blame – American Disasters

March 24, 2014December 16, 2020

Distinctions between Blame and Responsibility in Fradkin’s The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906

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From his title alone—The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: How San Francisco Nearly Destroyed Itself—we can identify one of Fradkin’s main arguments: much of the damage wrought during the earthquake and firestorms was self-inflicted by those in charge in San Francisco. Fradkin identifies a number of different ways the leadership in San Francisco failed those it served. 300 distribution mains and 23,200 connecting pipes that spread water throughout the town were fractured, so firemen could not extinguish the fires with water (72). Firemen, instead of miners who had experience with explosives, tried (and failed) to fight fire with fire (76). Acting Commander Funston marched troops into the town with no orders to do so, leading civilians to believe they were under Marshall law and to an unclear chain of command (63). Mayor Schmitz ordered that all looters be shot on sight since there was no place for a prison (67).

Fradkin clearly conveys to his readers that these would have been avoidable occurrences had there been better preparation for earthquakes and fires, fewer class/language barriers, and more communication between government and people. However, the tone of this article is much more understanding and forgiving than narratives we have recently read about the Galveston Hurricane, which as Jeremiah points out implied a degree of hubris that I now associate with most Gilded Age disasters. While Fradkin notes that other towns looked down on San Francisco as being a “sinful city,” he does so in a remarkably objective manner, citing a poem advertising a whisky store which made light of the city’s poor reputation (171). He also tempers the argument that damage was self-inflicted with a counterargument that several aspects of the 1906 San Francisco fire were competently dealt with. Navy Lieutenant Frederick N. Freeman, Fradkin argues, saved the waterfront of San Francisco, providing a safe supply line for relief to enter the city (172).

I think Fradkin uses this disaster to separate blame from institutional and cultural disparities. For example, he does not blame any group or individual for the tragic inequality of experience felt by members of the clubs and inhabitants of Chinatown. Instead, Fradkin points to the commonalities between the two cultures in claiming that both sought places to worship. Although Fradkin points to racism, he often does so in the passive voice: “Few Asians were counted as victims. It was as if they did not exist” (110-111). Although I’m not sure whether or not I agree that we should separate blame from institutional and cultural disparities, I think this text is distinct from others we have read thus far.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Selfish Living or Acceptable Ignorance

Reading the first three chapters of David McCullough’s book, it is obvious that McCullough attempts to blame a variety of people for the events around the 1889 storm. However, I believe some of the targeting is a too harsh and unwarranted, especially on the members of the South Fork organization. Clearly McCullough tries to place considerable blame on these elite businessmen who established, lived, and were members of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club. Pointing out members like Carnegie who willingly financed the dam’s research, acknowledged the risks presented by Fulton and Morrell, yet ignored calls to fix the structure. McCullough is extremely harsh on the men of the South Fork essentially stating that their frugality endangered Johnstown. However, the more I read chapter two and three, the more I tended to agree with Catherine that this disaster should not be blamed on these people. During the second chapter especially, I could not help but think of extravagant homes from around the word and potential blame if something extreme were to happen. For example, you hear about celebrity homes on the foothills of LA that clear out vast amounts of space for views of the downtown or houses in Malibu built on cliffs for better ocean views. Should we blame them for forest fires in dry areas because some material in their houses slightly expedited the natural progression of a fire? If an earthquake were to hit, could we blame those in Malibu for potential landslides because their houses disrupted natural landscape? Additionally, I thought of houses along ski resorts and if an avalanche were to occur, would we blame those inhabitants that who created a cliff while building their house, ultimately facilitating an avalanche? I understand there is a difference between these example and building an unstable dam, yet I just do not think you can put blame for these people for the severity of the rain was what caused most of the problems. As McCullough states, the rain had already caused flood from anywhere between 2-10 feet before the dam broke. This storm produced rain unlike anything ever produced or ever expected. As Sarah points out the engineers did everything according to code and did a “competent job”. Everything was up to standard set up by the government and maintaining the dam was not a requirement. The residents of the club had done everything legally required.

Placing blame for something unnatural starts a slippery slope when it comes to proving a precedent for responsibility. By definition, unnatural is something out of the ordinary; impossible to predict. By placing blame on the elite members along the Fork, people are implying that they should predict the future. The storm was of greater magnitude than ever expected so how could one prepare for something like that. I feel this would be very different had a smaller rain storm destroyed the walls because that was something that could have happened at any time. Going back to the house at a ski resort, if there were to be a snow storm of epic scale followed by a subsequent avalanche, could we blame the person when for x number of years their cliff had produced no problems. So long as regulations are met, we cannot place blame for predicting the unexpected. That is not to say that these people did not inhibit to the severity of the damage, yet there needs to be a line between willful endangerment and something like this.

February 19, 2014December 16, 2020

Who is to Blame?

After a disaster of such magnitude like the Johnstown Flood, the natural inclination is to attempt to blame somebody(s) or something for the tragic event. The cause of the flood could be attributed to the deforestation, cyclical flooding, and industrialization like Schmidt points out. The people of Johnstown were accustomed to frequent floods and viewed them as a part of life. On the other hand, the owners of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club and the expert they hired to assess the strength of the dam could also be at fault. Ruff, the man hired to oversee the maintenance of the dam could also be a culprit since he ignored the advice of John Fulton who believed the dam would break.

I believe the improper maintenance of the dam is to blame for the disaster, while environmental factors exacerbated the damage. If the dam had been properly managed the incredible magnitude of the flood could have been averted. The question now becomes: whose job was it to maintain the dam? Were the owners of South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club responsible? Or was Ruff guilty of ignoring the danger the dam presented? Both parties share a portion of the blame. As a proprietor of a piece of land, it becomes the responsibility of an owner to ensure all structures on the land are sturdy—especially when not doing so places human lives in danger. Ruff was guilty of ignoring voices that said the dam was structurally unsound. Both Ruff and the owners were negligent but in different ways.

Lastly, I want to comment on how the Johnstown Flood fits into the narrative of the Gilded Age made by Edwards. Edwards presents the notion of The Wedge to explain the distance between the working class and the rich industrialists. Seemingly, the relationship between the wealthy residents of the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club and the working class inhabitants of Johnstown fits into this narrative. I think this, however, would oversimplify the relationship. McCullough mentions the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club employing local residents of Johnstown to do construction work. Additionally, Johnstownians were proud that they had such wealthy neighbors. While there is clearly an economic and geographical wedge, this situation does not fit into the category of extreme disconnect that Edwards believes in. There seems to be a comfortable homeostasis between the two groups.