Kevin Rozario – American Disasters

January 29, 2014December 16, 2020

Relative Abundance: Parallels between Cronon and Rozario

Warning: Undefined variable $num in /home/shroutdo/public_html/courses/wp-content/plugins/single-categories/single_categories.php on line 126

Warning: Undefined variable $posts_num in /home/shroutdo/public_html/courses/wp-content/plugins/single-categories/single_categories.php on line 127

Cronon’s piece does, in my opinion, a remarkable job in salvaging Frederick Jackson Turner’s place in history as an influential historian. This is achieved through a historiographical study of the conditions in which Turner’s thesis emerged and also by studying the different approaches Turner took in writing his books and his essays which help to explain his essay’s somewhat questionable historic methodology as a product of the paper’s goal rather than of Turner’s historical abilities. More so, Cronon notes his ability to unite seemingly separate historical realities into a historical narrative that still endures today. This is not to say that Cronon salvaged the frontier thesis itself. Nor should he have, both AJ and Eli, despite their differing degrees of harshness, are correct in pointing out its flaws.

What interested me most about Cronon’s piece however didn’t necessarily relate to Turner’s work, but rather through a theory that he introduced to better understand Turner’s work. Cronon argues that Turner would have done better to understand the environmental history of North America (western history to Turner) through the lens of relative abundance to scarcity rather than from free to occupied land. He then goes on to more broadly say that “neither abundance nor scarcity has ever been absolute. Instead their definitiions shift always according natural and artificial constraints… and according to peoples beliefs about whether they are experiencing economic…stasis, progress, or decline.” (172) I would like to apply this this concept of understanding historical progress through population’s relative understanding of abundance and scarcity to Rozario’s economic evaluation of disasters.

As we discussed in class, Rozario’s piece can be seen to be potentially flawed because of his overreliance on examples of urban disasters in exceptionally prosperous environments. This criticism is well complemented by Cronon’s observation that people only have a relative understanding of abundance that is largely based on the perceived economic climate. Property in San Francisco and New York was extremely scarce and thus extremely economically valuable because of people’s perceived economic climate. Had New York been in the midst of a depression during the fire, this newly available property would have far less relatively scarce and less valuable. Similarly, a disaster to a relatively unimportant Midwestern town during an economic boon wouldn’t result in increased capital because comparable property is relatively abundant.

January 27, 2014December 16, 2020

Distinguishing Between Planned and Unplanned Destruction of Capital

The argument made in Kevin Rozario’s “What Comes Down Must Go Up: Why Disasters have been Good for American Capitalism,” is extraordinarily informative and particularly relevant to the many of us who are American citizens, or who those of us who live in beds of economics growth. But in that relevance lies one of the shortcomings of Rozario’s argument; at many points he seems to attempt to extrapolate the lessons and evidence surrounding the disasters in economic hubs, such as San Francisco or New York City, into a broader understanding of the economic implications of disasters on the whole. I would argue that this evidence speaks less to the general nature of disasters and more towards the “creative destruction” facet of capitalism as it relates to areas of economic interest.

Eli’s blog post noted the parallels between disasters and capitalism present in this article; I found this parallel to be extremely interesting and would like to try to take it a step further by arguing that Rozario, while successful in pointing it out, errors in overemphasizing the parallels between all disasters and all capitalistic endeavors.

When describing the conditions during which New York experienced the New York Fire of 1835 Rozario notes that the City was still economically stimulated by the recent opening of the Erie Canal, that, as a financial center, New Yorkers enjoyed “singular access to international capital,” (79) and that there was abundant credit made available by the expansion of state and “wildcat” banks. All of these features created confidence in a swift recovery that led to little hesitance to rebuild. Similarly, when discussing San Francisco Rozario quotes a writer for the Times who noted that San Francisco’s natural advantages (its location as a hub of trade for the entire west coast) ensured its recover rather than an “artificial enhancement by investment.” Rozario’s evidence is centered on disasters in uniquely valuable locations.

