Introduction
The U.S.-Mexican War saw the rapid succession of territorial expansion second only to the Louisiana Purchase. The rise of the prominent tacticians and generals who would forge legendary careers with the outbreak of the Civil War, and once President James K. Polk called for war it created a controversy among Congressional members who viewed it as an opportunity to expand slavery westward. The biggest debate surrounding the war is what is left out of the established narrative, which labels it a glorious and justifiable war? For many years, historians such as Dr. Robert W. Johannsen a J. G. Randall Distinguished Professor of History Emeritus at the University of Illinois, believed the decision to go to war with Mexico war was reluctantly taken by President Polk and his cabinet. Once word was received of the ambush of an American unit north of the Rio Grande in which several lives were lost. Gave the United States a reasonable excuse to call for a state of war. As a result whatever doubts remained were now removed when Polk sent his war message to Congress, and two days later both houses approved a war bill by overwhelming majorities.[1] However, this paper seeks to use new scholarly works to argue that the U.S.-Mexican as an unpopular war, which created controversy among Congressional members and the public alike. In addition, to call for the the advancement of the field to view the war itself as a manufactured war created for the purpose of American imperialism. Resulting in the leaving out of California and Mexican narratives in the newly conquered lands west of Texas. Because it is important to have a complete perspective on the war, which encompasses all narrative, so that scholars and students alike can gain a better understanding as why the war was fought and its effect on the people already living in the lands the U.S. won.
Historiography
On May 11, 1846, President James K. Polk sent a special message to the Congress of the United States for a declaration of war against Mexico. Polk stated that on April 12, Mexican forces at the small border town of Matamoras under the command of General Pedro de Ampudia assumed a belligerent attitude and notified General Zachary Taylor to break up his camp within twenty-four hours and to retire beyond the Nueces River. If Taylor failed to comply with these demands and he would announced that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question. However, April 24 General Mariano Arista, who had succeeded to the command of the Mexican forces engaged with a large body of Taylors troops, and after a short affair sixteen U.S. troops were killed and wounded while reaming men were surrounded and compelled to surrender.[2] As such, Polk argued for the vindication for the rights and defense of the United States for which Congress must recognize the existence of the war. As such, he urged Congress to place the disposition of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. As result of this, message Congress officially declared war on another nation for the second time in the history of the nation. Nevertheless, the actual decision to go to war provoked controversy among the congressional members and the public alike, which seems to have been swept under the rug, do the notion of history books empathizing America’s victory over Mexico and the observation that the majority of American don’t like controversy surrounding military operations like the Iraq War.
Several historians argue that even though the Mexican-American War caused a firestorm of controversy among Congressional party members who called into question was the war necessary. Historians like Associate Professor Michael A. Morrison from the University of Michigan, argues that the Whig Party was committed to a program of controlled, peaceful expansion. However, they became disturbed by Polk’s method of acquiring California and the borderlands of the Southwest. Arguing that the fruits of the war-land hunger, greed, and a widely dispersed population-promised to destroy the social and economic conditions necessary to a virtuous.[3] Whig opposition to the war focused on the geographic landscape and economic but the manipulation of and enslavement of others rooted in a classical tradition that stressed the interdependence of personal autonomy and republican government. This ideology pitted virtues of industry and independence against effects of luxury, and dependency. Believing agriculturalists were, by their nature and circumstances, less given headlong pursuit of private interests at the expense of the public Democrats looked to independent yeomen “as the great and perennial foundation of that Republican our free institutions.”[4] Morrison work is important because he provides the main opposition agonist the war, which is not mentioned in most history books. As such, resulting enthusiasm of going to war questioned the morality that with victory the possibility of slavery expanded to the west became a reality something that the Whigs feared the most.
