that while better forecasting would have minimized some damage, most of the destruction was inevitable.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Selfish Living or Acceptable Ignorance

Reading the first three chapters of David McCullough’s book, it is obvious that McCullough attempts to blame a variety of people for the events around the 1889 storm. However, I believe some of the targeting is a too harsh and unwarranted, especially on the members of the South Fork organization. Clearly McCullough tries to place considerable blame on these elite businessmen who established, lived, and were members of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club. Pointing out members like Carnegie who willingly financed the dam’s research, acknowledged the risks presented by Fulton and Morrell, yet ignored calls to fix the structure. McCullough is extremely harsh on the men of the South Fork essentially stating that their frugality endangered Johnstown. However, the more I read chapter two and three, the more I tended to agree with Catherine that this disaster should not be blamed on these people. During the second chapter especially, I could not help but think of extravagant homes from around the word and potential blame if something extreme were to happen. For example, you hear about celebrity homes on the foothills of LA that clear out vast amounts of space for views of the downtown or houses in Malibu built on cliffs for better ocean views. Should we blame them for forest fires in dry areas because some material in their houses slightly expedited the natural progression of a fire? If an earthquake were to hit, could we blame those in Malibu for potential landslides because their houses disrupted natural landscape? Additionally, I thought of houses along ski resorts and if an avalanche were to occur, would we blame those inhabitants that who created a cliff while building their house, ultimately facilitating an avalanche? I understand there is a difference between these example and building an unstable dam, yet I just do not think you can put blame for these people for the severity of the rain was what caused most of the problems. As McCullough states, the rain had already caused flood from anywhere between 2-10 feet before the dam broke. This storm produced rain unlike anything ever produced or ever expected. As Sarah points out the engineers did everything according to code and did a “competent job”. Everything was up to standard set up by the government and maintaining the dam was not a requirement. The residents of the club had done everything legally required.

Placing blame for something unnatural starts a slippery slope when it comes to proving a precedent for responsibility. By definition, unnatural is something out of the ordinary; impossible to predict. By placing blame on the elite members along the Fork, people are implying that they should predict the future. The storm was of greater magnitude than ever expected so how could one prepare for something like that. I feel this would be very different had a smaller rain storm destroyed the walls because that was something that could have happened at any time. Going back to the house at a ski resort, if there were to be a snow storm of epic scale followed by a subsequent avalanche, could we blame the person when for x number of years their cliff had produced no problems. So long as regulations are met, we cannot place blame for predicting the unexpected. That is not to say that these people did not inhibit to the severity of the damage, yet there needs to be a line between willful endangerment and something like this.

February 5, 2014December 16, 2020

Theorizing A City

Reading the blog posts for this week thus far, I think Sherwood, Jean, and Sarah all make excellent points about the natural and unnatural juxtaposition theorized by Cronon. There is no doubt that Chicago rose because of its natural geography and the locational advantage as the “gateway” to the west. I though Sherwood’s aside was particularly fascinating, pointing out almost irony behind the modern definition of natural. Just because farmers use land, does that mean they are any more natural than others? Sherwood mentions the cultivation of land, which I think brings a very interesting debate about how much we can change nature for it to still be considered natural.

On a separate note, the element of the introduction and the first two chapters that stood out most was the near overwhelming amount of Chicago urban theory. Cronon brings theorists and historians like Sullivan, Garland, Turner, Von Thunen, “Boosters,” and many others as people all trying to explain how and why Chicago grew. From the vast array of opinions, it almost seems like the rise of Chicago is almost too complex to explain using one theory alone. Every argument made by the historians above can be challenged. The booster’s argument, ranging from Scott’s economic to others focused more on the relationship between the city and the land, only accounts for small periods of Chicago’s history. The theory of the concentric rings seems unlikely as you split the city into different regions. No one theory adequately explains the complexity of Chicago. Almost taking the Hewitt argument towards disasters (how every disaster must be looked at separately), I believe we cannot summarize or compare the rise of Chicago to any other city. While Chicago had the geographical foundation, the city became great for so many individual reasons. No one factor or theory can summarize the cities rise to power.

To finish off, I believe one aspect that Cronon and the several other Chicago theorists severally underestimate is local climate. As I am writing this blog post at home in Massachusetts, desperately hoping my evening flight doesn’t get cancelled due to the foot of snow we are getting right now, I wonder how much climate and weather factored into the rise of these cities. Cities with harsh winters like Boston and New York arose because they did not necessarily rely on their local natural products. Trade and industry drove their expansion. Meanwhile a city like Chicago had an entirely different function but with the same “natural” problems. Chicago has similar, if not worse, weather than other big Northeast cities. They have the snow, the wind, and the freezing temperatures. All of this has made me think about how it was possible for Chicago to be the center of Midwestern agricultural trade when little could grow locally because of the long harsh winters. It takes Cronon two chapters to first mention problems of the impeding weather, saying that only through the building of railroads could crops be transported easily. This makes me question whether Chicago could have risen without the use of modern transportation. While Chicago was clearly the best geographically Midwestern city for trade, if technology wasn’t evolving around the 1830’s there was no way the harsh climate of Chicago would have allowed the city to grow so astronomically. Cronon’s book severely underestimates the rise of science, technology, and industrialization in Chicago’s history.

