hubris – American Disasters

March 24, 2014December 16, 2020

Distinctions between Blame and Responsibility in Fradkin’s The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906

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From his title alone—The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: How San Francisco Nearly Destroyed Itself—we can identify one of Fradkin’s main arguments: much of the damage wrought during the earthquake and firestorms was self-inflicted by those in charge in San Francisco. Fradkin identifies a number of different ways the leadership in San Francisco failed those it served. 300 distribution mains and 23,200 connecting pipes that spread water throughout the town were fractured, so firemen could not extinguish the fires with water (72). Firemen, instead of miners who had experience with explosives, tried (and failed) to fight fire with fire (76). Acting Commander Funston marched troops into the town with no orders to do so, leading civilians to believe they were under Marshall law and to an unclear chain of command (63). Mayor Schmitz ordered that all looters be shot on sight since there was no place for a prison (67).

Fradkin clearly conveys to his readers that these would have been avoidable occurrences had there been better preparation for earthquakes and fires, fewer class/language barriers, and more communication between government and people. However, the tone of this article is much more understanding and forgiving than narratives we have recently read about the Galveston Hurricane, which as Jeremiah points out implied a degree of hubris that I now associate with most Gilded Age disasters. While Fradkin notes that other towns looked down on San Francisco as being a “sinful city,” he does so in a remarkably objective manner, citing a poem advertising a whisky store which made light of the city’s poor reputation (171). He also tempers the argument that damage was self-inflicted with a counterargument that several aspects of the 1906 San Francisco fire were competently dealt with. Navy Lieutenant Frederick N. Freeman, Fradkin argues, saved the waterfront of San Francisco, providing a safe supply line for relief to enter the city (172).

I think Fradkin uses this disaster to separate blame from institutional and cultural disparities. For example, he does not blame any group or individual for the tragic inequality of experience felt by members of the clubs and inhabitants of Chinatown. Instead, Fradkin points to the commonalities between the two cultures in claiming that both sought places to worship. Although Fradkin points to racism, he often does so in the passive voice: “Few Asians were counted as victims. It was as if they did not exist” (110-111). Although I’m not sure whether or not I agree that we should separate blame from institutional and cultural disparities, I think this text is distinct from others we have read thus far.

March 17, 2014December 16, 2020

Lack of Preparedness and the Hubris of Men

After reading A.J.’s post, I think he correctly identifies preparedness as being one of the most important issues regarding this disaster. Like the Johnstown Flood, the Galveston Hurricane seemed to have caught its victims by surprise. Due to the shoddy forecasting ability of meteorologists in this period, the citizens of Galveston were shocked by the storm’s devastation. Similar to the citizens of Johnstown, the Galveston residents mistakenly diagnosed the flooding as a normal occurrence. The stories of children playing in the floodwaters and the general feeling of a business as usual atmosphere are similar in both disasters.

The notion of preparedness will probably be a topic that we discuss extensively in class tomorrow. Clearly, Galveston was not prepared for the hurricane in 1900. One of the most obvious reasons is the lack of viable information about the impending storm. According to the experts, this storm was supposed to move north rather than northeast towards Texas. Only later would they acknowledge that the storm was headed towards Texas, but still insisted that the storm would not be much to worry about. The lack of information coupled with what Larson calls, “the hubris of men” made this massive storm even more deadly.

Larson’s notion of “the hubris of men” is an important idea to analyze. Similar to other disasters that we have studied in class, the Galveston Hurricane featured men that believed they had conquered nature and were summarily reminded that they had not. Disregard for the power of nature seems to be a reoccurring theme during this period. The Galveston Hurricane served as a wake up call of sorts for these men. After the hurricane a seawall was built and engineers raised the height of the city with jacks. The Galveston Hurricane made it clear that man had not conquered nature.