While other scholars like Assistant Professor of English at the University of South Carolina Lancaster Nicholas Lawrence, believes that this enthusiasm for the United States’ military action in Mexico saturated national discourse and political figures. At all levels of government, along with a virtual armada of newspaper writers and literary authors, responded, argue that even popular writers such to the war as a galvanizing moment. However, writers like Henry David Thoreau criticized the war as being “the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool.”[5] While publishers like the the United StatesMagazine and Democratic Review (the leading producer of literary materials for the Democratic Party) created an editorial entitled “The Peace Movement” in February 1842, two years before the the outbreak of the war clearly laid out the dangers of going to war. By arguing, “What moral right has anyone to oppose his country; to embarrass her operations, when actually engaged in war, if he holds to the right and expediency of ever fighting at all?”[6] What Lawrence argues is that the Review offered a token narrative position which few subscribed regardless of circumstance however it provided the the right of citizens to make meaningful distinctions between “offensive” and “defensive” wars. According to such logic, once Polk placed American troops on the Mexican ground, the time for debate was over.[7] Although not a true historian, Lawrence’s work empathizes the need to look at other sources to gain a better understanding of the disenfranchisement, which boiled over due to Congress’s decision to go to war had on both the American public and politicians alike. Which can be used to advance the field surrounding the war by emphasizing just how unpopular the war was and how the fear of expansion westward was seen as threat to the Union. Rather than the established narrative of seeing western expansion as positive succession of American progress. While political backlash, which Lawrence displays in his article surrounding Congress’s advisement of going to war, creates a parallel warning of what will happen once the United States decides to war that resonates today. Specifically, when he draws attention to how Vice President Al Gore drew a harsh critical connection between the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, and the U.S.-Mexican War for which Gore stated:
“Abraham Lincoln’s experience in elective office consisted of eight years in his state legislature in Springfield, Illinois, and one term in Congress during which he showed the courage and wisdom to oppose the invasion of another country that was popular when it started but later condemned by history.”[8]
Like those who spoke out against the war with Mexico from the beginning, anti-supporters of Operation Iraqi Freedom during its early days would be the victims of a distorted view. However, Lawrence’s work displays how it is necessary to look at these early protests and objections to governmental decisions to advance the our understanding that even having a “reasonable excuses” for a war are is fondly welcomed by everybody in America. Similarly, Associate Professor Dr. J. Javier Rodríguez form the University of North Texas, argues that:
“The war against Mexico stabilized racial narratives of national dichotomies but also intense counter-narratives wherein Mexico and Mexicans were either equivalent Americans defending their republic from invasion, or, in a further extension, and far more disturbing, agents of existential disturbance, standing against the very possibility of meaning itself.”[9]
As such, he points to one of the clearest examples of this kind of agonistic U.S.–Mexican War literature The Biglow Papers. Produced in by James Russell Lowell in 1848, The Biglow Papers are anti-war satire, which are fragmentary diverse pieces that ranged from anti-war critiques, to tongue-in-cheek pro-war rants by immoral politicians, to agonistic essays about language and knowledge. Lowell invents Parson Homer Wilbur who edits the poetry of the equally fictional Hosea Biglow, the titular Yankee farmer whose role in the text is not only to write poetry, but to also rewrite Birdofredum Sawin’s (a fictional Yankee U.S.–Mexican War volunteer) frontline letters into dialect verse.[10] Dr. Rodríguez, argues that these papers represent a silent side of the war, which give a deeper understanding on the various thoughts, feelings, and observations people had on the events surrounding the conflict between U.S. and Mexico rather than those who outwardly supported it. Much like Lawrence’s work empathizes the need to look at the disenfranchisement of both the politicians and the public to gain a better understanding of what the war represented to the individual or a group. Which are often over looking in the grand narrative of the war and its outcome. However, one must not only look at the public opinion to see the disagreement of the U.S. picking a fight with Mexico but to look at those who fought on the frontlines.
According to Dr. Paul Foos from University of North Carolina at Charlotte, what is missing from the grand narrative of the U.S.-Mexican War is the disenfranchise of the many men who volunteer to fight Polk’s war. He argues that the self-conception of soldiers and the differing standards of discipline marked the two branches (regular enlisted men and volunteer) as distinct. Regular army officers were notoriously quick to resort to the lash against miscreant soldiers. In the volunteer regiments solider as the bulwark of national policy, but the despised regulars were chief instrument of those same politicians on launching and prosecuting the Mexican War.[11] Even before the war started, Taylor’s regulars experienced extreme hardships and diseases. Dysentery and fever raged through the camp until one-sixth of the men were on sick report and half suffered from a degree on infirmity.[12] When war was officially declare many cities across the country where divided once the stance of recruitment in regards of the justification on going to war with Mexico. For example, in Ohio anti-war feelings ran high. To the point that an anti war partisan wrote scornfully of the mindless enthusiasm shown by the citizenry, with military parades, cannons booming from boats in the river, and even religious revival meeting held by persists of the God of war, in which excitement has been raised by song as well as speech.[13] While other places like down in New Orleans recruiting reflected political and social hierarchies and conflicts where several sectors of the population opposed the war, but their opposition was scattered and muted.[14] What is important about Dr. Foos’s book is that it calls for the continuation of look at the perceptive views of the individuals, which are not regularly mentioned in the grand narrative of war. By showing, the harsh condition soldiers experienced before and during the war and the anti-war sentiment that popped up in various cities across the Union. Foos expands the notion that war was not a galvanizing monument in which every citizen got behind but rather a war that many were dragged into unwillingly.
