1906 San Francisco Earthquake – American Disasters

March 26, 2014December 16, 2020

“Seismic Denial’s” Ripple Effect

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A theme common to both Steingburg and Davis’s articles is the role of man in both causing and intensifying the effects of natural disasters. In “Smoke and Mirrors: the San Francisco Earthquake and Seismic Denial,” Steinberg argues that the alliance between California’s business class and politicians served to redefine the San Franciscan earthquake of 1906 by placing the blame for the majority of the destruction on the ensuing fire. As nakindig discussed in his post, this “seismic denial” was a common boosters, who popularized it in an effort to protect San Francisco’s image. In order to describe the effects of this “seismic denial,” Steinburg articulates the immediate changes in building codes after the 1906 earthquake and the subsequent easing of the building codes in later years. He argues that “such lenience stemmed directly form the conspiracy of seismic silence that remained a major preoccupation of San Francisco’s business community well into the 1920s” (Steinberg 112). Steinberg’s use of the word “conspiracy” reinforces his argument that the blame for much of the damage in later earthquakes should be placed squarely on the shoulders of man.

Steinberg also pulls in a class-power argument through his discussion of how “pyrotechnics of property destruction have eclipsed the truly deadly story”- that is, the unequal distribution of the earthquake’s damage on the population of San Francisco. Steinberg emphasizes that the poor and ethnic populations were more affected by the earthquake and likewise, more impacted by the “seismic denial.” The decision to undermine the role of the earthquake in the decimation of San Francisco is responsible for the loss of even more lives (Steinberg 121). This argument suggests that until building codes and other necessary preventatives were standardized and updated, deaths resulting from post-1906 earthquakes are essentially the responsibility of man and not nature.

March 26, 2014December 16, 2020

The economic discourse around seismic enlightenment

The fireman’s commission, on the thirtieth anniversary of the temblor, published a report assessing the structural progress made since the 1906 earthquake. “The lessons of 1906 were speedily forgotten. Public apathy, an aversion to admitting that earthquakes occur in California, and the desire of building construction speculators to build for profit, combined gradually to prevail over the counsel of engineers” (115). The 1906 earthquake left at least 3,000 dead – but did little in the way of encouraging structural change. It was only after experiencing more earthquakes in the 20s and the 30s that Californians began to accept their precarious geography. It was only then understood that “Economic development depended on open recognition of earthquake risk.”

In this course we have talked extensively about who shapes the perception and narratives of disaster. And in the case of the 1906 “fire”, Steinberg argues that business elites and politicians fueled by their economic interests shaped the discourse. At the time of the temblor, San Francisco was developing into a banking hub and already led the West in trade and manufacturing. As a result, the economic elite cried “fire” rather than “earthquake” – seemingly positing the disaster as nothing more than a freak accident. Business leaders assumed indifference to the damages of the earthquake calamites in order to ensure continued investment in the city. However, Steinberg was quick to point out that the earthquake did in fact cause tremendous damage, pointing to the fact that the quake damaged 95% of the chimneys in San Francisco. Steinberg reports that in all, the jolt was responsible for 20% of the damage. (However, Steinberg does a good job of explaining the difficulties of classifying the fire and the quake as two separate occurrences.) Yet at the time, the quake was understood as “a little shake in the earth’s crust. . .constitu[ing] no real source of danger.”

This reminds me of some of the responses to Galveston Hurricane. Leaders of the city initially resisted the idea of constructing a sea wall. For although Progressive prudence encouraged its construction, building the massive wall meant that the city had to recognize that it was in a dangerous location.

Steinberg concludes his argument talking the modern implications to this disaster surrounding social justice. The 1989 jolt encouraged improvements in earthquake resistant construction – but these advancements have not yet reached the more marginalized citizens. Jean concludes her post with an important question, “has the legislation constructed in the wake of disaster been beneficial to all classes in society (outside of economic benefits)?” For while it is true that there is “no safe place”, Steinberg argues that real estate cartel continues to quell the seismic enlightenment in favor of profit. “The idea of no inconveniencing someone – but allowing them to be killed, well, things seem to be upside down.”

February 26, 2014December 16, 2020

Fire and Brimstone: Religious Interpretations of the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake

As we have consistently seen, religion tends to have a significant impact on the interpretation of disasters. From Father Pernin’s narrative of the Peshtigo Fire, to the interpretation of the Chicago fire as cleansing, religious interpretations of disasters abound. Given both the often complex nature of disasters, coupled with the wanton destruction, disasters seem to almost request the meaning which religion may ascribe to them. Furthermore, disaster almost always inspires community unification and religion has often facilitated such unity.