Finally, I want to comment on why Isaac Cline is given possession of this storm by Larson. It seems ambiguous while reading Isaac’s Storm as to whether Isaac is being blamed for the storm or is being defended. Larson points out that Cline may have saved thousands of lives by warning residents of houses near the gulf that a storm was coming. Conversely, Larson details how Cline ignored the signs the storm presented and chose to minimize its severity. Rather than condemning or praising Isaac Cline, Larson seems to want,” to explore the lives of history’s little men.” The phrase “history’s little men” would obviously hurt the feelings of the far-from modest Isaac Cline, but helps readers to understand why Larson chose to frame the Galveston Hurricane around Isaac Cline.

March 17, 2014December 16, 2020

Waitin on a Sunny Day

As the rain pours on Davidson’s campus, students shuffle into the Union to dry off like wet dogs after a swim in the lake. This weather sucks. This accumulation might reach an inch by the end of the day, and we’re all tired of it. Fortunately, I’m jammin to The Boss, so I really don’t have a care in the world. Isaac Cline, however, didn’t have the luxury of Bruce Springsteen and witnessed something drastically more intense than our little drizzle. This hurricane is the deadliest in American history and ranks as the second costliest. The rain caused by the hurricane was significant, but proved harmful when coupled with the extraordinarily high windspeeds and a massive storm surge.

Larson’s book was more interesting to me than to most of esteemed classmates because I chose the Galveston Hurricane for my research topic. I’m also a numbers guy, so when I read winds over 120+ mph or 6,000 people died or the storm surge was 16 feet high, those statistics resonate with me. Think about it. Try sticking your hand (or head) out the window while driving on I-77 at two thirds the speed of the winds, yet one can still feel the wind’s power and control. Think about three times Davidson’s campus (all your friends, collegeues, lunch ladies, and professors) dead. Imagine water that all of a sudden reaches and submerges the first two floors of Chambers with class still in session. Powerful stuff.

My favorite aspect of Larson’s portrayal of this event was the inclusion of the history of hurricanes from a meteorological perspective. I enjoyed learning what causes the waves of hurricanes and how hurricanes were viewed during this period. Maybe I’m a nerd, but I think this gives the story a more historical science approach and showed the depth of Larson’s research. However, Larson probably intended for me to gain some other message from the book than an appreciation for his research. Unlike my good friend, AJ, I’ll tackle the issue (eh? See what I did there? Football analogy for a football player). The hubris of the period astounds me, although I guess it shouldn’t because that’s been a consistent theme throughout this class. The national weather service was new and wanted to assert itself as an accurate weather forcaster, but continued to hinder its rise to respectability with inaccurate weather reports. So, when the Cubans tried to warn Americans of the storm’s path, the Americans were too arrogant to believe them. To borrow a phrase from Captain Gene Mauch in The Other Guys, “shake your *hands*, this *waving* contest is over.” If the Americans in the weather service put aside their egos and listened to the voices of experience, many lives may have been saved. I think the city would suffer substantial damage either way, but many lives could have been saved with an accurate warning. One aspect of the story that I don’t understand was the timing of the storm. Now we’re able to plot the path of the storm with satellites and all that good stuff, but shouldn’t they have been able to know the speed of the storm and figure out its trajectory from there? If the storm is moving at 15 mph and it hasn’t hit Florida, hasn’t hit Louisiana, so it must be headed further out and going for Houston area. I’d have to draw a map to better show my point, but somebody dropped the ball in my opinion.

Lastly, Larson humanized the book, which increased the story’s potency. Reading the scene of the first train trying to make it back to the island with references to the debris, especially a child’s toy, was quite sobering. Furthermore, Joseph’s dog miraculously staying with his family after the house fell apart only to jump back in the water out of duty to the missing member of the family. Animal deaths always get to me because of their innocence. Obviously Larson intended for that moment to be heart-wrenching and worded the story in such a way, but it works. Many of Larson’s stories were chosen for that purpose and makes this story more of a narrative than an academic work. Although, much like the Johnstown Flood by McCulloh, I think it’s an excellent source to use.