Primary Source
The reason why scholars today are urging for a better examination of sources to argue that the U.S.-Mexican War was an unpopular war among Congressional members and the public. Resides in the fact that upon looking at President James K. Polk’s diary one can gather why historians and other scholars now press for a change on how the war should be looked at now. Written between 1845 and 1849, the diary is essential to find out why Polk pushed for war, which caused a firestorm among congressional members and public alike. More importunity it puts in to play on how the war with Mexico should be examined due his ambitions of finishing the conquest of the continent. In which he emphases on gaining the remaining European holdings in the Pacific Northwest and any disputed land left after the Texas Revolution (1835-1836). In his earliest dairy entry dated August 26, 1845, Secretary of State James Buchanan suggested to Polk that the United States assert and enforce their authority in the whole Oregon Territory and settle on a comprise between the border of the U.S. and Canada on the 49th parallel of the north latitude. However, when the British government refused the comprise Polk became infuriated that he was dined access to the Pacific and that rejection to him meant he would no longer give Britain peace. When Buchanan told Polk that if he were to carry out such intentions the U.S. would have war; to which Polk replied, “If we do have war it will not be our fault.”[15] This makes it clear that if Polk wanted any land he would resort to declaring war fortunately the subsequent the acquisition of the Oregon Territory was bloodless and was resolved with the signing of the Oregon Treaty in 1846. However, when Polk turned his attention to the southwest his wanting for land pulled the United States into an actual war.[16] Is this curial to understand why scholars today want to argue for the revaluation of the war self as unpopular war.
From his diary, we can see that Polk had established intentions on the possible acquisition of California seven months before war was officially declared against Mexico. During a cabinet meeting on Friday October 24, 1845, in which they discussed the dispute over the Oregon Territory, Polk recognized that California played a key role in the balance of power in the Pacific and argued that the United would not permit Britain or any other European monarchy to establish any new colony. Since he believed, the Monroe Doctrine gave him the justification to take California and its fine San Francisco Bay in addition to Oregon.[17] As such, he sent Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the Marine Corps on a secret mission to the American counsel in California Monterey where he was instructed to inform Thomas Larkin to persuade California to secede from Mexico but it did not work.[18]
On February 13, 1846, a man by the name of A. J. Atocha visited Polk on behalf of the exiled Mexican President Antonio López de Santa Anna who was in favor of establishing a new treaty which adjusted the boundary between the US and Mexico. Atocha stated that Santa Anna was willing to adjust the boundary in the way that the Del Norte would be the western Texas line and the Colorado of the West down through the San Francisco Bay to the sea will be the Mexican line for the price of thirty million dollars.[19] However, from the diary we learn that Polk never trusted Atocha and disregarded the offer. Instead, the only terms Polk would ever accept were his own when the relations between the U.S. and Mexico began to deteriorate by April due the establishment of the new government in Mexico by General Mariano Paredes who rejected Polk’s offering of a multimillion-dollar payment to negotiate a new treaty. In addition, to receiving word that Senator John Slidell of Louisiana was denied entering Mexico in which Polk called for Congressional legislation to be adopted to remedy the injuries and wrongs they had suffered.[20]
This diary entry alone opens the door on how scholars can see how Polk looked at this situation as an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. With the refusal of Mexico to negotiate and the rejection Senator Slidell, Polk wanted war in order to finally claim California for the U.S. and insert American authority firmly on the continent. However, this is where the debate gets murky in regards to Polk’s involvement in the actual start of the war. Did he purposely send troops down to the disputed borderlands to start the fighting or was it an actual attack by Mexican forces that lead to war? Although Polk never mentions having perpetuated any wrongdoing he does make it perfectly clear that the entire objective in going to war with Mexico was not for conquest however in actuality:
“It was clear that in making peace we would if practicable obtain California and such other portion of the Mexican territory as would be sufficient to indemnify our claimants on Mexico and defray the expense of the war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries had forced us to wage.”[21]
