Acknowledgment vs. Preparation: The Johnstown Flood

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David McCullough’s casual approach to historical authenticity is questionable at some points. For example, it would be to difficult to verify the scene where Johnstown telegraph agent Frank Deckert read the telegraph concerning the South Fork Dam breaking and “laughed out loud” (87). Even though he bases his narrative more on speculation than exact eyewitness accounts, McCullough illustrates the important point in this scenario: Deckert had little concern about the dam breaking, as it was a rumor that he had heard dozens of times before. It is a trend that McCullough highlights: many people acknowledged the dangers that the South Fork Dam and Lake Conemaugh presented, saying that “not a house in town would be left standing” should the dam give way (158). Nevertheless, the preparation process in case of this scenario was appallingly mismanaged. This issue of acknowledgment versus preparation is vitally significant in not only the Johnstown flood, but in innumerable disasters throughout history. How could so much risk be universally accepted, yet not be addressed directly and seriously?

McCullough presents a compelling, if not simple, answer: diffusion of responsibility. As Alexandra noted earlier, McCullough notes in Chapters 4-6 how this lack of proper communication and responsibility contributed directly to damage and to deaths. The risk was so great and so imminent that the region’s residents simply presumed that efforts at inspection and communication were conducted by a higher body. Townsfolk assumed that local officials kept an eye on the dam, and local officials assumed that the South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club managed the dam’s affairs. No clear authority was established for the safety of the dam; therefore, the telegraph agents interpreted the warnings before the collapse as hogwash and rumor rather than official decree. Even railroad magnate Robert Pitcairn did not know if he should trust the transmissions, as he doubted Colonel Unger’s capabilities and “simply paid little attention to any reports…as they had been made perhaps nearly every year” (174). The “Crying Wolf” scenario plays a big role here, but leaves another gaping question: If Pitcairn (a SFFHC member) was untrustworthy of reports about the dam, why didn’t he make an effort to make the reports more reliable or improve the communication? He acknowledged the problem, but made no effort to ameliorate it. Such is the mistake – often fatal –  that McCullough emphasizes throughout his analysis of the flood.