I would like to examine a specific disaster and the religious response which it elicited from the community, on a local or perhaps wider scale. What were the religious or other interpretations of this disaster and its significance? How were interpretations of this disaster shaped by religious leaders and the religious community? How did religious disaster narratives shape the recovery from this disaster? How did the religious landscape change as a result of the disaster or the concomitant changes? In what ways were religious disaster narratives productive or counterproductive, in terms of rebuilding community in the wake of this disaster?

I think that the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire might be particularly interesting to examine, for a variety of reasons. Foremost, the scale of the disaster, which was substantial, would have accentuated any effects that such a disaster might have on a populace or community. Yet, this alone does not distinguish San Francisco’s disaster from some others. Though fires were the most destructive element in this case, they were secondary to an earthquake, in terms of cause. Earthquakes present a particularly interesting disaster in that they are—much more than Mrs. O’Leary or her cow—open to religious interpretation. The trembling of the very earth beneath our feet lends itself to religious interpretation. Moreover, San Francisco in 1906 was a city of cultural clashing, with significant divides between the white and Chinese communities. Doubtless, such cultural conflict played out in the context of religious thinking.

Local and community newspapers will be a great source for this examination, especially if they cater to a specific religious community within the city. I do not, necessarily, need to limit myself to local newspapers but can look on a national and state scale as well, since those have potential to be sources of religious interpretation as well. Within newspapers, I expect editorials to be a particularly good source. Journals or correspondence, though rare, have the potential to be great sources of religious thinking or interpretation, especially that which people might not say publicly. Perhaps there are records of sermons that were given in the aftermath of the disaster or during the recovery that address the disaster in a religious context.

January 27, 2014December 16, 2020

Distinguishing Between Planned and Unplanned Destruction of Capital

The argument made in Kevin Rozario’s “What Comes Down Must Go Up: Why Disasters have been Good for American Capitalism,” is extraordinarily informative and particularly relevant to the many of us who are American citizens, or who those of us who live in beds of economics growth. But in that relevance lies one of the shortcomings of Rozario’s argument; at many points he seems to attempt to extrapolate the lessons and evidence surrounding the disasters in economic hubs, such as San Francisco or New York City, into a broader understanding of the economic implications of disasters on the whole. I would argue that this evidence speaks less to the general nature of disasters and more towards the “creative destruction” facet of capitalism as it relates to areas of economic interest.

Eli’s blog post noted the parallels between disasters and capitalism present in this article; I found this parallel to be extremely interesting and would like to try to take it a step further by arguing that Rozario, while successful in pointing it out, errors in overemphasizing the parallels between all disasters and all capitalistic endeavors.

When describing the conditions during which New York experienced the New York Fire of 1835 Rozario notes that the City was still economically stimulated by the recent opening of the Erie Canal, that, as a financial center, New Yorkers enjoyed “singular access to international capital,” (79) and that there was abundant credit made available by the expansion of state and “wildcat” banks. All of these features created confidence in a swift recovery that led to little hesitance to rebuild. Similarly, when discussing San Francisco Rozario quotes a writer for the Times who noted that San Francisco’s natural advantages (its location as a hub of trade for the entire west coast) ensured its recover rather than an “artificial enhancement by investment.” Rozario’s evidence is centered on disasters in uniquely valuable locations.

Citing little other evidence he combines this analysis of the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 and the New York Fire of 1835 with theoretical economic analysis from reputable thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter, John Stuart Mills, and Karl Marx concerning the necessity of “creative destruction” (Shumpter) or the “enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces” (Marx). (80) His analysis, which often calls for logical jumps such as substitutions in Marx’s theory (changing “calamity” for “crisis), often stretches what seems to be the initial meaning of these economic theories. By this I mean that these theories seem to refer to destruction as a more controlled and thoughtful decision to replace low-productivity capital with high-productivity capital. Rozario then replaces these conscious decisions for unplanned disasters.

The danger of this sleight of hand in which he equates these unique disasters with all disasters and also replaces conscious destruction with unplanned disasters becomes clear when he argues that “one of the primary benefits of a calamity is that it destroys urban environments and thereby liberates and recycles capital.” It is only in these highly valuable urban spaces such as San Francisco or New York that this land in itself is capital that needs to be liberated. A counterexample is found in the Peshtigo Fire which, though causing up to 2500 deaths and creating a massive loss of capital, in no way “liberated” or “recycled” capital.

January 27, 2014December 16, 2020

The Benefits of Disaster

The detrimental losses and challenges of homeowners, widows and politicians after a disaster often obscure the disaster’s economical, historical and geographical advantages. That is not to say that the human aspect of disasters should be removed, but rather that those who study disasters should do so using two analytical methods: one which recognizes the immediate impact and one which considers the historical legacy.