This passage completely changes the perceptive of the war that is either missing in history books or in other scholarly articles how we should remember the war itself. Yes, some do argue it was a means of spreading slavery but this idea was never an issue because the passage of an appropriation bill on August 10, 1846, which prohibited slaveholding in the newly acquired territory and even Polk, recognized that slavery would not work in the new provinces.[22] More importantly, it was not fought for the retribution for the soldiers killed near the border but for the long awaited ability for Polk to claim the land he wanted. The land he felt was rightfully his in the name of American progress and expansion. Especially when Polk remarked that when it came time to make a treaty with Mexico he found that he could obtain a boundary from the mouth of the Rio Grande west to the Pacific by paying a few million more.[23]
Armed with Polk’s diary historians and other scholars can pick apart the narrative that Polk and his cabinet reluctantly declared war. Then establish a new narrative that supports the notion that war itself was manufactured for for the sole the purpose of American imperialism because Polk deemed it his right to do so. More importantly, historians and other scholars can use Polk’s dairy to argue for the need to look at repercussions of Polk’s desire for war. For example, Polk wanted to firmly insert American authority on the continent however, he never mentioned what will happen to the Califorino and Mexican residents already living in the lands he desired the most once the war began. Nor does he express concern for the thousand of American soldiers who fought in his war.
Expanding the Field
What missing in the grand narrative of the Mexican-American War is the lack of sources from the Mexican side of the conflict. Which sites up another debate as to if we are going to discuss or write about the Mexican-American should we include Mexican sources and narratives. In addition, to the personal accounts of the U.S. Amered Forces that fought the in campaigns . To which one should argue that yes, they are needed to tell the complete story of the war and break with older traditional narratives. That painted an empire in ruins that fed call for the conquest and assimilation of the region, which was under absolute control of the Apaches.[24] Although there is thousand of websites and archives available on the web. One that can be extremely valuable in expanding the need to exclude Mexican, Californio, and U.S. Army sources and narratives is the Digital History: Using New Technologies to Enhance Teaching and Research. This website was designed and developed to support the teaching of American History in K-12 schools and colleges and is supported by the College of Education at the University of Houston. The site includes a U.S. history textbook; over 400 annotated documents from the Gilder Lehrman Collection, supplemented by primary sources on slavery, Asian American, Mexican American, and Native American history. In addition to having severally sources regarding U.S. political, social, and legal history.[25] With a simple click of a mouse, a student can easily find what he or she is looking for when it comes to the U.S.-Mexican War which can expand help expand their understanding of the importance of primary sources to tell the complete story of the war and break with older traditional narratives. Historians like, Dr. Lisbeth Haas from the University of California, Santa Cruz, seeks to uncover the unexplored accounts of the Californios who have been largely forgotten form the war’s narrative. As such, she argues Californios fought wage a long campaign to create and protect their political autonomy in territorial affairs and would not allow either Mexico or the U.S. to erode their sovereignty without significant resistance. Even those who sympathized with the United States’ republican system and democratic ideals would express a strong sense of having been deceived by Americans whose race ideas were pervasively expressed against them during the war and occupation.[26] Californios’ tactics of resistance to U.S. occupation involved most of the resident population moving their cattle and other livestock from the coast. To enable American access to fresh meat, but leaving behind enough for the Californios who travel without supplies. While Califorinio wives hide troops at great risk to their families, pleaded for the lives of their loved ones, and prepared the ground for negotiations that would enable Califorinio citizenry to exercise their civil rights once the war was over.[27] These tactics enabled the outnumbered and overpowered Californio troops to hold positions for months while American forces prepared a counter attack. What is important about Dr. Hass’s work is that it stresses the importance of giving agency to individuals who represent the silent side of the war, which can give a deeper understanding on the various thoughts, feelings, and observations surrounding the conflict between U.S. and Mexico.
