Too Prepared?


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In class on Tuesday, March 18, we discussed the reactions of the Weather Bureau, taking a primarily critical view of the organization’s actions.  Erik Larson’s view undoubtedly heavily influenced out take on the culpability of the organization and their potential to have prevented many deaths.  I agreed with our assessment of the situation, blaming the nascent organization that was trying to save face for their inaction.

However, in reading a source for my independent research project, Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus that Caused It, I came across an event that interestingly mirrored that of the 1900 Galveston Hurricane.  In 1976, a flu season occurred that reflected many of the same patterns of the deadly 1918 Influenza that killed around 50 million people worldwide. The Centers for Disease Control and the US government jumped into action, commencing a nationwide vaccination campaign to protect the entire country.  This is exactly what the Weather Bureau did not do, looking at a potential threat and acting upon it to protect the population.  This is the criticism that I gave the Weather Bureau, but the Swine Flu Scare of 1976 turned out very differently than expected.  Millions were spent and millions were vaccinated, but the expected pandemic never came.  The federal government came under intense criticism for jumping the gun, so to speak, and the CDC lost credibility.  This is what the Weather Bureau was preventing by not forecasting a storm, and what the leadership was trying to prevent in banning the use of the words ‘hurricane’ and ‘tornado.’  While I’m not excusing the failure of the Weather Bureau, I think the 1976 Swine Flu Scare serves as a helpful counterpoint to our critiques, explaining, although not excusing, the actions of the Weather Bureau in the 1900 Galveston Hurricane.

This argument contradicts that of Jean, although she does make a convincing argument.  Planning is key in disaster awareness and management.  However, can you ‘cry wolf’ one too many times, leaving the population exposed when a disaster is indeed imminent?  I don’t know how to fix the problem, but it is exemplified by the two exemplars portrayed in Isaac’s Storm and Flu.