The economic discourse around seismic enlightenment


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The fireman’s commission, on the thirtieth anniversary of the temblor, published a report assessing the structural progress made since the 1906 earthquake. “The lessons of 1906 were speedily forgotten. Public apathy, an aversion to admitting that earthquakes occur in California, and the desire of building construction speculators to build for profit, combined gradually to prevail over the counsel of engineers” (115). The 1906 earthquake left at least 3,000 dead – but did little in the way of encouraging structural change. It was only after experiencing more earthquakes in the 20s and the 30s that Californians began to accept their precarious geography. It was only then understood that “Economic development depended on open recognition of earthquake risk.”

In this course we have talked extensively about who shapes the perception and narratives of disaster. And in the case of the 1906 “fire”, Steinberg argues that business elites and politicians fueled by their economic interests shaped the discourse. At the time of the temblor, San Francisco was developing into a banking hub and already led the West in trade and manufacturing. As a result, the economic elite cried “fire” rather than “earthquake” – seemingly positing the disaster as nothing more than a freak accident. Business leaders assumed indifference to the damages of the earthquake calamites in order to ensure continued investment in the city. However, Steinberg was quick to point out that the earthquake did in fact cause tremendous damage, pointing to the fact that the quake damaged 95% of the chimneys in San Francisco. Steinberg reports that in all, the jolt was responsible for 20% of the damage. (However, Steinberg does a good job of explaining the difficulties of classifying the fire and the quake as two separate occurrences.) Yet at the time, the quake was understood as “a little shake in the earth’s crust. . .constitu[ing] no real source of danger.”

This reminds me of some of the responses to Galveston Hurricane. Leaders of the city initially resisted the idea of constructing a sea wall. For although Progressive prudence encouraged its construction, building the massive wall meant that the city had to recognize that it was in a dangerous location.

Steinberg concludes his argument talking the modern implications to this disaster surrounding social justice. The 1989 jolt encouraged improvements in earthquake resistant construction – but these advancements have not yet reached the more marginalized citizens.  Jean concludes her post with an important question, “has the legislation constructed in the wake of disaster been beneficial to all classes in society (outside of economic benefits)?” For while it is true that there is “no safe place”, Steinberg argues that real estate cartel continues to quell the seismic enlightenment in favor of profit. “The idea of no inconveniencing someone – but allowing them to be killed, well, things seem to be upside down.”

Life in a Bubble or Life on the Edge


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After reading both Mike Davis’ and Ted Steinberg’s articles about the buildup of California and specifically Los Angeles and San Francisco within the past century, I could not help but be drawn to numerous ethical and psychological dilemmas faced by all those associated with the region.  Both articles paint an ominous forecast for California and imply inevitable devastation.  They clearly show how vulnerable the area is and how likely a massive catastrophe (most likely greater than the 1906 earthquake) is in the near future.  Nevertheless, I find their arguments pushing for relocation shortsighted.  I think they draw on some unique scientific proof, but their suggestions seem unrealistic.  Individuals residing in California have understood the risks and still proceed with their lives.  Scaring residents of Los Angeles and San Francisco will ultimately change little, for they have understood the risks for some time.

Let me begin with some of the facts that Davis points to.  He notes the unusual climate and geological location of California implying how the region is susceptible to weather anomalies.  He notes that the rivers hardly ever reach their flowing average, but on the rare occasion they do, can flow at 3000 times their capacity.  How after taking land samples, the area had experience catastrophic droughts comparable to Mayan proportions.  Finally, he notes how the vaults are ticking time bombs ready for explosion.  Forecasters predict an 80-90% chance of a big earthquake by 2025 and that in the past 195 years there should have been 17 catastrophic earthquakes, yet only 2 have actually occurred.  Essentially, the area is doomed.  At any point there could be a flood, a drought, a heat wave, or a massive earthquake.  But isn’t the climate what makes California so beautiful and appealing.  I’m not implying that people live in California for the risk of disaster, but that people see this tropical, Mediterranean mix as an appealing hybrid.  The risks are a natural consequence for living in such a nice area.  Even if there is a “dry spell” of earthquakes, people continue to play the game of chance.  We are always playing the odds and clearly the climate of the west coast is appealing.

From an economic prospective, the growth of the region makes relocation impossible. People moved out west for economic promise and hope for a better life.  As Steinberg notes, even in the immediate aftermath of 1906, the region quickly rebuilt.  By the 1930’s people began building for profit and in the 1950’s there was an explosion of housing.  The Redwood shores are a great example.  Real estate moguls built up the area and even hired scientists to prove that their housing was no greater risk than anywhere else.  Basically, if they didn’t do it, someone else would have.  Sherwood makes some great points in his post that I believe support this claim.  The conspiracy about the blame on businessmen for the improper memorialization of the 1906 earthquake is unwarranted.  Capitalism is part of our United States’ culture and someone took the opportunity that was there.  There was now an economic draw because people were moving their businesses out west and families therefore relocated.  By the middle of the century the reward in terms of livelihood was too great to ignore and risk became almost a non-factor.  Even today, as Davis notes, the government (Clinton administration) pumped money into Southern California so there is an economic investment that cannot be ignored.

Finally, while both authors note the costs of abandoning the west coast, the reality is impossible.  Who would fit the bill for disaster fortification?  From the governments prospective they have four choices: 1. Stop people from living in dangerous area (but the California government would lose millions in taxes and lose residents) 2. Force earthquake remodeling (California would lose millions again because people would sell buildings at lower costs and relocate) 3. Pay for remodeling out of their own budget (but as Davis notes, the people in CA not from the vulnerable area would feel their tax money is wasted) or 4. Do nothing and proceed as is.  Unless there is a disaster, the government will always do number four.  From an individual prospective, it fiscally does not make sense to remodel.  Insurance agencies pay up to 43% for a destructed house.  If you put in twice the money that your house is worth remodeling for earthquake prevention and the house still gets destroyed, you basically double your losses. From an economic standpoint, people are willing to task the risk.  Steinberg notes that a city like San Francisco would need to spend $835 million to save 415 lives.  While you cannot put a dollar amount on a life, neither the city nor an individual will willingly sacrifice that much when it is still a game of chance.  We cannot expect people to live in a bubble or alter their lives completely to construct this bubble.  Californians know their risk and we should all step back praying that they continue to beat the system.