Speaking of the conflict, what also needs to be further expanded upon in regards of the U.S.-Mexican War is the notion that the war did not guarantee an immediate U.S. victory. According to Dr. Irving W. Levison from the University of Texas of Rio Grande Valley, the conflict between the United States and Mexico was the first U.S. war in which military victory over the foe’s conventional army failed to produce the desired outcome.[28] Unlike Ulysses S. Grant who to mentioned in his memories that the war was a one sided affair that saw a stronger nation crushing a much weaker opponent.[29] Dr. Levison argues that in fact, the U.S. Army needed some degree of Mexican civilian acquiescence’s to survive the long march to Mexico City. He explains that General Winfield Scott instructed to his troops could succeed on their march, only if those civilians residing along his line agreed to supply provisions. Consequently, he ordered his men to pay for all provisions they obtain. To which Mexican forces recognized the invaders depended upon the countryside r, Presidente Sustituto (Substitute President) Pedro Maria Anayasigned a decree calling for the establishment of a Light Corps to function as part of the National Guard, which would be to operate behind the U.S. Army.[30] The resulting harassment of Mexican force combined with the harsh condition soldiers experienced before and during the war to which Dr. Paul Foos in his book Levison attributes volunteers taking out their anger and frustration upon civilians.[31] This mistreatment in turn triggered Mexican forces in Mexico City to fight so fiercely that Scott threatened to burn down the entire city and allow U.S. troops to freely pillage if the firing did not cease.[32] Although U.S. forces ultimately prove victorious in the war Dr. Levison’s articles is important because it urges that the war was not a simple one-sided affair. Rather a long drawn out fight in which Mexican forces had to be driven from to house, square to square while they left their dead behind.[33] That only ended diplomatic intervention to helped speed up the process of signing a treaty. When the U.S. government offered to Mexico subbed revolts that erupted during its conflict with the U.S. Army.[34]
Once hostilities ceased on May 7, 1848 with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Polk finally gained the land he rightfully his in the name of American progress and expansion; but what would he do with it. If one looks at the establish narrative the conclusion of U.S.-Mexican War opened the door to western expansion to the Pacific. However, what is missing from the narrative is the complex history of life along the newly border and territories. Even though the treaty designated and established a new border between the U.S. and Mexico that will be religiously respected by both countries.[35] According to Associate Professor of History Dr. Rachel St. John, what treaty did not motioned was how difficult it was for the commission to impose the boundary line and the sovereign authority it represented on the ground.[36] Despite the existence of customs regulations and tariffs commodities, animals, and people crossed the border freely through illegal means. Similarly to Dr. St. John assessment on the need to expand the narrative of U.S.-Mexican War to reflect lives in the borderlands. Dr. Samuel Truett establishes the notion that within this landscape of greed, gunfights, and bandits networks of corporate and state powers supported shadow pathways oriented around the local lives of Mexican smelter workers, Yaqui miners, Chinese farmers, U.S. colonist, and others. These human webs kept the borderlands in motion, even if states and corporations bent their collective will lashing the harsh and fugitive terrain to the managerial foundations of modern America.[37]
Conclusion
In conclusion, new scholarly works argue that the U.S.-Mexican as an unpopular war, which created controversy among Congressional members and the public alike. However, beyond the need to establish the narrative that the war its self was not popular it is necessary to examine the individuals who are left on the on fringes. In order to gain a greater understanding on the grand narrative of the war we must look voices of soldiers, citizens, and the renegades that inhabited the land that President Polk deemed rightfully his. In doing so can we effectively gauge the impact the war from coast to coast and the hidden sorties that dot the harsh landscape along the border.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Conway, Chistopher, ed. The U.S.-Mexican War: A Binational Reader. Translated by Gustavo Pellon. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2010.
Grant, Ulysses. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. Volume 1 New York, Charles L. Webster & Company, 1885.
Lookingbill, Brad, ed. American Military History: A Documentary Reader. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
Polk, James and Allan Nevins. Polk: the Diary of a President, 1845-1849: Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California and the Southwest New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1968.
Secondary
Foos, Paul. A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican-American War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Haas, Lisbeth. “War in California, 1846-1848.” California History 76, no. 2/3 (1997): 331-355.
Johannsen, Robert Walter. To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Lawrence, Nicholas. ““This boa-constrictor appetite of swallowing states and provinces:” Anti- Imperialist Opposition to the U.S./Mexican War.” South Central Review 30, no. 1 (Spring, 2013): 55-82.