As Kevin Rozario points out in “What Comes Down Must Go Up” economic loss is the initial stage, but economic growth is the latter stage. Similar to Sarah’s post, I also, find this concept strange. However, redevelopment of cities, through reconstruction and urban planning can adapt cities to meet the current more modern needs while bringing in jobs. Following the fire in New York City in 1835 property prices increased from $93,000 to $765,000. Additionally, the San Francisco earthquake and fire destroyed about five acres worth of property and left hundreds of people dead, but allowed the city to recreate itself following the Parisian model of transformation (Rozario). Given that this era was abundant in disasters and therefore demanding of reconstruction, the argument James Connolly made in “Bringing the City Back in” about urban planning in the Gilded Age gains credibility.

But further than Eli’s point in “The perverse and often baffling economics of disaster,” I believe disasters have more than just an economic benefit. In year 79 Pompeian citizens lost their lives when Mount Vesuvius exploded. Over 1500 years later archaeologists and historians excavated the site and made discoveries that have contributed to the modern understanding of the Pax Romana time period. Similarly the King Manor Museum (KMM) in Jamaica, Queens experienced a fire in 1962 that “damaged the upper floors of the manor house” but left artifacts such as “bottles and jars, household ceramics, flower pot fragments, tin cans, buttons, nails, bricks, animal bones, plaster and foil” (Matthews, 737). Archaeologists were then able to interpret these remains to understand how the museum served as a “center for cultivating elite women’s agency” (734). Disaster as a means of preservation seems contradictory, especially when descriptions of disaster include: economic loss, damage, emergency, tragedy, victims, and mortality rate (Hewitt). Maybe in another 2000 years historians and archaeologists will make discoveries about our society and culture based on artifacts from Hurricane Sandy or the 2010 Haitian earthquake.

January 25, 2014December 16, 2020

The perverse and often baffling economics of disasters

As someone who has completed an economics minor, I can tell you little about the economy or economics or finance or international trade with much confidence. I can, however, say with complete confidence that economics is an odd discipline. It’s hyper-rationality embraces only empirical judgments of the economy while simultaneously validating people’s subjective values as determinant of welfare. In Kevin Rozario’s “What Comes Down Must Go Up: Why Disasters Have Been Good for American Capitalism,” we catch a glimpse of the strangeness of economics, and indeed of capitalism itself.

Rozario seeks to show how disasters, but especially the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, had positive economic impacts, among other effects. He makes the case that with a disaster, the destruction of existing capital draws in funds from elsewhere to rebuild an even more productive environment. Though this may be true, anyone can easily tell that a disaster is not good news in the broadest sense. Resources exist and can be destroyed; that loss does not disappear once the city is rebuilt. At the very least, readers can acknowledge that, economics aside, a disaster represents the loss of natural resources, and the person-hours that were put into the construction and development of that capital. Moreover, it often results in the loss of human life.

Most interestingly, Rozario draws parallels between disasters and capitalism. Both are destructive: disasters raze buildings and destroy the capital within, while capitalism encourages the constant renewal of technologies and spaces to better produce the newest and most effective widgets. He points out, as examples, the ability of Bostonians to widen their streets after one fire, or more prominently, the efforts of progressives to improve San Francisco’s urban space in the aftermath of the earthquake and related fire.

In examining the opportunity offered by a disaster to sculpt the urban landscape, we see that the desires of those sculptors was inherently opposed to the capitalist ethos: Haussmann and the progressives of San Francisco wanted to make permanent changes to the city, for a variety of purposes. They wanted to create cities which withstood the test of time and served to benefit the city (and the owning class). Yet, the vision of cityscape which endures the test of time stands in direct opposition to capitalism, which desires the continual renewal of technology, business, commerce, and therefore urban spaces.

It is also telling that the so-called progressives of San Francisco cared as little about the effect of their plans on the working class as did Haussmann, though at least they did not blast away their housing with cannon. Indeed, throughout his article, Rozario makes it clear that the poor suffered, even as the economy, the city, and the business class benefitted in the aftermath of the ravages of disasters.

I enjoyed CT’s analysis of the art on the spoons at the State of Emergency exhibit, and I think that he is apt in his analysis of the spoon and its role in the artwork: as a domestic item, it seems particularly at home depicting a tornado, perhaps because so much of the destruction of tornados, as CT points out, happens in the midwest, away from major bodies of water. Such areas tend to be less urban, and often symbolize the domestic of American society.