January 29, 2014December 16, 2020

Historiography Persuasion

Let me begin by agreeing with AJ’s comments about reading through Eli’s post. Bringing in the Belk parking spot certainly made me laugh and made Turner’s article seem even more far-fetched, stereotyped, and prejudice. While I shared many of the same initial thoughts that Eli describes, Conon’s historiography almost justified Turner’s paper into making “THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY” seem accurate and almost skillfully neglectful. Maybe I have fallen into Cronon’s trap, yet after reading the historiography Turner’s general thesis seems much more accurate, so long as you avoid the problems about democracy, national character, theological problems, and his stereotyping of frontier “types”. (171)

During my initial reading of Turner, I had many of the same feelings that Eli referenced and noted many of the critiques that Cronon brought up. I thought Turner lacked detail, failed to acknowledge many of the underlying factors of western expansion, and his “analytical shortcomings.” (170) Nevertheless, I was slowly persuaded to acknowledge Turner’s entire thesis after I finished Cronon. Regardless by how much historians reject the structure and thesis of Turner’s work, we are still reliant on the work today. As noted throughout Cronon, we acknowledge the article predominantly for the academic ingenuity to understand history through narrative. If one consider Turner’s article as more of a narrative for history as a whole, using the broad theme of the American frontier, than maybe his piece has merit. Regardless of whether Turner though of this piece as a story or strict scholarly writing is insignificant. If Turner was trying to explain why he believed the course of American history was going to take a drastic turn in the years after 1893, than his paper narrates a plausible story behind his reasoning.

As I re-read the last portions of Turner’s article (after reading Cronon who caused me to ignore some of the obvious flaws) the general ideas seemed to make sense. If we ignore some of details, the American frontier has a unique and possibly accurate parallel with the Mediterranean. Maybe, in 1893 when Turner wrote the article, the idea of expansion had been lost. Without the idea of free land and the frontier, maybe Americans felt forced to modernize. Without the possibility of horizontal expansion, was the vertical expansion (urbanization and industrialization) the next logical chapter in American history? Certainly, I do not agree with everything that Turner is saying, but his thesis, at the most basic level, is hard to ignore. As Cronon points out, a logical story is hard to ignore. If we compare the expansion of American history to various country histories and the interaction with American landscape, maybe Turner was right.

My biggest take away from these two reading’s lies in my drastic openness to Turner’s argument. Can a good historiography like Cronon’s change your mind on even the most farfetched ideas? Certainly this will not be true for every article, but I was struck by how logical Cronon’s approach was to an article I had nearly dismissed.

January 24, 2014December 16, 2020

The Overwhelming Power of Size, Magnitude, and Sound Reflected in Namelist and Remembrance

A number never fully eternalizes the magnitude of a disaster. Whether these numbers are the economic cost for recovery, area of impact, value of damages, people injured, or even deaths; numbers lack the personalization that could affect foreign attention and deep emotion. However as individual numbers become personified and more realistic through details, feelings of sorrow, and depression, a global connection spreads. Ai Weiwei’s work entitled Namelist, with the audio recording Remembrance playing in the background successfully transforms one room into a memorial that connects the viewer to every single young student that died so tragically on May 8^th, 2008 from the Sichuan earthquake.

The Sichuan earthquake has been significantly underreported in the United States and few Americans fully comprehend the magnitude of this natural disaster. As regards to foreign disasters, over the past ten years more media attention has been given to the East Asian Tsunami, Great East Japan Earthquake, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. As a result, the Sichuan disaster failed to get the long term global support and recognition. Nevertheless this 7.9 earthquake centered in the Sichuan province had staggering numbers that could easily rival the magnitude of any recent disaster. According to the BBC recovery page written five years post May 12^th earthquake the facts are unfathomable: nearly 87,150 people missing or dead, 4.8 million people homeless, over $137 over spent on recovery and with over 191 million USD in damages billion, this earthquake represents the second most costly earthquake since the start of the 20th century.[1] However numbers only mean so much. Weiwei’s piece draws attention to this disaster and forces you to think about every 5,196 students that died during this earthquake.