Levinson, Irving. “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War.”Journal of Military History 73, no 2(2009): 393-416.
Morrison, Michael. “New Territory versus No Territory: The Whig Party and the Politics of Western Expansion, 1846-1848,” Western Historical Quarterly 23, no. 1 (1992).
Rodríguez, J. Javier. “The U.S.-Mexican War in James Russell Lowell’s the Bigelow Papers.” Arizona Quarterly: A Journal of American Literature, Culture, and Theory 65, no. 3 (2007): 1-33.
Simmons, Edwin. “The Secret Mission Of Archibald Gillespie.” Marine Corps Association Foundation. Last modified November 1968. Accessed December 1, 2016. https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/secret-mission-archibald-gillespie.
St. John, Rachel. Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011
Truett, Samuel. Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2006.
Unknown. “Digital History: Using New Technologies to Enhance Teaching and Research.” The College of Education at the University of Huston. Last modified 2016. Accessed October 2, 2016 tp://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu.
[1] Robert Walter Johannsen, To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 8.
[2] Brad Lookingbill, ed, American Military History: A Documentary Reader (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 112-13.
[3] Michael A. Morrison, “New Territory versus No Territory: The Whig Party and the Politics of Western Expansion, 1846-1848,” Western Historical Quarterly 23, no. 1 (February 1992): 28.
[4] Michael A. Morrison, “New Territory versus No Territory,” 29-30.
[5] Nicholas Lawrence, ““This boa-constrictor appetite of swallowing states and provinces:” Anti-Imperialist Opposition to the U.S./Mexican War,” South Central Review 30, no. 1 (2013): 55-56.
[6] Nicholas Lawrence, ““This boa-constrictor appetite of swallowing states and provinces,” 60.
[8] Nicholas Lawrence, ““This boa-constrictor appetite of swallowing states and provinces:” Anti-Imperialist Opposition to the U.S./Mexican War,” South Central Review 30, no. 1 (2013): 75.
[9] J. Javier Rodríguez, “The U.S.-Mexican War in James Russell Lowell’s the Bigelow Papers,” Arizona Quarterly: A Journal of American Literature, Culture, and Theory, 63.3 (2007): 2.
[10] J. Javier Rodríguez, “The U.S.-Mexican War in James Russell Lowell’s the Bigelow Papers,” 7.
[11] Paul W. Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican-American War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 13.
[12] Paul W. Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair, 17-18
[13] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk: the Diary of a President, 1845-1849: Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California and the Southwest (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1968), 48.
[14] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk, 52.
[15] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk: the Diary of a President, 1845-1849: Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California and the Southwest (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1968), 2-3.
[16] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk, 116.
[18] Edwin H. Simmons,”The Secret Mission Of Archibald Gillespie,” Marine Corps Association Foundation, November 1968, accessed December 1, 2016, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/secret-mission-archibald-gillespie; James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk: the Diary of a President, 1845-1849: Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California and the Southwest (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1968), 22.
[19] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk, 50-2.
[21] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk: the Diary of a President, 1845-1849: Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California and the Southwest (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1968), 91.
[22] James Polk and Allan Nevins, Polk, 138; 183.
[24] Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press), 37.
[25] Unknown, “Digital History: Using New Technologies to Enhance Teaching and Research.” The College of Education at the University of Huston, last modified 2016, accessed October 2, 2016 tp://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu.
[26] Lisbeth Haas, “War in California, 1846-1848,” California History 76, no. 2/3 (1997): 336-337.
[27] Lisbeth Haas, “War in California, 1846-1848,” 343.
[28] Irving Levinson, “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War, “Journal of Military History 73, no 2(April 2009): 393.
[29] Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Volume 1 (New York, Charles L. Webster & Company, 1885), 54.
[30] Irving Levinson, “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict,” 400.
[32] Irving Levinson, “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War,” Journal of Military History 73, no 2(2009): 408-409.
[33] Chistopher Conway, ed. The U.S.-Mexican War: A Binational Reader (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing company: 2010), 100.
[34] Irving Levinson, “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War,” 411.
[35] Chistopher Conway, ed. The U.S.-Mexican War, 128.
[36] Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 22.
[37] Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press), 103.