Citing little other evidence he combines this analysis of the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 and the New York Fire of 1835 with theoretical economic analysis from reputable thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter, John Stuart Mills, and Karl Marx concerning the necessity of “creative destruction” (Shumpter) or the “enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces” (Marx). (80) His analysis, which often calls for logical jumps such as substitutions in Marx’s theory (changing “calamity” for “crisis), often stretches what seems to be the initial meaning of these economic theories. By this I mean that these theories seem to refer to destruction as a more controlled and thoughtful decision to replace low-productivity capital with high-productivity capital. Rozario then replaces these conscious decisions for unplanned disasters.

The danger of this sleight of hand in which he equates these unique disasters with all disasters and also replaces conscious destruction with unplanned disasters becomes clear when he argues that “one of the primary benefits of a calamity is that it destroys urban environments and thereby liberates and recycles capital.” It is only in these highly valuable urban spaces such as San Francisco or New York that this land in itself is capital that needs to be liberated. A counterexample is found in the Peshtigo Fire which, though causing up to 2500 deaths and creating a massive loss of capital, in no way “liberated” or “recycled” capital.

January 27, 2014December 16, 2020

The Benefits of Disaster

The detrimental losses and challenges of homeowners, widows and politicians after a disaster often obscure the disaster’s economical, historical and geographical advantages. That is not to say that the human aspect of disasters should be removed, but rather that those who study disasters should do so using two analytical methods: one which recognizes the immediate impact and one which considers the historical legacy.

As Kevin Rozario points out in “What Comes Down Must Go Up” economic loss is the initial stage, but economic growth is the latter stage. Similar to Sarah’s post, I also, find this concept strange. However, redevelopment of cities, through reconstruction and urban planning can adapt cities to meet the current more modern needs while bringing in jobs. Following the fire in New York City in 1835 property prices increased from $93,000 to $765,000. Additionally, the San Francisco earthquake and fire destroyed about five acres worth of property and left hundreds of people dead, but allowed the city to recreate itself following the Parisian model of transformation (Rozario). Given that this era was abundant in disasters and therefore demanding of reconstruction, the argument James Connolly made in “Bringing the City Back in” about urban planning in the Gilded Age gains credibility.

But further than Eli’s point in “The perverse and often baffling economics of disaster,” I believe disasters have more than just an economic benefit. In year 79 Pompeian citizens lost their lives when Mount Vesuvius exploded. Over 1500 years later archaeologists and historians excavated the site and made discoveries that have contributed to the modern understanding of the Pax Romana time period. Similarly the King Manor Museum (KMM) in Jamaica, Queens experienced a fire in 1962 that “damaged the upper floors of the manor house” but left artifacts such as “bottles and jars, household ceramics, flower pot fragments, tin cans, buttons, nails, bricks, animal bones, plaster and foil” (Matthews, 737). Archaeologists were then able to interpret these remains to understand how the museum served as a “center for cultivating elite women’s agency” (734). Disaster as a means of preservation seems contradictory, especially when descriptions of disaster include: economic loss, damage, emergency, tragedy, victims, and mortality rate (Hewitt). Maybe in another 2000 years historians and archaeologists will make discoveries about our society and culture based on artifacts from Hurricane Sandy or the 2010 Haitian earthquake.

January 26, 2014December 16, 2020

Disastrous Capitalism?

In Eli’s post “The perverse and often baffling economics of disasters,” he examines Kevin Rozario’s “What Comes Down Must Go Up: Why Disasters Have Been Good for American Capitalism.” Rozario believes disasters may have positive economic effects particularly on capitalism. It does seem odd, as Eli notes, that a disaster where homes are damaged, property destroyed, resources ruined, industries interrupted, and lives lost may be counted as an economic good. It appears that any economic good may happen in the long run rather than immediately after the disaster. This argument reminds me of an article we read last week, Richard Schneirov’s “Thoughts on Periodizing the Gilded Age: Capital Accumulation, Society, and Politics, 1873-1898.” Schneirov credits much of the United States economy and capitalism to Civil War and Reconstruction. Schneirov does not state capitalism took off immediately at the end of the Civil War. Rather, the Civil War started economic trends that continued through the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.