Ai Weiwei’s design is intrinsically simple; white walls, white paper, black grid-like writing, and a small audio player make up the entire room. Nevertheless, the instant you fully entire the room, you are instantly struck, both physically and emotionally, by strong feelings of power, horror, and wonder. The voice box, playing a foreign recording, only adds to the eerie sense of confusion regarding the details and reasoning behind such a design. Slowly as you approach the wall, one realizes that these are not random writings but instead memorials. For me, not knowing any meaning behind the manuscript, the only thing that made sense was the numbers. As I pieced together that these numbers were either birthdays or ages, the full power hit me. Not only were all these children born after I was, their lives were cut short nearly five years prior. As I examined further, the worst part was the vast amounts of empty spaces. These children had no record for their birthday or age. Weiwei’s work hit me as the grids and numbers were not just art, but memorials for actual humans.

Like many memorials of such nature[2] Ai Weiwei’s main purpose for listing names like this was to pay equal tribute to every victim. No one name differs from the other and no name has higher importance than anyone else. However, unlike the Vietnam Memorial and the National September 11^th memorial Ai Weiwei’s decision to memorialize just children adds the horror of this disaster. By choosing just children found in schools, Weiwei targets destruction of this earthquake as a whole. Clearly children impact everyone because of their vulnerability. But when you learn that this memorial that overwhelms you in size represents only a portion of all victims (roughly 6% of all deaths) the visualization of the entire memorial befuddles viewers. A brilliant choice of space, Weiwei covers the entire room and skillfully presents the boards at angles so no person can actually read the top quarter. Your eyes wander, knowing that the size alone makes the imagery of ever human nearly impossible. Yet, as the audio plays behind you, one is forced to realize that every name represents one child lost.

A memorial like Weiwei’s personifies a disaster and connects viewers to the pain and tragedy often only felt by those directly affected. As historians studying disaster, we must realize that numbers alone never tell the entire story. The loss of one life is tragic; the loss of 5,196 is a travesty that words alone cannot summarize. Art work like this makes you realize a death toll is so much more than a number. When looking back on disasters we must stay mindful of the physical destruction, yet realize how there is no value on life. These children all had their lives cut short and a death toll cannot fully encapsulate the loss every family must still be going through.

[1] “Sichuan 2008: A Disaster on an Immense Scale,” BBC, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22398684.

[2] The description references the Vietnam Memorial and the National September 11^th Memorial as similarly designed memorials

January 22, 2014December 16, 2020

The Progressive Era: A Culmination of Social, Economic, and Political Reform

Edwards, Progressive, Culture Continue reading “The Progressive Era: A Culmination of Social, Economic, and Political Reform”

January 15, 2014December 16, 2020

The Media, Cultural Evolution, and Modern Amplification

Simply put, there is no unique or correct way for anyone to classify and approach the general term of disasters. As stated in both the class discussion and throughout the readings, disasters can be technological, natural, man-made, or some intricate hybrid. Disasters are such a unique aspect of our culture because their uncertainty allows for interpretation and debate. As Bergman mentions, there is no one disciple that disaster study is limited to. Based on this initial first day of reading, it has become clear how this simple term has so much more complexity than I originally thought. Throughout the readings, both Hewitt and Bergman demonstrate that in history each disaster is unique and requires specific analysis. As people try to generalize all disasters as a singular term, the more question emerge. While both Hewitt and Bergman have different thesis, they are both right because their analysis is a historical overview rather than a specific theory. Hewitt’s argument about uniqueness and an understanding through cultural immersion based on context is very much valid. We cannot compare disasters from different time periods, different locations, or different cultures because every disaster has a unique impact on time and space. This theory blends well with Bergman’s idea that there can be no evolution into a disaster classification. Disasters are unexplainable in a modern sense and our understanding can only be completed through analysis and historical research. Essentially these theories blend together, in my mind, in that every “disaster” is unique and can only be fully understood when the full ramifications are felt and analyzed.

This combined interpretation of the readings troubled me as I recollected a section early on in Hewitt’s introduction. Hewitt mentions the media and radical rise disaster classifications between 1989 and 1993. By his research the media identified about 110 technological disasters and 50 natural disasters. (page 7) What troubles me was not that the have been a vast spike in disasters but the idea that the media now has such an impact on modern history. Today, our society has accepted the media’s focus on “disasters” and developed strong interests in conflict and despair. However, does the media too easily magnify any event into a disaster and as a society do we accept it? Certainly there is strong evidence correlating modern technology and the destruction of environment, but does the modernization of our society create every disaster or are we too easily classifying anything unexpected under this broad term of disaster? Having done no prior primary source research about Gilded Age disasters, this semester will provide a unique opportunity to compare the modern media against early newspapers and publications. I am looking forward to seeing if the United States has always magnified every event or if this trend of inflated dramatization is truly a modern response for societies’ new interest.