Eli’s comparison of disaster and capitalism is an interesting one. Disasters, he writes must destroy things, and capitalism must also clear previous technologies to move forward. As Rozario puts it, capitalism “must constantly destroy to create.” I think the point holds to an extent, but capitalism and progress does not always need to destroy the past. Casting capitalism as a destructive force seems negative, and also belittles the effects of disaster. New technology often—if not always—builds on previous knowledge. Eventually, the advancement may come to replace earlier models, but it is not the same destruction inherent in a disaster.

Another point I find unusual in Rozario’s article is that many Americans have “a longstanding conviction that calamities are blessings.” Disasters are useful for exposing flaws in society and motivating people to address the issues. They can clear space for innovation. I do not entirely agree, however, that Americans commonly perceive disasters as blessings. It seems that people might have a tendency to be hopeful or optimistic; they must look for the best or the disaster could be overwhelming. The art on Hiroshima from the State of Emergency that I examined suggested this optimism. The pieces, while about something as terrible as thousands of deaths, held a sort of peaceful promise in their serene colors. Disasters are much more than economics; they involve people’s lives, hopes, and dreams.

January 25, 2014December 16, 2020

The perverse and often baffling economics of disasters

As someone who has completed an economics minor, I can tell you little about the economy or economics or finance or international trade with much confidence. I can, however, say with complete confidence that economics is an odd discipline. It’s hyper-rationality embraces only empirical judgments of the economy while simultaneously validating people’s subjective values as determinant of welfare. In Kevin Rozario’s “What Comes Down Must Go Up: Why Disasters Have Been Good for American Capitalism,” we catch a glimpse of the strangeness of economics, and indeed of capitalism itself.

Rozario seeks to show how disasters, but especially the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, had positive economic impacts, among other effects. He makes the case that with a disaster, the destruction of existing capital draws in funds from elsewhere to rebuild an even more productive environment. Though this may be true, anyone can easily tell that a disaster is not good news in the broadest sense. Resources exist and can be destroyed; that loss does not disappear once the city is rebuilt. At the very least, readers can acknowledge that, economics aside, a disaster represents the loss of natural resources, and the person-hours that were put into the construction and development of that capital. Moreover, it often results in the loss of human life.

Most interestingly, Rozario draws parallels between disasters and capitalism. Both are destructive: disasters raze buildings and destroy the capital within, while capitalism encourages the constant renewal of technologies and spaces to better produce the newest and most effective widgets. He points out, as examples, the ability of Bostonians to widen their streets after one fire, or more prominently, the efforts of progressives to improve San Francisco’s urban space in the aftermath of the earthquake and related fire.

In examining the opportunity offered by a disaster to sculpt the urban landscape, we see that the desires of those sculptors was inherently opposed to the capitalist ethos: Haussmann and the progressives of San Francisco wanted to make permanent changes to the city, for a variety of purposes. They wanted to create cities which withstood the test of time and served to benefit the city (and the owning class). Yet, the vision of cityscape which endures the test of time stands in direct opposition to capitalism, which desires the continual renewal of technology, business, commerce, and therefore urban spaces.

It is also telling that the so-called progressives of San Francisco cared as little about the effect of their plans on the working class as did Haussmann, though at least they did not blast away their housing with cannon. Indeed, throughout his article, Rozario makes it clear that the poor suffered, even as the economy, the city, and the business class benefitted in the aftermath of the ravages of disasters.

I enjoyed CT’s analysis of the art on the spoons at the State of Emergency exhibit, and I think that he is apt in his analysis of the spoon and its role in the artwork: as a domestic item, it seems particularly at home depicting a tornado, perhaps because so much of the destruction of tornados, as CT points out, happens in the midwest, away from major bodies of water. Such areas tend to be less urban, and often symbolize the domestic of American society.